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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to situate our reading of the Platonic dialogue 
Alcibiades Major among both ancient and modern readings of the dialogue. Since the 
nineteenth century the issue of authenticity has preoccupied most modern commentators 
of the dialogue, but from all reasonable evidence, commentators from the ancient world 
had no such qualms about attributing the authorship of Alcibiades Major to Plato. Our 
reading of Alcibiades Major is in line with modern commentators who take both the 
dialogue’s dramatic features and educative value seriously, while not ignoring that in 
some quarters Alcibiades Major’s authorship is still in dispute.  
Our treatment of Alcibiades Major differs from the attention given to it by past 
and present commentators, because it is our desire to see the ideas—expressed in the 
dialogue with such enthusiasm by Socrates and Alcibiades—entertained in a number of 
different contexts. For this reason we have titled the dissertation Socratic Encounters: 
Plato’s Alcibiades, with each chapter designed to facilitate a kind of cross-fertilization of 
ideas from a variety of intellectual perspectives. Looking at the dialogue from various 
perspectives has allowed us to cast some new light on the dialogue from which other 
commentators may benefit.  
The objective of the dissertation to highlight Alcibiades Major’s timeless insights 
and enduring relevance to contemporary issues, has led us on a course that revolves 
around pedagogy. The Platonic dialogues are gold-mines of insight, but knowing this to 
be the case does not answer the fundamental question: ‘What did Plato intend to teach us 
by writing Alcibiades Major?’ The dissertation goes to great lengths to provide answers 
to the question, and the answers it provides take unusual approaches. For example, Plato 
invites us to consider five issues in Alcibiades Major: appropriate listening, priorities, 
tradition, hypothetical questions, and women’s role in male achievement. The dialogue is 
not limited to these five issues, but the dialogue cannot be seriously dealt with without 
2 
 
considering them. What does Plato intend to teach us about listening? We provide an 
answer to the question in chapter two, ‘Listening in Plato’s Alcibiades Major and 
Plutarch.’ Whereas most commentators think that Socrates’ conversation with Alcibiades 
was contrived to show that Alcibiades was corrupt prior to their meeting, we argue that 
Alcibiades’ encounter with Socrates would have been beneficial if Alcibiades would have 
listened appropriately to what was being said to him. Thus, Plato intends for us to see that 
listening can be a source of moral uplift or a source of corruption.  
The speech in the center of Alcibiades Major, the Spartan and Persian Speech, is 
crucial to the dialogue. Women figure prominently in the speech. In chapter six, 
‘Women, Moral Insight and Marriage,’ we account for the prominence of women in the 
speech  by arguing that women provide moral insight regarding male goals and 
achievement. Plato intends to teach us that Alcibiades’ goals can be realized only by 
considering the opinions of him held by the mothers, daughters, and wives of his 
competitors. These are just two examples of the dissertation’s approach to what Plato 
intends to teach us in Alcibiades Major.  
 
I. Historical Survey of what Prominent Commentators have said about Alcibiades Major 
Up until the nineteenth century the dialogue Alcibiades Major was considered by 
ancient and medieval thinkers to be a primer for those interested in philosophy proper, 
and the Platonic corpus in particular (Denyer 2001, 14-15; cf. Alfarabi 1962, 53-54). The 
Middle Platonists (c. the first century B.C. through the second century A.D.) placed 
Alcibiades Major at the head of a number of reading programs. In particular, the Middle 
Platonist Albinus wrote a short preface to the Platonic dialogues titled Prologue to 
Platonic Philosophy1 which gives three explanations for the prominence given to 
Alcibiades Major: (1) It teaches us to know ourselves as a rational soul. The soul is the 
true self (auto) that remains the same and remains the true subject of our actions. Thus, 
                                                        
1 See Julia Annas’ Townsend Lectures on the Middle Platonist in Platonic Ethics, Old and New (1999). 
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we must see the body as the instrument of the soul;2 (2) It is protreptic. The dialogue 
seductively exhorts Alcibiades and the reader to turn towards philosophy;3 and (3) The 
dialogue is maieutic. Socrates helps Alcibiades give birth to some truth within himself by 
drawing out and clarifying his ideas.  
However, the authenticity of Alcibiades Major was called into question by the 
German theologian Ernst Friedrich Schleiermacher (1836, 328-336) who deemed its 
literary quality unworthy of Plato. That Schleiermacher is aware of going against 
centuries of special praise accorded to Alcibiades Major is acknowledged in the opening 
pages of his commentary. He attributes the praise given to Alcibiades Major to learned 
authors, both ancient and modern, who themselves, ‘unable to invent anything original’ 
have preserved the ‘honor and dignity’ of learned men who have judged Alcibiades 
Major to be an authentic Platonic dialogue (328). These learned men, according to 
Schleiermacher, only proceed in deference to the tradition that esteems the dialogue. He 
goes on to say that he will gain little from being the ‘first to communicate doubts of this 
kind, and to explain the grounds of them,’ but it is imperative for him not to shrink from 
declaring his opinion on the merits of the dialogue (329). The grounds of 
Schleiermacher’s challenge to the historical prominence of the dialogue is on display in 
the following remarks: 
 This little work, which, with those who are accustomed to admire in the gross, 
 has been ever a subject of most especial commendation, appears to us but very 
 insignificant and poor, and that to such a degree, that we cannot ascribe it to  
 Plato, even though any number of these who think they can swear to his spirit, 
 profess most vividly to apprehend it in this dialogue. (329-330) 
                                                        
2 This also accounts for the subtitle Thrasyllus has given the dialogue ‘On the Nature of Man’. True 
happiness is knowing one’s true self. On Thrasyllus see Tarrant 2000, 118-123.  
3 Up until Hellenistic philosophy, all of Greek philosophy was protreptik—it proselytized. This idea is 
made delightfully clear by Vlastos 1991, 200-232. 
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The specific reasons for Schleiermacher’s negative reception of the dialogue reads like a 
laundry list, but the list can be condensed in to one major complaint: want of uniformity 
in both literary structure and Socratic characterization. 
 Schleiermacher believed the dialogue contained genuine Platonic passages, which 
he does not cite throughout his commentary, but amid many other ‘worthless’ passages 
that read like little ‘broken dialogues’ (330). Even among the Platonic passages, he felt as 
if their literary effect was perfunctory (‘shell-like’, 331), designed to echo other genuine 
Platonic dialogues. When Schleiermacher turns to the want of uniformity in the 
characterization of Socrates in Alcibiades Major his criticism is more pointed, but not as 
much as one would hope considering the impression of his ideas on subsequent 
commentators of the dialogue. That Socrates is not the Platonic Socrates found in Plato’s 
genuine dialogues is witnessed, Schleiermacher believed, in the opening remarks 
Socrates makes to Alcibiades (103a-104c) and the depiction of  Socrates converting 
Alcibiades in the course of the dialogue from a hubris-filled youth to a submissive 
sycophant. In the opening pages of the dialogue we hear Socrates tell Alcibiades that he 
has been observing him for some time, and that it was a divine being that prevented him 
from speaking to Alcibiades sooner. Schleiermacher found it unagreeable that Socrates 
would introduce himself with such a long speech, and utterly unworthy of him to admit 
that he had been observing Alcibiades for a long period of time (334). As for 
Schleiermacher’s complaint about the conversion experienced by Alcibiades in the course 
of the dialogue, he only mentions in passing that Socrates ‘does not show that he alone 
has the power of teaching Alcibiades what he stands in need of… .’ (331). We will see 
this particular criticism reappear in other commentaries that are skeptical of Alcibiades 
Major’s authenticity. Schleiermacher also found it un-Socratic that in discussing the 
virtues and the riches of the Persians and Lacedaemonians in the Spartan and Persian tale, 
Socrates does not make the irony in his laudatory description more apparent. 
Schleiermacher goes on to point out that the ‘statistical notices’ displayed in dwelling 
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upon the virtues of the Spartans, for example, is more in the manner of Xenophon than 
Plato. Additionally, he faults the characterization of Socrates as being eristic. Socrates 
constantly intrudes on the subject matter, ‘breaking off the subject shorter than is his 
custom’ simply to shame Alcibiades (333). Schleiermacher concludes his commentary by 
speculating about the origins of the Alcibiades Major. He believed that a pupil may have 
gotten hold of a rough draft of the dialogue Plato rejected, Plato having deciding instead 
to distribute the ideas contained in it to other dialogues, and inserted ‘foreign additions,’ 
the effect of which is it lacks uniformity (336). 
Schleiermacher’s judgment of the dialogue as inauthentic4 was highly influential, 
and the dialogue soon fell out of favor. This is not to say that Alcibiades Major was 
declared inauthentic across the board at the time. A contemporary of Schleiermacher, the 
English utilitarian philosopher George Grote (1864, 331-363) addresses some of the 
concerns Schleiermacher had about the inauthenticity of the dialogue, but found the 
dialogue (including the lesser known Alcibiades Minor) to be ‘perfectly Socratic both in 
topics and manner’ (355). Grote concedes that Alcibiades Minor is ‘inferior in merit’ 
(350)5 compared to Plato’s better known dialogues, but he accounts for its deficiency by 
speculating that it was probably an early production, having been written between 399-
390 B.C. A concern of Schleiermacher’s that Grote echoes is the incompatible depiction 
of Alcibiades as inordinately insolent to Socrates’ entreaties and the inordinate 
submissiveness towards Socrates ascribed to Alcibiades as the dialogue unfolds. Grote’s 
response is that it is highly improbable to have such a conjunction in an interlocutor, but 
it attests to the larger point that ‘Plato attributes to the personality and conversation of 
Socrates an influence magical and almost superhuman’ (354). 
                                                        
4 See Pangle 1987, 1-19 and Denyer 2001, 14-26 on the debate of authenticity surrounding Alcibiades 
Major.  
5 In commenting on the literary quality of Alcibiades Major, Grote says the following: 
 …we find an excessive repetition of specializing illustrations, often needless and sometimes  
tiresome: a defect easily intelligible if we assume them to have been written when Plato was still a 
novice in the art of dialogic composition. (355)  
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Other prominent commentators have been tepid towards Alcibiades Major in light 
of Schleiermacher’s comments, despite its prominence in the ancient world. For example, 
Paul Shorey (1933, 415-418) acknowledges that it was once considered to be the best 
introduction to Platonic philosophy, but concerning its authenticity ‘it is inadvisable to 
dogmatize’ (415). In spite of the disclaimer, Shorey’s overall comments on Alcibiades 
Major indirectly weights in on the side of Schleiermacher due to his portrayal of it as a an 
exceptional case or a scholastic gloss on ideas convincingly expressed in Plato’s other 
dialogues. Shorey comments: 
 But if we attribute it to Plato we have to assume the improbability that he 
 thought it worth while to elaborate a tedious, if scholastically convenient, 
 summary of a long series of ideas and points that are better and more interest- 
ingly expressed in other dialogues, and that he repeats or quotes himself more 
often than in any other genuine work, and we must be prepared to overlook a  
few expressions which jar on the ear of any reader who knows intimately 
Platonic Greek. (415) 
Shorey does cite as significant two ideas in Alcibiades Major that he finds expressed 
more clearly there than in any other Platonic dialogues. The first is that the body is the 
instrument of the soul, which is the true self; the second is that as the eye can see itself 
only through reflection, so the mind best knows itself through the reflection of its 
thoughts in another mind6 (415). 
                                                        
6 Cf. Aristotle’s treatment of this idea in Magna Moralia (1231a13-26), where the value of friends is 
considered: 
 Since then it is both a most difficult thing, as some of the sages have said, to attain a knowledge 
 Of oneself, and also a most pleasant (for to know oneself is pleasant)—now we are not able to 
 to see what we are from ourselves (and that we cannot do so is plain from the way in 
 which we blame others without being aware that we do the same things ourselves; and this is 
 the effect of favor or passion, and there are many of us who are blinded by these things so that 
 we judge not aright); as then when we wish to see our own face, we do so by looking in to the  
 mirror, in the same way when we wish to know ourselves we can obtain that knowledge by look- 
 ing at our friend. For the friend is, as we assert, a second self. If, then, it is pleasant to know  
 oneself, an it is not possible to know this without having some one else for a friend, the self- 
 sufficing man will require friendship in order to know himself. 
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 The now conventional reading of Alcibiades Major as a spurious Platonic 
dialogue, or at best, an incomplete work written by an immature Plato, held sway from 
the early nineteenth century (1836) up to the late twentieth century (1964). The 
commentator who seriously challenged the conventional reading of the dialogue with as 
much positive enthusiasm for the philosophical and literary merits of Alcibiades Major 
and Plato’s authorship of the dialogue as Schleiermacher expressed disdain and doubt, 
was the classical scholar and philosopher Paul Friedlander (1964, 231-243). The 
uniqueness of Friedlander’s commentary is that what was considered by previous 
commentators to be Alcibiades Major’s literary weaknesses and odd characterization of 
Socrates becomes a complex type of writing characterized by dramatic irony.7 
Friedlander’s dramatic reading of the dialogue has yielded valuable insights, and, as we 
will see in part two, has influenced subsequent commentators of the dialogue who are not 
concerned as much with its authenticity as they are with its educative value. In order to 
maintain continuity in the progression witnessed in the readings of Alcibiades Major we 
will structure our appraisal of Friedlander’s commentary as a response to the criticism we 
have heard from the previous three commentators, and then discuss two ideas brought out 
by Friedlander that have set him apart from these same commentators.    
 Friedlander begins his commentary by acknowledging that in antiquity ‘there was 
no doubt about Plato’s authorship’ of Alcibiades Major (231), but that Schleiermacher 
was the first to regard it with strong antipathy as un-Platonic. As if to juxtapose the 
special honors given to the dialogue by the ancients, and Schleiermacher’s comment that 
the praise attributed to it is due to unoriginal authors who wish to preserve the dignity and 
honor of learned men who judge the dialogue to be an authentic Platonic dialogue (see 
page 3), Friedlander lists distinguished ancient authors who either used the dialogue as a 
basis for explaining Alcibiades’ subsequent career, such as Plutarch (Clough 1992 vol.2, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
If this passage is modeled on Alcibiades Major, and the Magna Moralia is an authentic work of Aristotle, 
then this would be good evidence of the authenticity of Alcibiades Major. 
7 See Vlastos 1991, 21-44; cf. Longinus 1991, 42-48; Klein 1989, 1-31 and Strauss 1988, 30-37. 
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258-290), Aristotle echoing the striking image discussed in Alcibiades Major (132e-
133d) about the eye looking into another eye (see no. 6, page 7) or scenes from 
Xenophon’s Memorabilia (e.g., Socrates’ encounter with Glaucon III. vi-vii. 9) having 
been modeled after the dialogue. In juxtaposing the reception of the dialogue in this way, 
it is clear that Friedlander is placing the burden of proof squarely in the lap of those 
commentators who follow Schleiermacher’s lead. One of the more substantial criticisms 
Schleiermacher levels against reading Alcibiades Major as an authentic Platonic dialogue 
is that several of its opening episodes show a Socrates that is unagreeable and unworthy 
of Plato’s Socrates. In the first episode we see Socrates confronting Alcibiades with a 
long speech, which, in other Platonic dialogues Socrates ‘hates’ (334), according to 
Schleiermacher; in the second episode Schleiermacher finds it unworthy and strange that 
Socrates admits he has been watching Alcibiades for some time but was prevented from 
talking to him by a divine being.  
Friedlander’s reading of the opening remarks Socrates makes to Alcibiades is not 
framed, like Schleiermacher’s, in relation to other standard Platonic dialogues and their 
portrayal of the Platonic Socrates, but instead is framed by an internal critique of 
Alcibiades Major. What we mean by an internal critique is that Friedlander reads the 
dialogue in such a way that it is allowed to provide its own answers to interpretative 
difficulties.8 For example, Friedlander sees the initial encounter between Socrates and 
Alcibiades as ‘filled with a tension unequaled in Plato’ (232) due to the collision of two 
very proud persons. The long speech and Socrates’ admission is indicative of  a pent-up 
erotic attachment that was born in the past, that is now able to unfold in the present, and 
the reader is in the unique position to witness it. But this tensioned-filled beginning can 
not be appreciated fully, Friedlander believes, without connecting it to how the dialogue 
                                                        
8 This is not to say that other Platonic dialogues may not assist with interpretative difficulties. We are 
sympathetic to the position that the dialogues are self-contained. For the opposite position see Szlezak 
1993, 66-75. He argues that all the Platonic dialogues have ‘gaps’ which can only be filled by Plato’s 
unwritten doctrines. Cf. Kahn’s Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a Literary 
Form (1996). He advocates a proleptic reading of the dialogues.  
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ends. Friedlander cites Socrates’ last words that the state may win out over him and over 
Alcibiades (135e) as complementing the tense beginning in the opening of the dialogue 
between the past and the present. These last words foreshadow the political career of 
Alcibiades and the death of Socrates. ‘Thus, the dialogue…ends with tension between 
present and the future’ (233).  
Here we see Friedlander employing parts of Alcibiades Major to assist in 
interpretative difficulties raised in other parts of the dialogue. What he ends up with is a 
broader perspective to bring to bare when countering the type of criticism Schleiermacher 
raises. A constitutive part of this broader perspective is Friedlander’s discernment of how 
the dramatic irony that informs the philosophical discussions in Platonic dialogues 
function. A good example of how a proper understanding of dramatic irony can explain 
an apparent lack of uniformity in a dialogue is exhibited by the different interpretations 
given by Schleiermacher and Friedlander of the Spartan and Persian Speech.9 
Schleiermacher found the speech Xenophontic, not Socratic, because it dwelled 
superfluously on the riches of the Lacedaemonians and Persians without making it 
apparent to Alcibiades the irony in his laudatory description. Friedlander, on the other 
hand, considers the Spartan and Persian Speech to be the core of  the dialogue. Its 
‘iridescent images’ (236) are designed to keep Alcibiades from falling bellow himself, 
considering he is all too willing to measure himself against local, Athenian politicians 
who are of no account. According to Friedlander, the speech also functions to accomplish 
two other ends: (1) It facilitates and sharpens the discussion focused on the concept of 
‘caring for oneself’ as the highest form of  self-knowledge (124c-135e) which directly 
follows the speech; and (2) It serves as a Socratic critique of Athenian educational 
practices where the care of the young is left to the most useless slaves (122b-d), and in 
                                                        
9 Cf. Protagoras 342ff. on the secret teachings of the Spartans, Charmides 156cff. on the special art of 
healing that King  Zalmoxis taught the Thracians and Hipparchus 228b-229e.   
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the guise of the four royal Persian tutors teaching the Socratic virtues to the heir of the 
Persian throne, we see the outlines of a state dedicated to education.  
A general criticism of Alcibiades Major that runs throughout each of our previous 
three commentators, which Friedlander addresses, is the sentiment that the dialogue is 
deficient in quality. Schleiermacher found it unworthy of Plato; Grote considered it an 
authentic Platonic dialogue but an early production from an immature Plato; and Shorey 
all but says it is not authentic by commenting that it is improbable that Plato thought it 
worthwhile to elaborate such a tedious and scholastic summary of ideas found expressed 
more lucidly in other dialogues. The specific point of convergence for at least two of our 
commentators, Schleiermacher and Grote, and hovers in the background of the third, 
Shorey (i.e., the scholastic comment) is the complaint that the depiction of Socrates’ 
transformation of Alcibiades in the course of the dialogue from overly confident youth to 
overly submissive youth is incompatible with the Platonic Socrates. Friedlander 
addresses this complaint by again showing Plato’s use of dramatic irony in accounting for 
Alcibiades’ transformation. He explains that there is no discrepancy between the 
conceitedness displayed by Alcibiades in the opening pages of the dialogue when he 
disdainfully concedes to answer Socrates’ questions on the condition that Socrates can 
help him realize his ambition (103a-104e) and the submissiveness displayed for the 
remainder of the dialogue once Alcibiades has heard the Spartan and Persian Speech 
(124b-135e). The portrayal of the transformation of Alcibiades, according to Friedlander, 
is not the  weakening of authorial creative power, it is a moving and dramatic showing of 
a pupil’s pride broken once he has been brought to ‘see his own emptiness before the 
superior strength of his master’ (236). As a result, the ‘prerequisite of listening and 
replying, quietly and objectively’ (236) has been fulfilled and self-knowledge can 
proceed. Thus, the inner movement of the dialogue revolves around humiliation and 
submission, from the strong resistance of Alcibiades in the beginning to surrender at the 
end.  
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Having appraised Friedlander’s commentary on Alcibiades Major as a response to 
the criticism of it by the prominent commentators Schleiermacher, Grote, and Shorey, we 
turn now to two ideas pointed out in Friedlander’s commentary that are ignored by these 
other three commentators. The first idea accounts for the lack of dramatic externals10 
(e.g., no setting, no secondary figures) by arguing that in the person of Alcibiades the 
historical figure himself in both his ‘character and fate’ comes to life in such a powerful 
way that his mere presence obviates any need for what Friedlander refers to as a ‘setting 
full of charm and symbolic meaning’ (232). It is as if Alcibiades’ infamous exploits 
become the backdrop of the dialogue. Friedlander’s insight is significant because the 
sheer economy with which the dialogue focuses on Socrates and Alcibiades heightens the 
tension around which the dialogue revolves, as we mentioned earlier, and suggests where 
the dialogue’s continuity lies. The second idea is an extension of Friedlander’s comments 
on the Spartan and Persian speech. We know that Friedlander thought the speech was the 
core of Alcibiades Major and its function is to keep Alcibiades from falling beneath 
himself, because it poses a stark choice for him between careful training and wisdom or 
being the best only among the local, Athenian politicians. But the speech’s additional 
significance is its use of myth11 as a motivator for Alcibiades to get serious about a 
genuine education. Friedlander believed that the Spartan and Persian speech goes beyond 
all the other mythical speeches (see no. 9, p.10) in other Platonic dialogues due to its 
maturity in tying Alcibiades’ ambition to the concept of caring for oneself, unlike the 
myth told in Hipparchus (228bff.), for example, which had very little effect on the 
unnamed interlocutor.  
Overall, Friedlander’s remarks on Alcibiades Major are a substantive 
endorsement of the dialogue’s authenticity. As if to mock Schleiermacher’s attack on the 
                                                        
10 Johnson 1999, 1-19 argues that the lack of dramatic externals in Alcibiades Major is in keeping with the 
teaching of the dialogue which is that the self is ultimately impersonal, rational, and universal. 
11 Cf. Szlezak’s 1993, 96-99 discussion of Plato’s use of myth and logos and Sorel 1967, 26-56 on the 
importance of myth in motivating the masses in modern, industrialized democracies. 
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historical prominence of the dialogue, and other doubters who followed and continue to 
follow his lead, Friedlander concludes his commentary with a challenge: 
Among the minor dialogues of Plato, there is none in which such a moment— 
deeply saturated with what precedes and with what follows—is depicted with 
such irresistible power. Should we infer from this that someone else surpassed 
Plato? Or is it not rather Plato himself who is here surpassing his own previous 
achievements?   
 
II. Historical Survey Continued: Modern Commentators who take both the dramatic 
features and  Educative Value of Alcibiades Major seriously.   
For commentators who take Alcibiades Major’s dramatic  features and educative 
value seriously, Friedlander’s reading of the dialogue is a lesson on how the drama in a 
Platonic dialogue is inseparable from the philosophical issues the dialogue entertains. 
There are several commentators,12 while not doing so self-consciously, who follow 
Friedlander’s approach to the dialogue. Steven Forde’s commentary on Alcibiades Major 
views the role of women in the Spartan and Persian speech as central to understanding 
the dialogue as a whole, which echoes Friedlander’s interpretation of the speech as the 
‘core’ of the dialogue. To his credit, Forde’s interpretation of the speech takes us beyond 
Friedlander’s, due to his attempt to locate the precise role women play in Alcibiades’ 
quest for a genuine education. Mark Lutz’s commentary on Alcibiades Major construes 
the philosophical ideas entertained in the dialogue as having broad applications due to its 
role within Socratic education as a whole. In addition to viewing Socrates’ commitment 
to getting Alcibiades to appreciate the role virtue can play in his private and public life as 
analogous to the broader issue of whether or not virtue should play a role in liberal 
democracy’s moral, political and religious discourse, Lutz views Alcibiades Major’s 
                                                        
12 Bruell’s 1999, 19-38 commentary on Alcibiades Major will not be discussed, but his treatment of the 
dialogue should be grouped among the commentators we will be discussing.    
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teachings as contributing to what he calls the ‘classical counter-culture’s’ corrective to 
ideological mass movements such as multiculturalism. 
 Forde’s (1987, 222-239) commentary on Alcibiades Major begins by first 
acknowledging that the dialogue was held in the ‘greatest esteem in the Platonic school of 
antiquity’ (222), and secondly, refers the reader in the first foot-note, interestingly 
enough, to Friedlander’s commentary on the dialogue for a discussion of the tradition in 
the Greek school. Following the introduction there are no original insights in Forde’s 
commentary leading up to the Spartan and Persian Speech13 that are worthy of discussion, 
but his interpretation of the speech, which does call for discussion, is insightful and will 
have significant implications for how he views the remainder of the dialogue. Forde takes 
the position that the speech is the first part of a two-pronged strategy designed to 
persuade Alcibiades to pursue a genuine education. The first strategy employs 
paradoxical argumentation and combative refutation (103a-120b), but it has only 
managed to ‘force Alcibiades into silence. The second strategy employs the Spartan and 
Persian speech which promises success on the condition that he perfect himself. This 
latter strategy proves to be successful. For the sake of clarification, it will be in order here 
to briefly summarize the speech. Only by doing so can we appreciate Forde’s unique 
interpretation of the speech and contribution to the reading of Alcibiades Major as a 
whole.  
In the Spartan and Persian speech (120b-124c) Socrates tells Alcibiades that his 
true rivals are the Spartan and Persian Kings not men like Midias,14 the petty demagogue 
(120b). In the guise of Midias Socrates offers Alcibiades the possibility of neglecting 
himself, considering that even the women find Midias slave-like, before illustrating the 
length to which he has to cultivate himself in order to compete against his true rivals. 
                                                        
13 For reason unsubstantiated, Forde tells us that he prefers to refer to what we have been calling the 
Spartan and Persian speech as ‘The Royal tale’ due to his presumption that Socrates’ speech is a description 
of realities (228). 
14 See Denyer’s 2001,168-169 interesting explanation of Socrates’ reference to Midias’ slave-boy hair 
styles.   
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Alcibiades chooses to view the Spartan and Persian Kings as his rivals and Socrates 
commences the speech by explaining to Alcibiades: that the kings’ ancestors go all the 
way back to Zeus; the Spartan wives are guarded at public expense by ephors to ensure 
that their future kings are ‘descended from the family of Heraclidae alone’ (121b-c); the 
Persian king is so formidable that the Persian wife is only guarded by her own fear since 
no one would even suspect the king’s heir of being fathered by anyone except him; when 
the eldest son of the Persian king and heir to the throne is born all the king’s subjects 
have a feast day, and from that day all of Asia celebrates the king’s birthday; the young 
king is brought up by highly respected eunuchs in the royal household, and at the age of 
fourteen is entrusted to the ‘royal tutors’ (122a); Persian wealth is splendid and luxurious; 
and there is more gold and silver in Sparta alone than in the rest of Greece put together’ 
(122e).  
Socrates’ illustration of the king’s prominence, of course, serves as a touchstone 
when compared to the opposite condition Alcibiades find himself in. By any scale 
Alcibiades’ goods pale along side the goods of the Spartan and Persian kings. So what 
accounts for Alcibiades choosing to view the kings as his true rivals? Socrates takes this 
question up at the conclusion of the speech by having the women in the lives of the kings 
wonder what Alcibiades could possibly have in mind for even thinking he can 
successfully compete with their men. Amestris, the Persian king’s mother and widow of 
Xerxes, typifies the response the other women have regarding Alcibiades’ audacity. She 
simply says, ‘I don’t see what this fellow could be relying on, except diligence and 
wisdom—the Greeks don’t have anything else worth mentioning’ (123d). 
Forde argues that Alcibiades’ self- perfection, which is called for by the speech, is 
dependent upon women’s judgment, who, if they were in control of Athens, ‘alone might 
know how to despise Midias’ (229). Women as motivators and judges of male 
achievement is the normative assumption Socrates makes, according to Forde, which 
accounts for the prominence of women in the Spartan and Persian speech. This line of 
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reasoning is seen in Forde’s interpretation of Socrates’ account of the wealthy furnishings 
a trustworthy traveler witnessed who had been through the Persian king’s court (123b-c). 
The traveler reported that he passed through many regions and tracts of lands, ‘which the 
locals called the “the Queen’s girdle” and another “the Queen’s veil.” We are told that 
each of these tracts is named after the queen’s wardrobe, and that each one is set aside to 
pay for the queen’s finery. Forde finds it significant that the word designating each of the 
tracts pertaining to the queen’s wardrobe is kosmos (order), and based upon Socrates’ use 
of this word he draws the following conclusion: 
Indeed, what we learn from the trustworthy traveler whom Socrates cites is  
precisely that the Persian domain is cast onto a very well-defined order; that  
order revolves somehow around the person of the queen. (230) 
Although Forde is not explicit here, the ‘somehow’ is most likely the normative 
assumption he thinks Socrates makes in the speech regarding the role of women in male 
achievement. The Persian queen judges whether or not the domain and her king are in the 
proper order. Towards the end of his interpretation of the speech Forde does move a little 
closer to telling us what exactly accounts for his belief that Socrates casts women as 
judges, and, specifically, why Alcibiades’ quest for a genuine education revolves around 
the person of the queen, too. Similar to the women knowing how to despise Midias, the 
Persian queen recognizes true superiority, which is the principle of her devotion and 
obedience and if Alcibiades proves himself superior to the king she will give herself 
voluntarily to him. Forde concludes his comments on the speech as follows: 
 In the very act of showing Alcibiades the most pleasing possible political 
 prospect, Socrates cements his subjection to a new authority, the Persian 
 Queen who as judge imposes conditions for his success. (232) 
Although Forde’s emphasis on the dramatic role women play in Alcibiades’ quest 
for a genuine education is an interesting reading of the speech and deserves praise for its 
novelty, he does not adequately analyze how the women in the speech perform as judges; 
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or why Socrates even cast women in such a role. We will revisit this issue in chapter six 
of the dissertation by further analyzing the role of women in the speech. 
Lutz’s commentary (1998, 1-46 and 111-149) on Alcibiades Major is a part of a 
larger project motivated by the question of whether or not there is room in liberal 
democracy for virtue. This fascinating question is approached by Lutz with the 
assumption, made explicit by Friedlander, that the dialogue’s educative value is 
inseparable from the dramatic presentation of the two participants, Socrates and 
Alcibiades. In other words, Lutz takes it for granted that the dialogue’s form and content 
are not mutually exclusive.     
Lutz’s project is fascinating precisely because it envisions broad applications for 
the type of Socratic education found in Alcibiades Major that may concern modern times. 
Before we turn to his specific treatment of the dialogue and the educational issues found 
therein, it will be helpful to list possible uses a Socratic education may have for 
contemporaries according to Lutz15 (11): 
1) It may counter the inclination of democratic thinkers to dwell on the useful at 
the expense of contemplating the noble; 
2) It may counter the democratic tendency to focus on mass movements and the 
sweep of history at the expense of exceptional and influential actors; 
3) It may moderate democracy’s fascination with the titillating and sensational 
rather than the charming; 
and 
4) It may foster an appreciation for authentic human types as opposed to 
democracy’s embrace of exaggerated, artificial and abstract characters. 
Lutz conceives the acceptance of the Socratic sentiments expressed in the list to be the 
first steps towards promoting a ‘classical counter-culture’ (11) that would challenge, for 
                                                        
15 Lutz is endorsing, which he acknowledges, Tocqueville’s thoughts on the importance of the ancients. See 
Tocqueville 1969, 472-474, 487, 488-489, 525. 
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example, ideological mass movements such as multiculturalism. The Socratic challenge 
would not be in the form of invective, seeking to discredit all things modern. It would 
promote discourse, according to Lutz, about the role virtue should play in society: 
 By reading “multicultural” authors with an eye to what they imply about 
 justice and the rest of virtue, the Socratics would try to articulate their political 
 claims. In the course of elucidating these claims, they would hope to provoke 
 the writers of this literature… In the best case, this would induce writers to 
 compete with one another to guide the reading public. (13) 
Here we see the unique and practical perspective of Lutz’s project, which is brought to 
bear on his reading of several passages in Alcibiades Major. That Alcibiades Major plays 
a significant role in Socratic education as a whole, and contains educational correctives 
that are applicable to modernity, is affirmed by ‘Socrates’ knowledge of erotic matters’ 
(9) portrayed in the dialogue. For example, upon hearing how deficient he is compared to 
the Spartan and Persian Kings, Alcibiades, Lutz argues, under Socrates’ prodding finally  
feels erotic (119). Prior to the Spartan and Persian Speech Alcibiades was complacent 
with himself, having thought that his nature was sufficiently noble and good. Once his 
confidence is shaken there arises within him a ‘passionate desire to learn how to be noble 
and good’ (119). Thus, Lutz draws two important effects from the speech on Alcibiades’ 
quest for a genuine education:  
Firstly, it finally confirms… that erotic love depends on the belief that we lack 
something we need to be noble and good. Alcibiades loves what he believes he  
needs but lacks. Secondly, this speech marks the beginning of Alcibiades’  
education to virtue. By awakening him to his ignorance and need, he begins to  
desire to learn what is truly noble and good. (119) 
The applicability of Alcibiades’ awakening for contemporaries lies in awakening the love 
of the noble in modern man through a serious study of Socratic teachings contained in the 
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dialogues. Or, if this sounds too removed, Lutz suggests that the awakening may be 
kindled by exploring the classical heritage of modern modes of thought (13).16  
 There is one other idea expressed in the concluding remarks of Lutz’s 
commentary that seeks to make the teachings found in Alcibiades Major applicable to 
modernity. The idea is an extension of the previous discussion dealing with Alcibiades’ 
awakening. The closing thoughts of Alcibiades Major contain the arresting view that the 
eye can see itself only through reflection, so the mind best knows itself through the 
reflection of its thoughts in another mind. Similarly, the soul is unable to see itself  by 
itself, but must look into the soul of another and especially into the place in the soul that 
knows (133aff.). Socrates shares this image with Alcibiades, of course, with the intention 
of exerting great influence over him because Alcibiades’ political goals are said to be 
unattainable without cultivating the most noble part of himself, which Socrates reflects. 
Thus, Alcibiades must attach himself to Socrates if he wants a genuine education. The 
lesson that Lutz draws from this concluding imagery for modernity is that the most 
compelling works produced by the best minds of any tradition is worth serious study. 
Traditions such as Buddhism, Confucianism, Hinduism, Islam, and Judaism all contain 
lessons and thoughts capable of appealing to the best part of ourselves if approached 
sympathetically and honestly (13). This would also apply to great writing, too. Great 
writing, according to Lutz, whether it is Western or non-Western, necessarily raises the 
most fundamental political and social questions, which eventually lead around to issues 
having to do with virtue and, at least in the West, its place within liberal democracy. 
 
 
 
                                                        
16 The operating assumption Lutz seems to make in advocating a Socratic education, at least in this part of 
his interpretation of the Spartan and Persian speech, is that modern man would go about fulfilling his lack 
in the appropriate fashion once he is shown it exists. This assumption is not obvious at all. 
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III. Plan of the dissertation: Other Dramatic Features and Educative Issues Gleaned from 
a Close Reading of Alcibiades Major  
We have surveyed what prominent commentators have said about Alcibiades 
Major since its debut in antiquity (c. 350 BCE ) up to the present. Each commentator had 
something to say about the dialogue’s educative value, but it was not until Friedlander’s 
approach to Alcibiades Major were we made aware of how the dramatic features (e.g., 
irony) of the dialogue are part and parcel of its educative value. We can not have one 
without the other. Lutz’s reading of Alcibiades Major takes what Friedlander has taught 
us about the significance of dramatic features in the dialogue for the purpose of having 
Socrates’ conversation with Alcibiades embody lessons about virtue for liberal 
democracy. Lutz sees broad applications for the educative issues entertained in 
Alcibiades Major. In Socratic Encounters: Plato’s Alcibiades we continue the tradition of 
reading Alcibiades Major as a serious work that raises serious questions that are relevant 
today.  
Although we are confident the dissertation will contribute to the literature on 
Alcibiades Major, we are not claiming that the chapters that comprise the dissertation are 
definitive readings of the topics considered. We are claiming the weaker proposition that 
each chapter is highly instructive because they were framed by the question concerning 
Plato’s intentions in writing the dialogue. The chapters of the dissertation are outlined as 
follows: 
Chapter Two, ‘Listening in Plato’s Alcibiades Major and Plutarch,’ proposes that 
in the Graeco-Roman world rhetoric and public speaking was highly valued in higher 
education; listening as an art became a worthy academic pursuit. As a result, a tradition 
of ‘how to listen’ literature arose that sought to instruct about moral issues youths who 
were entering manhood. In particular, such writers as Pliny, Seneca and Plutarch crafted 
short treatises on the proper ways to listen. The animating idea of the various treatises is 
that faulty listening skills account for the main source of corruption in the young.  
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In the chapter we engage  the ‘how to listen’ tradition by employing conceptual 
categories taken from Plutarch’s short treatise On Listening and applying them to 
Alcibiades Major. With a little detective work, we discovered that there are dispositional 
reasons why Alcibiades failed to listen appropriately to the moderating forces of the 
Socratic conversation. Alcibiades’ failure to listen sets the stage for his notorious public 
enterprises. The dispositions that seriously hampered Alcibiades’ ability to listen and 
benefit from the Socratic conversation are envy, excessive admiration, and the inability to 
listen actively when engaged in conversation. We explore each of these dispositions from 
Socrates’ initial encounter with the ambitious youth to Alcibiades’ reaction to the Spartan 
and Persian speech to the conclusion of the dialogue in which we see a broken, 
submissive Alcibiades eager to listen and eager for a genuine education. 
Chapter Three, ‘Alcibiades Major and the Apology,’ continues the broad 
orientation the dissertation takes in interpreting Alcibiades Major by arguing that because 
the principal idea found in Alcibiades Major is also found in the Apology, each dialogue 
is a natural complement to the other. The leading theme in both dialogues is the 
importance of establishing priorities in one’s life. Our argument revolves around the 
concept of eudaemonism, and how by first reading the Apology as a synoptic view of 
Socrates’ orientation, and then reading Alcibiades Major as a specific illustration of 
Socrates’ cross-examination, we began to see that Socrates is arguing for a radical 
perspective regarding one’s priorities: our lives should be directed at some ultimate end 
with other ends subordinate to it. Coupling the two dialogues in such away has not been 
attempted by others who have commented on Alcibiades Major. We claim in the chapter 
that one can appreciate better Socrates’ intellectual and dramatic depth in Alcibiades 
Major after having witnessed his approach to the Athenians en masse in the Apology. In 
addition to the discussion of priorities, towards the end of the chapter we suggest other 
leading ideas found in the Apology and Alcibiades Major that might be worthy of 
attention. 
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Chapter Four, ‘Socratic Traditionalism’, also takes as its theme priorities and their 
proper ordering, but from the perspective of the craftsman putting his skills to good use. 
The focus of our discussion is Plato’s Alcibiades Minor17 and a type of traditionalism 
found in the characterization of knowledge as knowledge of utility in the dialogue. By 
characterizing knowledge in such a way, we argue that Socrates is endorsing a form of 
traditionalism that is referred to by the political philosopher Michael Oakeshott in his 
essay ‘Political Education’ as traditions of behavior. Here again we found it useful to 
employ conceptual categories taken from another intellectual tradition. In particular, 
Oakeshott’s general critique of rationalism in politics is a part of contemporary 
conservative thought that seeks to ground proper human doing not in ‘timeless, 
ephemeral principles,’ but in particular activities that are recognized as such due to their 
traditional modes of conduct. These traditions of behavior, we point out, make up a craft 
and determine whether a craft person puts his skills to good use, the precise subject 
Socrates is concerned with in Alcibiades Minor. In addition to Oakeshott, we analyze 
three of Pindar’s odes as illustrations of traditions of behavior that constitute an athlete’s 
craft. Often the athlete’s excellence is due to his command of a type of knowledge based 
in utility. 
Chapter Five, ‘Instances of Decision Theory in Plato’s Alcibiades Major and 
Minor, and Xenophon’s Memorabilia’, discusses Socrates’ use of hypothetical choices as 
early versions of what was to become in the in the twentieth century the discipline of 
decision theory founded by F.P. Ramsey. Socrates’ use of hypothetical choices and 
thought experiments in the dialogues is a way of reassuring himself of an interlocutor’s 
philosophical potential. We found that there are three distinctive categories under which 
                                                        
17 We do not find it necessary to justify our inclusion of Alcibiades Minor within the dissertation or 
rehearse what commentators have said about it. The majority of our concern in the dissertation is with 
Alcibiades Major for the simple reason that more has been written on it, but where there is overlap in 
themes between the two dialogues, as it is in the case of chapter five, we discuss it. Chapter four is solely 
devoted to Alcibiades Minor. For a vigorous defense of Alcibiades Minor’s authenticity see Grote 1864, 
331-363; no.4 on Pangle and no.12 on Bruell. 
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these choices and experiments are offered: (1) The Call of Ambition; (2) The Limits of 
Ambition; and (3) The Transparency of desire. Under the category The Call of Ambition 
the hypothetical choices offered to the interlocutor is concerned with establishing as fact  
from prior observation that an interlocutor is worthy of being befriended by Socrates due 
to the interlocutor’s ambition. The choices offered under the category The Limits of 
Ambition are designed to assesses the length to which an interlocutor is willing to go to 
fulfill his desire(s) so Socrates can establish limits around which the subject-content of 
the conversation revolves. To assess just how far Alcibiades is willing to go to attain his 
goal of being a great Athenian leader, we employ F.P. Ramsey’s concept, “Mathematical 
Expectation,” which is taken from his essay ‘Truth and Possibility.’ “Mathematical 
Expectation” operates on the assumption that it is not enough to measure probability, we 
must also measure our belief to ‘apportion our belief to the probability.’ That is, it 
determines how strongly or to what degree a person holds a particular belief. So if a 
person’s belief in X lacks enough doubts to cancel the belief out, the probability of his 
acting on this belief is higher than if his belief in X was plagued by a greater number of 
doubts. 
In Chapter Six, ‘Women, Moral Insight and Marriage,’ we take up several 
different themes raised in Alcibiades Major with the intent of showing that Plato’s 
comprehensive perspective may prove useful in shedding light on a number of 
contemporary issues. For example, we argue for the assumption we find Plato making in 
placing women in such a prominent role in Alcibiades Major’s Spartan and Persian 
speech: women provide moral insight regarding male goals and achievement. Our 
argument (1) lays out what precisely the women of the speech say about Alcibiades’ 
challenge to their men; (2) surveys and critiques what prominent commentators, in 
particular Steven Forde, have said about the prominent role women play in the speech; 
and (3) advances a reading of the speech that unifies the sentiments expressed by each of 
the women. Number three goes beyond the dialogue proper, but only to show the 
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relevance of Plato’s assumption for contemporary relations between men and women. 
Specifically, we discuss the prominent role played by women in the Spartan and Persian 
Speech in relation to the role women should play in contemporary society as envisioned 
by the feminist scholar Carol Gilligan. What we find is that for Plato and Gilligan women 
play a profound role when it comes to male achievement, but it is in the causal factor that 
accounts for the role played by women where Plato and Gilligan part company. The 
chapter argues for the causal factor Plato endorses in the dialogue. 
Chapter Seven, ‘After thoughts,’ concludes the dissertation. In this chapter we 
discuss briefly some of the implications of the ideas expressed in Alcibiades Major.  
Only by reading Alcibiades Major with this type of broad orientation can we hope 
the dissertation contributes something extra to ancient philosophy while, at the same 
time, showing the enduring relevance of the Platonic dialogues. 
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Chapter two: Listening in Plato’s Alcibiades Major and Plutarch    
 
  His [Socrates’] words overcame him so much, as to draw tears   
   from his eyes, and to disturb his very soul. Yet sometimes he  
   would abandon himself to flatterers, when they proposed 
   to him varieties of pleasure, and would desert Socrates; who,  
   then, would pursue him, as if he had been a fugitive slave…. 
   Cleanthes the philosopher, speaking of one to whom he was 
attached, says his only hold on him was by his ears….  
     (Plutarch’s Lives Volume I, p. 262)   
Introduction 
  Plutarch’s characterization of the young Alcibiades makes explicit a theme that is 
found throughout the writings that form the Alcibiades tradition.18 It was Alcibiades’ 
inability to listen (acuin) appropriately to the moderating forces of the Socratic 
conversation that led to his notorious public enterprises.19 That is, Alcibiades did not 
listen to Socrates in the sense of obeying him or following his advice or being guided by 
his conversation. Listening as an important pedagogical stance necessary for human 
flourishing has not, however, received the scholarly attention it deserves. 
 Although contemporary discussions of listening are not so common, the Graeco-
Roman world (c. first century B.C. through the second century A.D.) discussed it quite 
earnestly in the form of short treatises. Some writers dealing with this theme include: 
Pliny, Epictetus, Seneca, and Plutarch. Plutarch’s short treatise On Listening (Peri Tou 
Acuin) is particularly compelling because its main argument is that there are dispositional 
reasons why young listeners may not benefit from what they hear.20 This chapter focuses 
                                                        
18 Gribble 1999, 214-215 points out that there are two genres in the Alcibiades tradition. The first tradition, 
typified in the writings of Thucydides and Demosthenes, focuses primarily on Alcibiades’ bios or ‘way of 
life’ and how it influenced his civic attitude. The second tradition, the Socratics, focuses primarily on 
Alcibiades as a moral agent shaped by his own choices as a young man. Plato, the most notable figure of 
the Socratics, not only provides us with a defense for the charge against Socrates of corrupting the youth, 
he explores the relationship between philosophy and political life. 
19 On Alcibiades’ behavior during the Peloponnesian War  see Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War 6.27-29 
and Plutarch’s Lives on Alcibiades Volume I. 
20  See NE I.3 1095ff. on  the young listener’s inability to listen properly to lectures on political science 
because he is inexperienced in the opinions political action is based upon; and because the young listener’s 
tendency is to follow his passions as opposed to reasoned discourse. When I refer to dispositions I am 
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on Plutarch’s treatise and Plato’s dialogue Alcibiades Major because Plutarch explains 
well the practical significance of listening as a powerful force for moral edification, and 
he also provides us with the insight that how one listens can be decisive in what is heard, 
which may explain why the Socratic conversation did not have a lasting effect on 
Alcibiades, as his public career attests.  
  Plutarch’s treatise is addressed to the teenager Nicander whose entry into manhood 
is officially marked by the wearing of the toga virilis or adult dress. Plutarch’s concern is 
that the boy not forget that manhood is as much concerned with self-imposed discipline as 
childhood was concerned with listening to parents. Plutarch’s treatise is divided into two 
parts. The first part discusses briefly the significance of listening in relation to the sense of 
hearing, and surveys three dispositions he considers to be the main impediments to 
benefiting from what is heard. The dispositions are envy, excessive admiration, and non-
active listening. It is the awareness, or non-awareness, of these dispositions on the part of 
the listener that proves to be as vital to moral education as listening is to speaking. The 
second half of the treatise discusses how these three dispositions lead to listening 
improperly. It is the second half of Plutarch’s treatise, the half on which I concentrate, that 
gives an impressive account of Alcibiades’ failure to listen. In accord with Plutarch’s 
account, I will argue that Socrates’ approach to Alcibiades in Plato’s dialogue suggests that 
the young Alcibiades’ disposition is characterized by envy, excessive admiration, and the 
inability to listen actively when engaged in conversation. Consequently, the resourceful 
Socrates is forced to work with recognition of the limitations of his interlocutor. 
Plutarch begins his treatise by telling Nicander that it was Theophrastus who 
thought hearing was the most emotional of the senses because, unlike the degree of 
distraction visible, tasteable, or touchable objects cause, loud noises, like bad advice, 
resound in the mind at the expense of wholesome sounds (Cf. Crito 54d-e). The importance 
                                                                                                                                                                     
referring to hexis prohairetike. See NE ii 1103a15-1103b on the forming of dispositions through choice and 
actions. 
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of hearing, be it the most emotional of the senses or not, Plutarch tells us, is that hearing is 
less emotional than it is rational. Vice can affect the mind by entering the body in a number 
of ways, but virtue can only affect the mind through the ears, particularly the ears of the 
young (38a), if there has not been corruption due to flattery or negative remarks.   Plutarch 
also mentions Xenocrates’ suggestion that it is less crucial for boxers to wear ear protectors 
to protect against punches, than for children to wear ear protectors to protect their characters 
against the corruption of words. Plutarch’s position is somewhat novel perhaps because we 
might suppose sight the most impressionable of the senses when it comes to moral benefit 
and harm. Leontius’ struggle not to look at the corpses in the Republic iv might typify this 
view. Perhaps Plutarch’s position is not novel after all, however, if we take into 
consideration that Hellenistic and Roman education was primarily oral (Marrou 1956, 197-
286).  
 Plutarch is attempting to arouse in Nicander, by mentioning Theophrastus and 
Xenocrates, an awareness of the significance of listening that may compel him to respond 
attentively to his education. The philosophical flourishing of Nicander is not only a 
reflection of his moral capacity to listen appropriately, but a reflection on the moral 
disposition of Nicander’s parents. We know that Plutarch intends for Nicander’s parents 
to be implicated in his moral development because we are told that Nicander’s formative 
years were spent in a home that took philosophy seriously. Although the treatise does not 
tell us anything specific about the nature of Nicander’s philosophical home, a home 
which formed a particular moral disposition in him, Plutarch still finds it necessary to 
warn Nicander that hearing is a powerful source for corruption because of its 
manipulation of the emotions. Likewise, hearing is a powerful source of moral education 
due to its reception of rational arguments which regulate and discipline pleasure.  
Plutarch makes it clear that moral dispositions affect the receptivity to what is 
heard because hearing is necessarily both a passive and an active power. The listener is 
cable of listening appropriately only to the extent that he has been habituated to be 
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actively affected in a certain way. Aristotle’s discussion of  potentiality in Book 9 of the 
Metaphysics and potentialities in relation to being affected in chapter 8 of the Categories 
complements Plutarch’s argument. From Aristotle we learn that there are certain 
characteristics that are passive potentialities residing within an entity’s nature that are 
essential to the entity’s being. For example, a certain passive power belongs to oil to be 
burnable, in addition to having the passive potential to be acted upon in a certain way 
(1046a19 ff.). Aristotle’s use of oil to illustrate an entity’s active and passive power is 
instructive, but his discussion in the Categories of potentialities in relation to an entity 
being affected leaves room for the active and passive power of an entity to be influenced 
by habituation. Aristotle informs us that perceptual capacities (e.g., hearing) and the 
faculties of reason have the potential to affected in certain ways. Depending on the way 
perceptual faculties have been habituated, they can either be open to certain affections or 
closed; they can either have or shun certain emotions (Kosman 1980, 106-107). When 
Plutarch discusses with Nicander the effect envy, excessive admiration, and non-active 
listening has, as dispositions, on what the listener hears, he is referring to the whole 
person: the emotional and intellectual effect, and their discriminating ability to be either 
receptive or resistant to what is heard.21 Plutarch first discusses the role of envy as it 
relates to hearing.  
  
Envy (phthonus)22 
  “Now the presence of envy, attended by malice and hostility, is not a good thing 
for any undertaking, but it stands in the way of all that is honorable…;” 
(phthonus toenyn metha bascanias cai dysmenias oydeni mhen ergo paron agathon, alla  
pasin empodius toes caloes, 39d). The envious person, Plutarch tells us, becomes 
annoyed with the equipment or non-moral goods of others. That is, he becomes annoyed 
                                                        
21 See Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 1103a26-b25 and Aristotle’s theory of passive powers in Book 9 of 
the Metaphysics. 
22 See Aristotle’s Rhetoric ii, 10. 
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by those he considers his equals because of their beauty, status within the community, 
wealth, and good fortune. This envious disposition carried over into a context in which it 
must listen, “scatters the mind” which impedes the listener from assimilating the content 
of what is being said. Here Plutarch engages in what we can refer to as psychological 
detective work. If we could peer into the mind of the envious listener, Plutarch postulates, 
we would see that he is preoccupied with the following three things: himself, mistakes 
made by the speaker, and third person or audience receptiveness. 
  The mind of the envious listener is simultaneously comparing its state with the 
speaker’s mind, trying determine which is better. To understand Plutarch’s point we need 
only imagine the envious listener listening to a  mathematician or philosopher 
demonstrating a complex proof. Such a proof would call for such qualities as knowledge, 
a lucid memory, sensitivity in making subtle distinctions and patience. The envious 
listener is not interested so much in the demonstration of the proof and the beneficial 
effects from having heard it as he is in whether or not his mind is capable of displaying 
the same qualities. Next we see the envious listener focusing excessively on the mistakes 
made by the speaker. Remaining with our example of the mathematician or philosopher 
demonstrating a proof, the envious listener delights in the forgetfulness, hasty 
generalizations and impatience of the speaker. When the speaker misses the mark, makes 
a mistake in his proof, Plutarch adds, the envious listener does not put himself in the 
position of remedying the deficiency by contributing positively to the topic in some novel 
way, he tallies the mistakes, as if keeping score, in order to detract further from what is 
heard. The envious listener is concerned with third person reactions or audience 
receptiveness insofar as it may become aware of the speaker’s shortcomings. He voices 
disagreements by dwelling on the comments made by the speaker’s detractors, and if this 
is in effective in belittling the speaker, the envious listener insists that the proof at hand 
has been demonstrated better and more capably by other mathematicians or philosophers.                
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At bottom, Plutarch explains, the envious listener is motivated by an overriding desire for 
standing and recognition. 
Admiration (thaumazin) 
 “Admiration is the opposite to contempt, and it is, of course, a sign of more 
reasonable and equable nature; all the same, it too needs quite a lot of caution, and 
perhaps even more” (40f). 
Admiration as a moral disposition and its effect on how one listens and what is 
heard is the opposite of envy. Envy disregards content for superficialities, whereas 
admiration lacks a critical sense due to its eagerness and openness to assimilate what is 
said. Admiration signifies a character that poorly distinguishes between that which is 
precious and that which is pernicious in speech. Plutarch suggests that an admiring 
listener needs to be vigilant about philosophical argumentation and what it is conveying. 
Plutarch is describing the prudence that should inform all intelligent listening. Simply to  
be excited about what a speaker is saying is not enough. It is possible to curb the 
corrupting influence of an uncritical admiration. Plutarch’s practical suggestion is that 
upon the completion of hearing a speech or at the conclusion of a conversation we must 
ask ourselves whether we have been rewarded by the speech or conversation: “Am I now 
more confused after having talked with him?” “Did the speech provide me with moral 
insight?” Plutarch’s practical suggestion is eudaemonistic because it asks the admiring 
listener to place what he has heard within the larger context of  what constitutes a happy 
life, and, in turn, to assess whether or not what was heard enhances or subtracts from a 
virtuous life (see Vlastos, 1991, 200-232 on eudaemonism).  
  
Non-Active (cataeurythmus) Listening and Active (erythmus) Listening 
 Plutarch’s characterization of non-active and active listening pertains mainly to 
listening to speeches or lectures. Nonetheless, Plutarch’s outline of the responsibility of 
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the listener vis-à-vis the speaker is instructive for the intimacy of conversation between 
two or more interlocutors.  
Plutarch warns that people who non-actively listen take it for granted that the 
listener has no role to play while listening, whereas the speaker is presumed to have his 
subject-matter in order and so nothing further is needed on the part of the listener except 
to listen. This way of construing the situation could not be further from what actually 
takes place between the speaker and the listener. Plutarch argues that both the listener and 
the speaker have responsibilities that make for a productive conversation. Specifically, a 
concern for moral responsibility towards self-improvement should characterize the 
relationship between the one speaking and the one hearing. The responsible listener and 
the speaker must see themselves as composing a “harmonious rhythm” (45e-f). What 
Plutarch has in mind is the appropriate verbal and non-verbal communication that 
transpires when two or more people interact, and how what transpires incites each person, 
the speaker and the listener, to speak and listen as if they were taking part effortlessly in a 
very delicate balancing act. One of the more practical examples of harmonious rhythm 
Plutarch discusses is for the listener to have good manners and not to praise the speaker 
immoderately. 
Plutarch also tells us that the speaker must be prepared to present his information 
in an orderly, engaged manner. But more importantly, it is the active listener who 
complements the speaker’s preparedness by further reflecting on what has been said. Not 
to mimic, parrot style, what has been said as if one were a recorder intending to play back 
verbatim what the speaker said at some future time, but actively add to what has been 
said for the purpose of aiding “original thinking”23 and for the benefit of one’s own moral 
                                                        
23  Hume 1987, 253 aptly describes, many centuries later, what Plutarch seems to have in mind: “The great 
part of mankind may be divided into two classes; that of shallow thinkers, who fall short of the truth; and 
that of abstruse thinkers who go beyond it. The latter class are by far the most rare: and I may add, by far 
the most useful and valuable. They suggest hints, at least, and start difficulties, which they want, perhaps, 
skill to pursue; but which may produce fine discoveries, when handled by men who have a more just way 
of thinking.” 
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excellence. Listening must awaken the native abilities of the listener, to do otherwise, 
Plutarch tells us, is to be “sophistic and curious”24 (48dff.).  
Another aspect of active listening is to view criticism as a necessary step towards 
self-improvement. It is only through criticism, Plutarch believes, that youthful 
complacency can be minimized. We must pity the youthful listeners who “treat a rebuke 
by a philosopher with nonchalance or indifference, and laugh at reproof and praise their 
reprovers” (46c-d) because it is indicative of bad education and breeding. The opposite 
tendency of resistance towards criticism is the tendency towards sensitivity when 
criticized. Sensitivity may suggest a receptive nature on the part of the youthful listener, 
but often times it is this very sensitivity that accounts for the “lack of discipline and 
manliness” (46e-f) which turns the listener towards “flatterers” and “professional 
speakers.” The underlying idea behind the issue of indifference and sensitivity towards 
criticism is that listening, like philosophy, causes pain. And just as we would look 
forward to bandaging after having surgery, Plutarch reminds us, after youthful 
pretensions have been deflated by listening to the stings of reason, one should not run 
away before one has tried the treatment prescribed by reason. Plutarch concludes his 
treatise On Listening by reminding us that proper listening is the means by which reason 
habituates the listener towards self-improvement and proper living.  
   
Plato’s Alcibiades Major  
 As we have discussed, particular dispositions can determine what and how we 
hear, and it is in the dialogue Alcibiades Major that this is well illustrated. That is, the 
dialogue Alcibiades Major can be read in such a way as to show how envy, excessive 
admiration and non-active listening account for the failure of Alcibiades to listen to the 
Socratic conversation appropriately.   
                                                        
24 One might see a connection of active listening to “recollection” in Plato’s Meno. Meno is a poor 
interlocutor since he is not really active in the conversation. He does not much think but dodges. In contrast 
the slave is active and takes to heart what Socrates says. 
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Like Nicander in Plutarch’s treatise, Alcibiades is coming of age, and his 
enormous ambition and potential is seen by Socrates as calling for concern. What 
compels Socrates to engage Alcibiades in conversation is that Socrates recognizes the 
outstanding nature (phusis) that Alcibiades has is conducive to philosophy,25 but that 
Alcibiades is profoundly ignorant about the means by which he can fulfill his desire to be 
a great political leader. Ambitious figures such as Alcibiades are in need of self-analysis, 
because their overwhelming talent and insatiable desires can either be utilized 
constructively or destructively. Socrates’ task in the Alcibiades Major is essentially 
protreptic. It is through the Socratic conversation that Alcibiades’ desire to rule Europe 
and Asia will be re-directed towards desiring to rule himself first by cultivating that part 
of his soul where reason rules and is most divine.  
  
Envy and Alcibiades 
  In the opening pages of the dialogue, Socrates comes across in a strange manner 
(see 103a-105a). He explains to Alcibiades that he, in fact, is Alcibiades’ first and true 
lover. Socrates explains that ever since Alcibiades was a little boy he has observed him 
because he was unable to talk to him, until now, due to his daimonic voice. Socrates has 
observed many things over the years regarding Alcibiades, including the education he has 
received. In addition to taking notice of Alcibiades’ education, Socrates has correctly 
surmised that Alcibiades’ ambition is motivated by envy. Socrates’ insight is shown 
initially in a rather abrupt fashion when Socrates claims that Alcibiades feels entitled to 
be honored more than Pericles and anyone else, past or present. As the dialogue unfolds 
and Alcibiades is made aware of  the work required of him, we see that it becomes 
ambition in the service of envy that characterizes Alcibiades’ desire to be a great political 
ruler. To understand better Alcibiades’ envy we need only think of an individual with 
                                                        
 25 It is Diotima’s praise of eros in the Symposium (209b-e4) that illustrates best Socrates’ attraction to 
Alcibiades.  
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such large desires for personal and public distinction that it becomes almost painful to 
witness other’s accomplishments without that individual feeling a personal sense of loss. 
Alcibiades is such an individual. Alcibiades’ beauty, wealth and family connections can 
not satiate his large political desires, or the envy he suffers from, but is not yet fully 
aware of. In no uncertain terms, but quite subtly, Socrates piques Alcibiades’ wonder at 
the scope of his envy by imputing to Alcibiades a profound state of discontent. Socrates’ 
diagnostic ability is clearly on display in the following remarks spoken to the young 
Alcibiades:  
Suppose one of the gods asked you, ‘Alcibiades, would you rather live with what 
you now have, or would you rather die on the spot if you weren’t permitted to 
acquire anything greater’? I think you’d choose to die. What then is your real 
ambition in life? I’ll tell you. You think that as soon as you present yourself 
before the Athenian people—as indeed you expect to in a very few days—by 
presenting yourself you’ll show them that you deserve to be honored more than 
Pericles or anyone else who ever was. Having shown that, you'll be the most 
influential man in the city, and if you’re the greatest  here, you’ll be the greatest in 
the rest of Greece, and not only in Greece, but also among the foreigners who live 
on the same continent as we do. (105a-b) 
Alcibiades does not deny Socrates’ imputation, his desires are now transparent, so 
the dialogue proceeds as if Alcibiades freely confessed his discontent.  How do we know 
Alcibiades is envious? Aristotle’s account of envy in Rhetoric ii explains that to be 
envious is to be discontent because one has been aroused by another’s better fortune. 
Alcibiades is not yet fully conscious of another’s better fortune, this will be thematized 
for him in the Spartan and Persian tale, but he is aware of his uneasiness and enormous 
ambition. We want to claim that Alcibiades is partially conscious of another’s better 
fortune because it takes us quite a distance in making sense of Socrates’ claim, and 
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Alcibiades’ implied agreement, that Alcibiades thinks he deserves to be honored more 
than Pericles and anyone who ever was.  
Who is in a better position than Alcibiades to judge whether or not Pericles should 
be honored less.  Pericles, the influential politician  and general of the years between the 
Persian and Peloponnesian Wars, assumed guardianship of Alcibiades and his brother 
Clinias after their father died in the battle of Coronea (see Jaeger 1998, 406-411 and 
Plutarch 1992, vol.1, 201-234 on the life of Pericles). Alcibiades at this young age is so 
sure of himself he believes he will obscure the other generals and statesmen once he 
concerns himself with public affairs, and will eventually outdo Pericles’ reputation and 
authority. But Alcibiades has not said these things himself; he has not said he is Pericles’ 
equal. These various statements have only been implied because Alcibiades has not yet 
been disabused of the notion, a notion Socrates will forthrightly do away with (at 118c-
119c), that Pericles was unable to teach him what the just and admirable and the good 
and advantageous are. Subsequently, Alcibiades is partially aware of Pericles’ better 
fortune, but in due course his uneasiness and ambition will be shown to be based on envy. 
Pericles and his reputation will be the first obstacle to overcome in order for Alcibiades 
to achieve greatness.  
Having disclosed Alcibiades’ ambitions, Socrates asserts that they are impossible 
to achieve without his help (105d). The god would not permit Socrates to speak with 
Alcibiades until all the young man’ s great hopes were developed so that he would be 
willing to listen to Socrates since in no other way can he get the power he seeks. 
Socrates’ aim is to get the type of power over Alcibiades that Alcibiades desires to get 
over the Athenians (105e). Thus the young man who supposed himself in need of no one 
is told that he desperately needs Socrates in order to achieve any of his ambitions. This 
shocks and intrigues Alcibiades. Unlike his other suitors that offered him small 
advantages, Socrates offers him the world. What Socrates has done is to set himself up as 
the object of Alcibiades’ envy, but only to facilitate his more comprehensive aim, which 
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is to harness Alcibiades’ envy, and attach it to a life that is worthy or the best type of life. 
That is, by providing Alcibiades with an ultimate end, Alcibiades’ life will be identified 
and ruled by that end. The notion of eudaemonism underlies Socrates’ continuous 
references to the gods (105e5; 124c-d). Someone as ambitious as Alcibiades has no need 
for anything above himself. In an intellectual and pragmatic sense the divine must 
become the ultimate object of envy for Alcibiades. Only in this way will Alcibiades, in 
striving to be god-like, continuously find the motivation to cultivate himself, especially 
while out of earshot of Socrates. Before this can happen, Socrates must further inflame 
Alcibiades’ envy through the telling of the Spartan and Persian Tale.26 
     
Admiration, Alcibiades and the Persian and Spartan Tale   
  Alcibiades is brought to the point of acknowledging that he needs to care for 
himself, and that his thinking regarding local, Athenian politicians prevents him from 
doing so, because he thinks his natural abilities will be adequate. As we have argued, the 
disposition Socrates finds Alcibiades to have is envy. More accurately, ambition in the 
service of envy. It is Socrates’ task to provide Alcibiades with an end to strive towards; to 
provide direction and content to his overwhelming ambition. As the dialogue unfolds, we 
see that self-knowledge is what Socrates is prescribing to Alcibiades. What started off as 
an Alcibiades filled with envy and ambition gradually gives way to an uncritical 
admiration for the picture Socrates draws of the Spartan and Persian Kings.   
The tale of the Spartan and Persian Kings illustrates the relationship between 
political success and self-perfection. Socrates begins the tale by explaining to Alcibiades 
that his political ambitions can no longer be satisfied by simply outdoing the local 
                                                        
26 Commenting on the favorable attention the prisoners of Pylos gave to Nicias after the peace and 
restitution of the captives Plutarch says the following: “It was commonly said in Greece, that the war was 
begun by Pericles, and that Nicias made an end of it, and the peace was generally called the peace of 
Nicias. Alcibiades was extremely annoyed at this, and being full of envy, set himself to break the league.” 
Plutarch’s Lives: Alcibiades, 263, volume I. Plutarch’s comments are consistent with our argument that 
Socrates exploits Alcibiades’ envy in order to steer him toward philosophy. 
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Athenian politicians. In fact, if he really wants to attain what he has set out to do, which 
is to rule all of Greece and Europe, he must first become aware of, and then suitably 
assess, his true competitors with whom he must struggle (agwna, 120a6). Socrates 
informs Alcibiades that his main competitors are the Spartan and Persian Kings. What 
makes these kings worthy of Alcibiades’ attention is how they handle their women, their 
wealth, and their education. The Spartan Kings, Socrates says, are held in such high 
esteem that their wives “are guarded at public expense by the ephors, so that every 
precaution is taken to ensure that their kings are descended from the family of Heraclide 
alone” (121c). The Persian King is so supreme his queen does not need to be protected; 
fear (phobu, 121c3) prevents her from being unfaithful. When the Persian son and heir to 
the throne is born all of Asia celebrates; and the boy is brought up by royal tutors.  
Alcibiades’ tutor was old and useless, Socrates reminds him, and hardly anyone noticed 
when he was born. Socrates concludes the tale by stressing the amount of wealth the 
Spartan and Persian Kings have. Spartan wealth greatly exceeds Athens’, he tells 
Alcibiades, and their land in Messene is larger than all the estates in Athens. Persian 
wealth, on the other hand, is even larger than Sparta’s. According to Socrates, a reliable 
source informed him that the Persian court is so large that each tract of land is “named for 
a part of the queen’s wardrobe” (123, b-c).  
Alcibiades’ reaction to the tale is quite predictable; it is excessive. Alcibiades has 
been awed by Socrates’ portrait of the kings. Alcibiades’ excessive admiration of the tale 
is illustrated in the section directly preceding (124b1-126e1) the royal tale. The question 
at issue is what constitutes a healthy (hygieias) city. The intention of the royal tale, we 
must not forget, is to get Alcibiades to see who his real competition is in order to deflate 
his pretensions of knowledge so he can care for himself. Instead, Alcibiades admires the 
grandiose vision of the Spartan and Persian Kings so much that he answers Socrates’ 
question by equating like-mindedness (homonoia) of the citizens of the city to “the 
friendship (philian) and agreement (homonoean) you find when a mother and father agree 
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with a son they love, and when a brother agrees with his brother, and a women agrees 
with her husband” (126e1-4). Socrates suggests that homonoia must be analogous to 
common knowledge found among practitioners of a particular craft or art, such as 
arithmetic. 
The type of agreement Alcibiades prefers is subjective and unaccountable. 
Personal failings on the part of the brother, or a wife in relation to her husband, would not 
sever the agreement unless extreme circumstances prevailed. These types of relationships 
do not call for Alcibiades to master himself. The assumptions that Alcibiades seems to be 
making is that all will recognize his greatness without his having to lift a finger. 
Alcibiades is displaying a sense of entitlement, and Socrates recognizes this continuous 
subtle drift to which Alcibiades is prone. The type of agreement Socrates is looking for is 
the type of agreement that is intellectually based. The type of like-mindedness knowers of 
a particular art, such as mathematics, would have. Alcibiades’ conception of agreement 
precludes self-cultivation; he is claiming that emotional, familial-like agreements can be 
had despite a lack of an objective criterion by which we can separate the knowers from 
the non-knowers. This lack of intellectual agreement cannot have the necessary protreptic 
effect that Alcibiades needs because there is no common criterion Alcibiades feels 
compelled to aspire to. The practical implication of Alcibiades’ way of thinking is that he 
can neglect his soul. That is, the part of his soul that is wise and God-like.27  
  
Non-Active Listening and Alcibiades 
 Non-Active listening is the last disposition we must explore to determine how it 
played a part in the failure of Alcibiades to listen appropriately to the Socratic 
conversation. The main aspect of active listening that concerns our reading of the 
                                                        
 27  This correlates well with the leading philosophical thought that all beings are to be understood in terms 
of the principle of being, i.e., that which has being fully and independently (see, e.g., Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics iv 1-2 and NE 1168b31-33: “just as the city or any other systematic whole is most properly 
identified with the most authoritative element in it, so is man”.) 
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Alcibiades Major is what Plutarch describes as both the listener and speaker sharing the 
responsibility of forming a “harmonious rhythm.” That is, aside from the speaker or 
questioner being prepared to impart and promote knowledge through speech—moral 
knowledge in the case of Alcibiades’ conversation with Socrates—the listener must 
respond to what is being said  by showing what was said by the speaker has been 
understood intellectually and dispositionally. For a listener to understand intellectually 
and dispositionally the listener must be able to give an account of  what is heard through 
effectively explaining it to others and by exhibiting it to others through his behavior. 
There needs to be a harmonizing of word (logos) and deed (ergon). It is only in this way 
that we know the listener has been affected, the dye has been cast.     Does Alcibiades 
actively listen? Although in the course of the dialogue Alcibiades submits to Socratic 
questioning, and allegedly turns from his overwhelming desire for political rule to the 
care of his soul (128d-e), Alcibiades’ closing remarks illustrate that the Socratic 
conversation did not make a deep enough impression on him. Alcibiades did not actively 
listen, and so the dialogue ends on a rather unharmonious note with Socrates suggesting 
that the power of the city may prove to be his and Alcibiades’ downfall (135e). Why 
would Socrates make such a statement?  
Socrates makes such a statement because Alcibiades fails to locate the proper 
starting point for the arduous task of self-cultivation. The following exchange reveals 
Alcibiades’ persistent confusion, despite having come this far in the Socratic 
conversation, and Socrates’ unwillingness to name that confusion for what it is, 
slavishness (duleuin):   
S: Then do you know how to escape (apopheuxa) from your present state? 
     Let’s not call a handsome young man by that name. 
A: I do. 
S:  How? 
A: It’s up to you, Socrates. 
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S:  That’s not well said, Alcibiades. 
A: Well, what should I say? 
S:  That it’s up to God (oti ean theus ethela). 
A: Then that’s what I say. And furthermore I say this as well: we’re probably   
going to change roles, Socrates. I’ll be playing yours and you’ll be playing            
mine, for from this day forward I will always attend on you, and you will have 
me as your constant companion. 
 S:  Then my love for you, my excellent friend, will be just like a stork: after hat- 
      ching a winged love for you, it will be cared for by it in return. 
 A: Yes, that’s right. I’ll start to cultivate (epimelesthai) justice in myself right   
     now. (135c13-e4) 
 Alcibiades answering in such a way reveals his lack of understanding of the discussion 
he and Socrates have had in the dialogue. This lack of understanding on the part of  
Alcibiades is revealed by Socrates comparing his love for the youth to a stork. The 
commentator Nicholas Denyer points out in his commentary on Alcibiades that popular 
ornithology held that once storks taught their young how to fly their roles reversed, and 
the offspring cared for their parents. Likewise, Socrates has not only expressed his love 
for Alcibiades, he has produced in Alcibiades a counterlove for Socrates. In the Phaedrus 
255c-e we get the following description of  how the exchange of love between the lover 
and the beloved should unfold: 
Think how a breeze or an echo bounces back from a smooth solid object to its 
source; that is how the stream of beauty goes back to the beautiful boy and sets 
him aflutter. … So when the lover is near, the boy’s pain is relieved just as the 
lover’s is, and when they are apart he yearns as much as he is yearned for, 
because he has a mirror image of love in him—‘backlove’ [counterlove]—though 
he neither speaks nor thinks of it as love, but as friendship.   
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To Alcibiades’ credit he knows his initial role as beloved has been reversed, but he fails 
to understand that the reversal supervened as a result of his conversation with Socrates 
about justice. The earnestness with which Alcibiades concludes his conversation with 
Socrates by claiming he will start to cultivate justice in himself right away belies non-
active listening because for Alcibiades to have located the proper starting point for the 
arduous task of cultivating justice within himself he would have recognized it began in 
the beginning of his conversation with Socrates.     
  
Conclusion   
 Plutarch’s short treatise On Listening is both practical and profound. Its practical 
suggestion is that a listener’s dispositions can affect the receptivity toward what is heard. 
Among the young, Plutarch claims, the overriding dispositions that impede the moral 
benefit that is to be gained through conversation are envy, excessive admiration, and non-
active listening— just the sorts of dispositions we have found Alcibiades to have in 
Plato’s Alcibiades Major. On Listening’s more profound suggestion is that to care for 
ourselves there needs to be a perspective outside of ourselves to engage us in 
conversation— just the sort of approach Socrates takes towards Alcibiades. At least there 
must be this external challenge to our self so long as that self is not adequately 
developed. In fact, on a dramatic level, Socrates set out to redirect the provincial political 
ambition that Alcibiades harbors towards a concern for a genuine rule over his soul, but 
by the end of the dialogue Alcibiades’ inability to listen actively blinds him to the 
realization that throughout the Socratic conversation he had been cultivating justice in his 
soul.  
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Chapter Three: Alcibiades Major and the Apology  
 
The ancients regarded Alcibiades Major as the best introduction to Platonic 
philosophy because it contains in germ all the leading ideas found in the other dialogues 
that constitute Plato’s corpus.28 One of the more fascinating aspects of Alcibiades Major 
is that we see over the course of the dialogue Alcibiades transform from an arrogant, self-
sufficient youth who wants to be a great Athenian ruler to a humble youth who is willing 
to submit himself to Socrates for the sake of cultivating his soul, the ‘true self’. The 
transformation of Alcibiades merits further analysis because in addition to the protreptic 
effect the Socratic conversation has on him, it illustrates in impressive detail29 how 
Socrates operates and what means he employs to induce the protreptic effect. To speak of 
Alcibiades Major as providing important information about Socrates’ philosophical 
approach may initially seem awkward since Plato’s Apology might be the primary source 
of information pertaining to the historical Socrates. We will argue that because the 
principal idea found in Alcibiades Major is also found in the Apology, each dialogue is a 
natural complement to the other. By first reading the Apology as a synoptic view of 
Socrates’ orientation, and then reading Alcibiades Major as a specific view of Socrates’ 
cross-examination, we begin to see how these dialogues are complementary. The leading 
theme in both dialogues is establishing priorities in one’s life. There are also other themes 
found in both dialogues that are worthy of attention.  
   Establishing priorities in life is central to understanding Socrates’ conduct before 
the jury in the Apology and Socrates’ approach to Alcibiades in Alcibiades Major. 
                                                        
28 See the commentaries of Olympiodorus (Commentary on the first Alcibiades of Plato 10.18-II.6), and  
Proclus ( Sur le premier Alcibiade de Platon II.I-21) cited in Denyer. The Islamic philosopher Alfarabi 
comments, too, that all the Platonic questions are raised in Alcibiades Major (Alfarabi 1962, 53-54).    
29 Shorey 1933, 415 does not look favorably upon the details. Commenting on Alcibiades Major Shorey 
says the following: 
…we have to assume…that he [Plato] thought it worthwhile to elaborate a tedious, if  
scholastically convenient, summary of a long series of ideas and points that are better and more  
interestingly expressed in other dialogues… . 
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Socrates, in Alcibiades Major, confronts an interlocutor30 that cares more about what he 
has (e.g., wealth, power, honors, etc.) than about what he is. Alcibiades is a soul in need 
of cultivation and his soul merits attention before all competing alternatives. The task of 
reorganizing the interlocutor’s priorities is facilitated by Socratic testing, exhortation, and 
examination. Socrates’ criticism of Alcibiades’ priorities in Alcibiades Major, and the 
Athenians’ priorities in the Apology, is informed by moral reflection that is 
eudaemonistic. Eudaemonism is the idea that our lives should be directed at some 
ultimate end (i.e., happiness) with other ends subordinate to it. Once what happiness is is 
determined what should be sought is what contributes to happiness. In these two 
dialogues Socrates does not advocate a facile criterion for the proper ordering of  
priorities, but instead advocates by word and deed the best way to live.      
In the Apology there are two instances where Socrates addresses directly the issue 
of priorities. The first instance occurs after Socrates rejects his counterfactual reflection 
that entertains the possibility of acquittal on the condition he cease his investigations and 
stop practicing philosophy (29c6-29e4). The second instance occurs  after the jury finds 
Socrates guilty (36b4-d). In both instances Socrates addresses broadly the issue of 
Athenian priorities, mainly by focusing on the priorities held by the citizenry as a whole. 
The discussion of priorities in Alcibiades Major will complement the broad discussion of 
priorities in the Apology because Alcibiades is specifically approached by Socrates with 
the intent of trying to reorder Alcibiades’ priorities in order to assist him in the realization 
of his ambition.    
 
                                                        
30 Although Socrates defends his life, he does not wish merely to get off from the charges any way that he 
can. Were this his objective he should bring his children into court, cry, beg forgiveness, promise never to 
do such things again. Rather than conduct his defense this way, he tries to make his defense as much like 
the usual conversation as he can so that the Athenians will be confronted with Socrates as he is, and they 
will have to decide whether they find him as he is guilty or not guilty. The best way to defend his life, 
Socrates thinks, is to display that life in the courtroom. Hence this dialogue really is a dialogue. For a 
denial that the Apology is a dialogue see Myles Burnyeat’s ‘The Impiety of Socrates,’ Ancient Philosophy 
17 (1997), 1-12.  
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Priorities 
In the presence of the Athenian jury, Socrates underscores the ordering of 
priorities that inform his philosophical investigations and his general concern for the soul 
by presenting a counterfactual reflection. He entertains the possibility that the jury offers 
him an acquittal on the condition that he cease his investigations and stop practicing 
philosophy or die. If he were acquitted on those terms, Socrates imagines himself to say: 
Gentlemen of the jury, I am grateful and I am your friend, but I will obey the 
 god rather than you, as long as I draw breath and am able, I shall not cease to 
practice philosophy (philosophon), to exhort you and in my usual way to point out 
to any one of you whom I happen to meet: Good sir, you are an Athenian, a 
citizen of  the greatest city with the greatest reputation for both wisdom and 
power; are you not ashamed of your eagerness to possess as much wealth, 
reputation and honors as possible, while you do not care for nor give thought to 
wisdom (phroneseos) or truth, or the best possible state of your soul? (29d-e4) 
Socrates admonishes the Athenians to be ever vigilant in ordering all that they care about 
and to have the appropriate priorities in mind. What might this ordering of priorities look 
like? Consideration of a related passage at 29e-30b reveals Socrates’ standpoint in 
challenging the citizens of Athens for neglecting the right order through placing greater 
value on their personal possessions than their souls and thus attaching little importance to 
the most important things (e.g., wisdom, truth and the soul), while cherishing inferior 
things (e.g., wealth, reputation and honors). Socrates endorses the following claim:  
Wealth does not bring about excellence, but excellence makes wealth and 
everything else good for men, both individually and collectively.  
(hoyk ek chrematon arete gignetae, allex arete chremata kae ta alla agatha toes 
anthropoes kae idia kae demosia, 30a9-10)  
We can interpret this passage in several ways. Either virtue makes wealth and other 
things good for humans collectively or privately; or virtue does not come from wealth but 
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that from virtue comes wealth and all other goods for man collectively and privately. The 
ambiguity may be intentional to allow for both interpretations, but each interpretation is 
anchored in an order that prioritizes three types of goods: goods of the soul; goods of the 
body; and external goods. Goods of the soul revolve around the mutually entailing ideas 
of knowledge and virtue; goods of the body include non-moral qualities such as health; 
and external goods include, among other non-moral goods, wealth and honors. Socrates 
believes in the greater value of the soul than of the body and its possessions. What 
Socrates suggests is that only the goods of the soul allow one to use the other goods well 
(We will say more about the soul’s value when overseen by wisdom when the second 
instance of priorities is discussed). Even if external goods are most necessary, they are 
not the highest since the soul is what uses the others. For example, when we consider that 
it may be true that the virtuous person is rich,  presumably it is because such a person 
knows how to make do or do the best with what he has due to the moderating influences 
of the soul. We are now in a better position to appreciate why Socrates admonishes the 
Athenians so single-mindedly as his counterfactual reflection attests. The very things that 
give Athens the reputation for ‘both wisdom and power’ blind it and make it ‘sluggish’ 
(30e4) with respect to the most important things (30d4). Athens is blinded by its bodily 
goods and its possessions. Thus, the right ordering of Athenian priorities becomes the  
concern of Socrates’ examination and exhortation of his fellow citizens. 
  Following the jury’s verdict of guilty, Socrates again addresses the issue of  
Athenian priorities, and what role he played as a private citizen in trying to convince 
others to concern themselves with the state of their soul as opposed to the body and its 
possessions. Socrates explains that his counter-assessment must be commensurate with a 
life that has not been lived quietly or concerned with what occupies the majority of 
Athenians: wealth, household affairs and political offices (36b-c). The life that Socrates 
has tried to live is a life that has been useful, both to himself and to others: 
 I did not follow that path that would have made me of no use (ophelus) 
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either to you or to myself, but I went to each of you privately and conferred upon 
him what I say is the greatest benefit (eyergetin ten megisten), by trying to 
persuade (pithin) him not to care (epimelisthae) for any of his belongings before 
caring that he himself should be as good and wise (beltistus kae phronimotatus) as 
possible, not to care for the city’s possessions more than for the city itself (aytes 
tes poleos), and to care for other things in the same way. (36c-d) 
Whereas Socrates admonishes the Athenians for their lack of priorities in ranking the 
three types of goods in his initial discussion, in the passage we are considering we find 
Socrates reflecting on the worthiness of a life that is dedicated to the state of the soul. 
What is it appropriate that someone like Socrates should suffer who, having the proper 
perspective towards conventional goods, has gone around persuading people to care for 
themselves before any of their things or for the things of the city before the city itself. 
Socrates is a friend of Athens and has tried to benefit it as much as possible by being 
useful. What might Socrates have in mind when he describes his conduct as being 
beneficial and useful? Socrates is expressing the idea that the virtuous soul, that is 
directed by wisdom, determines how we put bodily and external goods to practical use. 
Hence, virtue is useful and beneficial.31  
In the Meno we see Socrates considering the practical aspect of virtue in his 
discussion with Meno. The following exchange between the two amplifies Socrates’ 
assumptions in the Apology regarding the practical effect the privileging of the soul in the 
ordering of his priorities, and the soul’s quest for virtue, had on his fellow Athenians and 
himself: 
So virtue is something beneficial (ophelimum)?—That necessarily follows from 
what has been agreed.—Let us then examine what kinds of things benefit us, 
taking them up one by one: health (hygieia), we say, and strength (ischys), and 
                                                        
31 Xenophon’s Memorabilia insists that Socrates’ central characteristic is usefulness (esp. Xenophon’s 
discussion of Socrates approach to friendship (2. 4-7). Cf. Aristotle, Rhet. 1.9.1366a 36-8. 
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beauty (kallus), and also wealth (plutus). We say that these things, and others of 
the same kind, benefit us, do we not?—We do.—Yet we say that these same 
things also sometimes harm (blaptin) one. Do you agree or not?—I do.—Look 
then, what directing (egetae) factor determines in each case whether these things 
benefit or harm us? Is it not the right (ortha) use of them that benefits us, and the 
wrong use that harms us?—Certainly.—Let us know look at the qualities of the 
soul. There is something you call moderation, and justice, courage, intelligence, 
memory, munificence, and all such things?—There is.— … Therefore, in a word, 
all that the soul undertakes and endures, if directed (egumenes) by wisdom 
(phroneseos), ends in happiness (eydaemonian), but if directed by ignorance 
(aphrosynes), it ends in the opposite?—That is likely. (87e—88c) 
 Socrates benefited the Athenians because his conversations, exhibited through testing, 
exhorting and examining, sought to persuade others to prioritize their lives in such way 
that all that they did, from the quotidian to the heroic, would take into account the 
positive, directing power wisdom has on the soul. The passage being considered is 
significant because it amplifies Socrates’ earlier statement in presenting his 
counterfactual reflection to the jury: ‘…while you do not care for nor give thought to 
wisdom…’ (29e1-2); and it clarifies why Socrates proposes dining in the Prytaneum as a 
counter-penalty to Meletus’ assessment of death. 
For the Athenians to disregard and not give thought to wisdom, the directing 
factor, is to disregard the transformative, beneficial effect wisdom can have on the soul. It 
is only through wisdom that the soul can bring to fruition, by striving towards the 
appropriate ends through the appropriate means, the power Athens is reputed to excel 
in.32 What Socrates’ characterization of the transformative power of wisdom in the 
                                                        
32 Socrates says as much by voicing (32bff.)) his objection while presiding in the Council to the Athenians 
wishing to try together the Ten Generals who had failed to collect the dead after the naval victory at 
Arginusae in 406. Socrates is defending the illegality of trying them altogether. Also he prudently thinks it 
foolish to kill your best generals in time of grave danger.   
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Apology (29d-e4) and the Meno suggests is that wisdom has a particular type of nature. 
The presence of it in one’s soul entails happiness; but even the mere thought of it sets one 
on the path of distinguishing the soul from what the soul uses (i.e., the body and its 
possessions). Wisdom prioritizes the soul’s goods (i.e., the body and its desires). The 
nature of wisdom also goes some way in explaining why Socrates would propose dining 
in the Prytaneum as a counter penalty.  
The significance of Socrates’ proposing such a penalty was that there was no 
regular penalty provided by the main charge brought against him, corruption of the youth 
(see Kitchel 1898, 30-36), so Meletus, the plaintiff, proposes death. Socrates, the 
defendant, is allowed to make a counter penalty, which he does in a rather dramatic 
fashion:  
 Nothing is more suitable, gentleman, than for such a man to be fed in the  
 Prytaneum, much more suitable for him than for any one of you who has won a 
 victory at Olympia with a pair or a team of horses. The Olympian victor makes  
 you think yourself happy; I make you be happy. (36d3-37a) 
Such a man is a man who has not lived a quiet life or has concerned himself with what 
occupies the majority of Athenians. When we recall that the Prytaneum was the town hall 
of Athens where, among other things, Olympian victors were celebrated upon their return 
home, we see Socrates’ counter-penalty as commentary on justice as distribution 
according to worth or merit.33 The true victors, like Socrates, have greatly benefited 
Athens by getting its citizens to adopt a perspective toward themselves that takes 
seriously the state of the their souls. The soul directed by wisdom is the standard of all 
values which in turn creates justice, good laws and right priorities in the city, which 
brings happiness to all. The Olympian victor, on the other hand, makes the Athenian 
seem happy because in the victorious wrestler, boxer, runner or chariot-racer he thinks he 
                                                        
33 See the OCD 1996, 1268-1269 on the difference between the once-only invitation to dine (xenia, 
deipnon) in the Prytaneum and the highly honorific permanent maintenance (sitesis) to dine in the 
Prytaneum. Socrates is requesting sitesis. 
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is witnessing the ‘revelation of the victor’s divine arete’ (Jaeger 1965, 173; cf. Pindar’s 
Olympian Odes in Bowra 1969, 32, 69, 64, 106, 122). The athletic ideal becomes the 
standard of all values in the praise of the Olympic victor, but the ideal can only be 
appreciated properly once it is seen as being subordinate to the role of wisdom in 
upholding the welfare of the city.34 Socrates’ concern that his fellow Athenians maintain 
the appropriate priorities in their lives and the city as a whole makes him worthy of free 
meals in the Prytaneum.  
 
Alcibiades Major and Priorities               
In the dialogue Alcibiades Major, Socrates’ orientation towards Alcibiades 
struggles with the priorities favored for the Athenians in the Apology since Alcibiades 
embodies big ambitions and ‘great qualities’, such as good-looks, wealth, and a noble 
pedigree, with limited concern for the state of his soul (104a3). The characterization of 
Alcibiades recalls Socrates’ admonishing of the Athenians for their lack of self 
examination and complacency in being the ‘greatest city with the greatest reputation for 
both wisdom and power’ (29d8-9). In both dialogues we see the interlocutor concerning 
himself with bodily and external goods as opposed to the cultivation of wisdom within 
the soul. The difference between the two dialogues, a difference which makes them 
complementary, is that in Alcibiades Major Socrates shows how the proper ordering of 
priorities plays out in a specific interlocutor with a specific  ambition. We find again two 
instances in Alcibiades Major where Socrates addresses the issue of priorities. The first 
                                                        
34 Socrates is echoing an earlier concern expressed by Xenophanes regarding the conflict between the old 
aristocratic culture of sport and the new philosophical ideal of wisdom:  
…he [the Olympic victors] does not deserve them [honors and gifts] as I do; for this wisdom of 
ours is better than the strength of men and horses! It is a mistaken custom: and there is no justice 
in preferring strength to wisdom. For even if a city has among its citizens a good boxer or a victor 
at wrestling or pentathlon, it is not any more in right order for all that; and a victory at Olympia 
gives little joy to the city, for it does not fill its store-rooms (frg. II trans by Jaeger; cf. Lesher’s 
translation of Xenophanes fragment II). Plato also thinks along the same lines by insisting that within his 
ideal state the guardians will be more deserving of honors and city-wide support compared to the Olympic 
victors: ‘…their victory is nobler and their public support more complete for the victory they have won is 
the salvation of the entire state’ (Republic 465d6-8).    
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occurs in the opening pages of the dialogue where Socrates introduces himself to 
Alcibiades after having observed him for a period of time (103a-c). Socrates’ 
introduction is designed to pique Alcibiades’ wonder in order that he answer Socrates’ 
questions. The issue at hand is why has Alcibiades shunned his pursuers. To Alcibiades’ 
satisfaction Socrates ventures to list the many qualities Alcibiades considers himself to 
excel at, starting with his body and its possessions and ending with his soul. Socrates 
eventually explains to Alcibiades that his ambition of becoming a great Athenian leader 
can be realized only with his help. How Socrates can help brings us to the first instance of 
Socrates’ discussion of priorities in Alcibiades Major. In the closing pages of the 
dialogue Socrates resumes his discussion of Alcibiades’ qualities, not merely by listing 
them as he did initially to pique Alcibiades’ interest, but instead by listing them in the 
proper order in which they should be seen. This is done by getting Alcibiades to see that 
the user or the craftsman is different from what he uses (128a-131b-c). Thus, Alcibiades 
should appreciate that he is different from his good-looks, family connections and 
influential friends, and that his true self, the soul, is in need of wisdom.  
 Socrates introduces himself to Alcibiades after having observed him for an 
unspecified period of time. Other suitors had pursued Alcibiades but they soon gave up 
after having concluded there was not much they could offer him to win him over. 
Socrates is the sole hold out in the pursuit of Alcibiades. The tact Socrates employs to 
woo Alcibiades is to congratulate him by reviewing the qualities that made it so easy for 
Alcibiades dismiss the other would-be lovers: 
You say you don’t need anybody for anything, since your own qualities (inae) are 
so great (megala) there’s nothing you lack; I’ll list them, starting with your body 
(somatus) and ending with your soul (psychen). In the first place, you fancy 
yourself the tallest and best-looking man around—and it’s quite plain to see 
you’re not wrong about that. Next, you think that yours is the leading family in 
your city, which is the greatest city in Greece: on your father’s side you have 
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plenty of aristocratic friends and relations (kai entautha prus patrus te soe philus 
kai syngenis plistus inae kai aristus) who would be of service to you if there was 
any need; and your mother’s side your connections are no worse or no fewer. And 
you have Pericles son of Xanthippus, whom your father left as a guardian to you 
and your brother; you think he’s a more powerful (dynatae) ally then all those 
people mentioned put together… . (104a-b6) 
The glaring omission of qualities pertaining to Alcibiades’ soul in contrast to the glib 
description of both his bodily and external goods is significant. Might Alcibiades pride 
himself only on his body and what pertains to it? After all, Socrates says he will list the 
qualities that made Alcibiades attractive to his pursuers but hard to get. In the omission 
we see Socrates gradually bringing to the fore the issue of priorities in Alcibiades’ under 
appreciation of the state of his soul.  
The extent to which Alcibiades valued and excelled at the qualities that Socrates 
mentions is given more salience when we turn to Plutarch’s Alcibiades. Plutarch 
compares Alcibiades’ beauty to a plant because in each stage of his life, from infancy, 
youth and manhood, it blossomed, giving Alcibiades a grace and charm (Clough, 258). 
Alcibiades’ speech was accented by a lisp which added grace and a persuasiveness to his 
rapid speech prompting Aristophanes and Archippus to take note of it in their literary 
works (259). From his youth on Alcibiades was distinguished by ambition and 
superiority. Such distinguishing characteristics is illustrated by the story of Alcibiades 
obediently obeying his masters when he began to study, except for his adamant refusal to 
play the flute because one had to disfigure the face in order to play it and one could not 
talk while playing. It was due to Alcibiades’ opinion that it was unbecoming of a free 
man to subject himself to such sordid practices that flute playing ceased as a skill to be 
mastered as a part of a liberal education (259-260). What Plutarch tells us about 
Alcibiades’ aristocratic familial origins and prominent friends underscores another facet 
of what Alcibiades excelled at. On his father’s side Alcibiades was said to have 
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descended from Eurysaces, the son of Ajax. On his mother’s side  Alcibiades was said to 
have descended from Alcmaeonidae, a noble Athenian family prominent in politics 
whose first member was archon Megacles (c. 632/1 BC), the father of Dinomache, 
Alcibiades’ mother. It is reported that Clinias, Alcibiades’ father, had a trireme 
constructed at his own expense, gaining honor in the sea fight of the battle of Artemisium 
during the Persian wars (OCD, 184). As far as prominent friends, Alcibiades was raised 
by one of the most popular Athenian leaders during the fifth-century, Pericles. Having 
Pericles as a guardian also enabled Alcibiades to benefit from the extensive network of 
guest-friendships (xenia) Pericles enjoyed (Gribble 1999, 82-90).  
We are now in a better position to see that Socrates is, in fact, telling us 
Alcibiades sends his pursuers ‘packing’ because he sees himself excelling at all the 
conventional goods when compared to his pursuers, but that he fails to excel at the most 
important good, which directs properly the use of all conventional goods: cultivating 
wisdom within his soul. Reminiscent of his concern in the Apology for the ‘greatest’ city 
of Athens with its reputation for both ‘wisdom’ and ‘power’, but blinded by disordered 
priorities due to the very conventional goods it excelled at, Socrates is concerned that the 
very goods Alcibiades prominently possesses will impede his combining a concern for 
his soul with his bodily goods and its possessions. For the city of Athens, and for 
Alcibiades in particular, disordered priorities might even prove to be destructive if we are 
to take seriously Socrates’ remarks reported by Xenophon in his Memorabilia on those 
who excel at conventional gifts. Socrates tells that those who have natural endowments 
are in need most of learning and education. Otherwise, those who are most gifted, but 
without the knowledge to exploit what they excel at, ‘become utterly evil and 
mischievous; for without knowledge to discern their duty, they often put their hand to 
vile deeds’ … . (IV. I. 3-5) After having listed the qualities Alcibiades excels at, Socrates 
brings to the fore the issue of priorities by explaining why he is the last hold-out in the 
pursuit of Alcibiades:                                             
52 
 
I hope to exert great influence (megistum dynesesthae) over you by showing you 
that I’m worth the world to you and that nobody is capable of providing you with 
the influence (dynamin) you crave, neither your guardian (epitropus) nor your 
relatives (syngenes), nor anybody else except me—with god’s (tu theu) help, of 
course… . (105e-106a) 
Socrates’ desire to exert great influence over Alcibiades is not unlike Socrates’ need to 
exhort, ‘test’ and ‘examine’ Athenian priorities in the Apology. Socrates deliberately 
refuses to remain quiet in the face of Alcibiades’ ignorance. It is Alcibiades’ great 
qualities that blind him to the need of tending to his true self, the soul. Only through 
Socrates’ private exhortation, not his guardian Pericles or his relatives, will Alcibiades 
come to see the great benefit Socrates is attempting to bestow upon him. First Alcibiades 
must be brought to see that the concern for the state of his soul entails a radical 
reorganizing of his priorities, which bring us to the second instance of Socrates 
addressing the issue of priorities in Alcibiades Major. 
 Socrates’ initial omission of the psychical qualities Alcibiades excels at becomes 
the topic of conversation once Alcibiades has been shown, through several episodes of 
the Socratic elenchus (106d-112e) and (esp. in light of the discussion 124c-127b10 of 
‘doing the things of oneself’), that reliance on his natural endowments without 
knowledge has not equipped him to give an account of the type of knowledge that would 
have made it possible to advise the Athenians about their business or distinguish between 
the things he uses or cultivates and cultivating himself. The root cause of Alcibiades’ 
inadequacy in both regards is not recognizing the difference between the conventional 
goods he excels at and his soul as his true self. The soul as the topic of conversation, and 
Alcibiades’ complete ignorance regarding the soul as the true self, is on display in the 
following exchange between Socrates and Alcibiades: 
Socrates: Well then, what does it mean to cultivate oneself (ti estin to eautu 
epimelisthae)?—I’m afraid we often think we’re cultivating ourselves when we’re 
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not. When does a man do that? Is he cultivating himself when he cultivates what 
he has (ar otan ton autu epimeletae tote kae autu)?  
Alcibiades: I think so, anyway. (127e-128a) 
Here we see Socrates confronting Alcibiades with the question, ‘What is caring for 
oneself?’ He suggest that most suppose that they are caring for themselves, but instead 
are often caring for their possessions rather than the self. Socrates is making a distinction 
between the parts of the body and the things that the body puts on either to conceal or 
adorn itself. He illustrates this distinction with examples that resonate with Alcibiades’ 
preoccupation with his conventional goods by asking him whether caring for things of the 
feet, such as caring for shoes, is the same as caring for the feet, or caring for a ring of the 
finger is caring for the finger. Alcibiades is not able to answer the question because he 
does not understand the distinction Socrates is making. To help the matter along, Socrates 
clarifies what constitutes care. To care rightly for something is to make it better (128b). 
The art that makes shoes better, or cares for shoes, is shoemaking (skutike). By this art we 
care for shoes rather than feet, but we make the feet better by that art which we make the 
whole body better, gymnastic (gymnastike). Thus, there are different arts by which one 
cares for oneself and by which one cares for the things of oneself (128d). Here Socrates is 
inviting Alcibiades not only to consider the art that would make himself better, but to 
appreciate that the care necessarily prioritizes the way it goes about making X better in 
the same way the soul prioritizes among goods of the body and its possessions. The order 
of priority, which goes from part to whole, is the topic of Socrates’ questions:         
Now if we didn’t know what a shoe was, would we have known (egnomen) what 
skill (techna) makes a shoe better?—No, we couldn’t have.—Nor would we have 
known what skill makes a ring better if we didn’t know what a ring was.—
True.—Well then, could we ever know what skill makes us better if we didn’t 
know what we were? (tis techna beltio poei aytum ar an pote gnoemen agnountes 
ti pot esmen aytoe, 128e) 
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The assumption is that an art makes its subject matter better; the art of X makes X better, 
so the art of shoemaking makes shoes better rather than feet better. What is at issue is 
which art, if any, makes the self better. At 129a Socrates returns to the need to know 
oneself (to gnonae eautum). Socrates asks if such knowledge is easy and for everyone or 
difficult and not for all. Alcibiades wanders in his thought about whether such knowledge 
is for everyone or quite difficult. Alcibiades’ confusion connects with his ambivalence 
about caring for himself. Socrates goes on to say, 
Tell me, how can we come to know the self itself (ayto tauto)? Maybe this is the 
way to find out what we ourselves are—maybe it’s the only possible way. (129b) 
The ambiguity in the phrase the self itself is quite interesting. The most plausible reading 
for the argument being made, which is that the soul is the true self and must be cultivated 
in order for one to direct properly the body and its possessions, is the self itself is the best 
part of oneself, i.e., the soul under the influence of wisdom.  
Socrates employs several other examples for Alcibiades to illustrate that the true 
self or soul is different from what the soul uses. One such example that Alcibiades seems 
to grasp is Socrates’ distinction between discoursing (dialegesthae) and using logos. To 
the aforementioned passage quoted, Alcibiades responds, ‘You say right’ (129b4). 
Socrates refers to what they are presently doing, i.e., exercising logos, to indicate what 
using is and what the self is. Using logos pertains both to the answerer or the questioner, 
but saying things, i.e., discoursing, pertains more to the answerer. Thus, although the soul 
may use logos, perhaps to talk idly, or use logos to express itself in authentic ways, the 
soul is distinct from what it uses. 
 Socrates now turns to other things that get used, especially the body. In discussing 
the body we see that it is what he primarily distinguishes from the soul. It is this 
distinction that resumes his initial promise of listing Alcibiades’ qualities from his body 
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ending with his soul (104a). The remainder of the dialogue is concerned with the soul as 
the ruling (archusa)35 element of the body and its possessions.  
Continuing his discussion of things that can be used, Socrates informs Alcibiades 
that the shoemaker not only uses his instruments such as knives but also uses his hands 
and eyes (129d). So the shoemaker will be different from hands and eyes which he uses, 
and if a human being uses the entire body, the human will differ from this (129e). The 
human uses the body and so differs from it. The question that remains is what then is the 
human? Socrates answers that the human is soul, and the soul rules the body by using it 
(130a). The arts, on the other hand, that care for the body are caring for things of oneself 
rather than oneself. And the arts that care for possessions of the body are even further 
from caring for oneself. When Alcibiades exploits the conventional goods he excels at he 
is caring for the body rather than for things of himself (131b). Socrates’ purpose here is 
to discredit Alcibiades’ preoccupation with conventional goods by reorienting his 
perspective towards the appropriate ranking of his priorities. This reorientation of 
perspective is captured in the following exchange: 
Socrates: And isn’t someone who takes care of his wealth (ta chremata) caring 
neither for himself nor for what belongs to him (oyth heautum oyte ta eautu), but 
for something even further away? 
Alcibiades: I agree. 
Socrates: So the money-earner is not, in fact, doing his own work (u ta utu ara eti 
pratti ho chrematistes). 
Alcibiades: right. (131b-c) 
                                                        
35 In the passage considered earlier from the Meno (87e-88c) Socrates uses the Greek word egumenes to 
describe what the soul does in relation to conventional goods. It can direct harmfully or beneficially 
depending on whether or not wisdom is present within the soul. In the section we are considering here from 
Alcibiades Major Socrates does not use the same word to describe the relation the soul has to conventional 
goods (the body and its possessions). Although this is the case, the relation of the soul to conventional 
goods in both dialogues is to command, lead or rule them. The connotation in both dialogues is the same. 
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There is nothing more conventionally good than money-making, and we see Socrates 
turning Alcibiades completely away from it and all the other goods he excels at. The only 
thing that Alcibiades is left with now is his true self, the soul, and its need for wisdom to 
rule appropriately the conventional goods he excels at. The prioritizing effect the rule of 
wisdom will necessarily have within Alcibiades’ soul is captured by Socrates’ advice to 
the jury in the Apology: ‘Wealth doesn’t not bring about excellence, but excellence makes 
wealth and everything else good for men, both individually and collectively’ (30a9-10). 
 
Other leading ideas found in Alcibiades Major and the Apology 
 The issue of priorities as a leading idea in Alcibiades Major and the Apology tells 
us a lot about Socrates’ conduct during his trial and his approach to Alcibiades. Other 
leading ideas found in both dialogues that are entertained in a general fashion in the 
Apology, then complemented in a specific fashion in Alcibiades Major, may be worthy of 
attention. The following brief list is intended to suggest such ideas: 
 1) If the Delphic Oracle in the Apology (20e-b) placed its stamp of approval on 
the type of conversation Socrates was having prior to Chairephon’s question, we see 
more clearly in Alcibiades Major that it is not the case that Socrates, as he claims in the 
Apology (32a-b), is just an example, a representative man whom the gods chose to 
highlight the idea that human knowledge is worthless compared to divine knowledge. 
Socrates has the gods on his side quite often (see Plato’s Theages), because the only thing 
that prevented him from conversing with Alcibiades sooner was the divine. It is only with 
the gods’ help that Socrates says he can help Alcibiades achieve his goal of being a great 
Athenian leader. Socrates’ appeal to the divine in Alcibiades Major might be a way of 
setting up eudaimonism: the ultimate human good, i.e., happiness, can be attained by 
striving to be god-like. The task left to Alcibiades is to follow the course (i.e., a Socratic 
education) that contributes to happiness.  
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 2) In both dialogues philosophical endeavors need the sanction of something 
divine or its equivalent. This may suggest that philosophical activity happens for reasons 
beyond sheer human curiosity. 
 3) Socrates approaches Alcibiades in a very flattering, seductive manner (103a-
106b). The opening pages of the Apology is equally seductive, but stemming more from 
Socrates’ self-effacement than fawning over the jurors (17a-21b). Socrates’ continued 
attempt to seduce the jurors is revealed in his statements following the jury’s vote of 
death. His intended audience is not the 501 jurors before him, per se, but the audience 
both present and absent of his fellow philosophical-types (38d1-4). The seduction is a 
specific seduction of the few. This is made clear when we recall that Socrates’ opening 
remarks to the judges as “men of Athens” (17a) is an incorrect form of address. Whereas 
he calls those who voted for his acquittal “judges” (39e-40a), the correct form of address.     
 4) We will conclude with one other leading idea found in both dialogues, and that 
is the idea of time. In the Apology Socrates recounts the accusations being brought 
against him by making first the following remark: 
 Very well then. I must surely defend myself and attempt to uproot from your 
 minds in so short a time the slander that has resided there so long …, but I think 
 this is very difficult and I am fully aware of how difficult it is … . (19a-b) 
In contrast to Socrates’ admission here, in Alcibiades Major, ironically, time is the factor 
holding Socrates back from speaking with Alcibiades. When permission is finally given 
by the god, from all indications Socrates has all the time he needs in order to ‘uproot’ 
Alcibiades’ presumptive knowledge of what the ruler needs to know to rule effectively 
(103a-b). 
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Chapter Four: Socratic Traditionalism 
 
In discussing priorities in chapter three we saw how bodily goods and external 
goods become beneficial when directed by the soul with the oversight of wisdom. 
Alcibiades’ beautiful body and wealth can be potentially harmful to him if he does not 
acquire the knowledge to exploit properly what he excels at. This chapter will reflect 
further on the role knowledge plays, but in the context of putting skills to good use. For 
example, must the orator’s skill consist only of speaking well to be persuasive or is 
something more needed, such as knowledge that would enable the orator to say the right 
thing at the right time to the right audience in the right way so as to foster some overall 
good? The focus of our discussion will be Plato’s Alcibiades Minor and what we call 
Socratic traditionalism found in the dialogue in the characterization of knowledge as 
knowledge of utility. The type of traditionalism we find Socrates endorsing in Alcibiades 
Minor, the type that informs traditions of behavior that make up craft knowledge, is 
explicated by the political philosopher Michael Oakeshott and illustrated by the lyric poet 
Pindar. In Oakeshott’s essay ‘Political Education’ found in his book The Voice of Liberal 
Learning he discusses tradition as the exploration of intimations or use value which 
complements Socrates’ claim that knowledge of the best is the same as knowledge of 
utility. Through myth, Pindar’s odes illustrate how traditions of behavior that compose an  
athlete’s craft is a type of knowledge based on utility. 
 
I. Knowledge of Utility 
 In Alcibiades Minor we again find Alcibiades full of ambition, but until Socrates 
engages him in conversation, unaware of not knowing what he needs to know. The issue 
at hand is whether or not it is smart for Alcibiades, and humans in general, to pray for 
anything in particular, considering the fallibility of human knowledge. Because without 
knowing it, explains Socrates, many pray for what they think are goods, when in fact, 
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they are praying to receive things that will affect them badly once their prayers are 
granted by the gods. To illustrate his point Socrates reminds Alcibiades of Oedipus’ 
prayer. Oedipus inadvertently blurted out the prayer that his sons might take up arms to 
settle their inheritance. The gods granted his prayer, and Oedipus’ sons killed one another 
(138). The cautionary tale Socrates shares with Alcibiades introduces the topic of 
knowledge and its role within human affairs, that is the concern of the remainder of the 
dialogue.  
There are three significant passages where knowledge and its role is discussed. 
Each passage gets more specific about the role of knowledge, and in the third passage we 
finally see Socrates advocating a type of knowledge that is not absolutely good, and an 
ignorance that is not absolutely evil. Instead we see that knowledge and its role is relative 
to the activity to which it is applied. For example, the knowledge required of a shoemaker 
is different from the knowledge required of a theoretical scientist. More importantly, in 
claiming the relativity of knowledge operative in human affairs Socrates is expressing the 
idea that knowledge results from existing traditions of behavior, not the other way 
around. We do not customarily conceive a way of going about an activity in the abstract, 
apart from the concrete activity of having engaged in the activity. The man who is 
already a scientist and cognizant of the traditions of scientific inquiry can formulate a 
plausible hypothesis. However, expertise can be applied to different contexts and prove to 
be effective, but it would not be as effective as it would be in its native context. In 
pointing this out we are showing that craft knowledge does not arise ex nihilo, but from 
the activity of practicing the craft. The first passage (140e-141a) claims the wise act and 
speak appropriately; the second passage (143d-e) looks at wisdom in relation to 
ignorance. The claim made here is that human error is due not to ignorance in general, 
but ignorance of the best; the third passage (145b2-c) claims that those who act and speak 
appropriately and have knowledge of the best are wise, which is knowledge of utility. 
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 After having explained to Alcibiades the difference between madness and 
stupidity, characterizing the latter as big-heartedness (megalopsychus) and the former as 
simply having large quantities of stupidity, Socrates resumes his discussion of the lessons 
learned from Oedipus and others who were not circumspect in what they prayed for. 
Socrates asks Alcibiades the following questions: 
Is it your view that the wise (phronimus) are those who know what should be 
done and said?—Yes.—And who are the stupid (aphronas)? Those who know 
neither of these things?—Just so.—And those who know neither of these things 
will say and do what they ought not, without knowing (lesusin) that this is what 
they are saying and doing?—So it seems.  (140e-141a) 
Here we see Socrates reflecting on the role of wisdom in prayer, and more broadly, its 
role in human affairs. The way Socrates discusses this wisdom suggests that the wise 
judge appropriately that their knowledge is right for an occasion and how it is to be 
applied to that occasion. For those like Oedipus neither know that their knowledge is 
appropriate in occasion-X nor once occasion-X arises, how to recognize and apply their 
knowledge to it. We also see that Socrates’ description of wisdom lacks any sort of 
mystical qualities. Wisdom is practical reasoning that allows us to do the right thing in 
the right circumstances. When we look at the passage (145b2-c) we will see that practical 
reasoning, or what comes to be called knowledge of utility, is due to experience gained 
through activity (i.e., practicing certain crafts).  
The next passage (143d-e) continues the discussion of knowledge and its role in 
human affairs, but it is widened to include a discussion of ignorance, and knowing what 
the best is as a criterion for right actions. We again return to the issue of prayer and how 
it can bring many evils. Alcibiades gives an account of those who think they are praying 
for good when in fact they are praying for evil by saying that all evil that befalls man is 
due to ignorance (143b). In part, Alcibiades’ account is correct, but he has cast his net a 
little too wide. Socrates says as much by insisting that Alcibiades ‘specify what it is 
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ignorance of’ (143b) because ignorance is not an evil to certain people in certain states. 
To illustrate his need for specification, Socrates mentions the shocking story of Orestes 
and Alcmaeon who murdered their mothers to avenge the death of their fathers. 
Alcibiades’ response to the story is quite emotional: 
Alcibiades: Spare me, for God’s sake, Socrates!  
Socrates: It isn’t the person who says that you should not ever want to behave 
like that whom you should ask to spare you, but rather any who contradicted 
(enantia) him; for the act to you seems so horrendous that you do not like to hear 
it spoken of even by way of example. But do you think that Orestes, if he had 
been of sound mind and known what was best for him to do, would have dared to 
commit any such crime? 
Alcibiades: No, I don’t. 
Socrates: Nor, I think, would anyone else. 
Alcibiades: Certainly not. 
Socrates: It seems then that it is ignorance (agnoeia) of the best (beltistu), failing 
to know what is the best, that is a bad thing. (143d-e) 
Socrates limits Alcibiades’ blanket indictment of ignorance as the cause of evil by adding 
that ignorance of the best is the cause of human evil. When we consider the context of the 
passage under consideration we see that the best is not talked about as if it were only a 
logical notion lacking content. Orestes and Alcmaeon were ignorant of what would have 
been best to do under the circumstances they found themselves in. Both were consumed 
by rage, and in the case of Orestes, he also killed his mother’s lover Aegisthus for 
plotting the murder of his father (see the Odyssey 1. 29ff; 298ff; 3. 303ff.) If they had 
been of sound mind and not ignorant of the best, perhaps they would have exacted a 
punishment upon their mothers but one short of death. The larger point to be gained is 
that the best is a criterion. All human affairs make use of a criterion (see145a-b). There 
are quite a number of human affairs, so it may do us some good if we speak about a 
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criterion within the context of an objective to be achieved, such as the orator giving us 
advice on war or peace. Now we have introduced means-ends reasoning that helps us to 
appreciate the psychological aspect several choices among means to ends reveal about the 
one choosing. Socrates’ claim is that there is a best means to a given end. What if we are 
ignorant of the best as the story of Orestes and Alcmaeon and Oedipus illustrate, but we 
have other skills (techne) or abilities in our possession that make it possible to pursue 
what we mistakenly think is the best. If Oedipus had suddenly lost his voice before he 
blurted out his prayer his sons would not have been harmed; or if Alcmaeon had failed to 
recognize Clytemnestra he would not have killed his mother (144c; and cf.144a-b 
Socrates’ shocking example of Alcibiades wanting to kill his mentor Pericles, but unable 
to do so because he cannot  recognize him). Socrates intends for us to draw two lessons 
from these stories. The first lesson is that for certain people in certain states, ignorance, 
ironically, turns out to be the best situation for those ignorant of the best; and second, not 
knowing the best, combined with skills, usually brings harm to their possessor.36 
 The third passage (145b2-c) is critical in our attempt to survey knowledge and its 
role in human affairs as found in Alcibiades Minor. So far we have learned that the wise 
are those who know what should be done and said on the appropriate occasion due to 
practical reasoning in contrast to the ignorant, who fail to act appropriately because they 
are ignorant of  the best. The passage we will now consider is a more comprehensive look 
at the role of knowledge in human affairs because we get a summation of how knowledge 
has been characterized up to this point, and we see also the traditionalism that 
characterizes Socrates’ conception of knowledge.  
 To illustrate the idea that possessors of skills who lack knowledge of the best will 
be harmed, Socrates discusses with Alcibiades the role of orators. In focusing on the 
                                                        
36 Thus, we hear Socrates telling Crito: ‘My dear Crito, your eagerness is worth much if it should have 
some right aim; if not, than the greater your keenness the more difficult it is to deal with you’ (46b). 
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orator Socrates not only emphasizes the harm that is done to the orator who lacks 
knowledge of the best, but also the harm done to those who act on the orator’s advice: 
 Well, do you call a man wise who knows how to give advice, but not what 
advice is better (beltium) to give or when it is best to give it?—Certainly not.—
Nor, I imagine, a man who knows how to make war, without knowing when or for 
 how long war should best be made? Isn’t that right?—Yes.—Nor again a man 
 who knows how to kill or steal or banish people without knowing when it is 
 better to do this, or to whom?—No.—So what we want is the person who  
 knows one or the other of these things but also has the knowledge of what is 
 best—which no doubt is the same as knowledge of utility (ophelimu). (145b2-c) 
In the passage under consideration Socrates recounts what he has shown us in the other 
two passages about knowledge and its role in human affairs, but he provides the added 
perspective that the type of knowledge he has characterized up to this point as a criterion, 
which is knowledge of the best, turns out to be the same as knowledge of utility. 
Socrates’ use of the word ophelimu to describe this type of knowledge is consistent with 
our argument that he is endorsing the idea that knowledge results from existing traditions 
of behavior that are relative to the activity of a particular craft.  
In arguing that Socrates is making such an endorsement in Alcibiades Minor we 
will look (1) at Oakeshott’s thoughts on traditions of behavior that inform what he refers 
to as the arrangements of society. We will see that for Oakeshott tradition is useful to the 
degree it renders behavior efficient when engaged in various activities. The efficiency is 
due to the accumulation of knowledge gained through the trial and error of the practice of 
a particular activity which is then distilled into traditions of behavior. Traditions of 
behavior that are highly efficient are informed by knowledge of the best or utility; and (2) 
we will look at the examples Socrates cites (145d-146b) to justify his claim that 
knowledge of the best is the same as knowledge of utility. It is due to Socrates’ examples 
cohering with Oakeshott’s reflections on traditions of behavior and the knowledge that 
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informs those traditions, that we refer to Socrates’ endorsement of this type of knowledge 
as Socratic traditionalism. 
 
II. Oakeshott on Traditions of Behavior 
 Oakeshott’s reflections upon traditions of behavior in ‘Political Education’ are 
motivated by what he sees as its opposite, the ideological style in politics. Although 
politics per se is not our concern in looking at Alcibiades Minor, it will prove helpful to 
consider Oakeshott’s description of  the ideological style in politics as a foil for the 
concrete traditions of behavior that are exhibited in any activity or craft. In doing so we 
are not too far afield because the effective politician excels at the craft of politics, and we 
are concerned with the type of knowledge that results from the practicing of any craft. 
The ideological style of politics is an abridgement of ideas from the political traditions of 
a society. The ideologue fails to recognize that his ideology has been inspired by the 
concrete traditions of his political community or a political community, but, instead, to 
have been the product of  his intellectual premeditation. What results is a body of free-
floating principles with pre-meditated ends that are supposed to determine and guide the 
arrangements of a political community. The significance of Oakeshott’s description of the 
ideological style in politics is not unique to politics. His description is a rubric, under 
which many crafts can be mistakenly approached. For example, Oakeshott parallels the 
ideologues’ disregard for the traditions of political behavior from which his ideology was 
abridged to the craft of cooking: 
 It might be supposed that an ignorant man, some edible materials and a cookery 
 book compose together the necessities of a self-moved (or concrete activity)  
 called cooking. But nothing is further from the truth. The cookery book is not an  
 independently generated beginning from which cooking can spring; it is nothing 
 more than an abstract of somebody’s knowledge of how to cook: it is the step- 
 child, not the parent, of the activity. The book, in its turn, may help to set a 
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 man on to dressing dinner, but if it were his sole guide he could never, in fact, 
 begin: the book speaks only to those who know already the kind of thing to  
 expect from it and consequently how to interpret it. (168) 
The problem is not that the ignorant man or the ideologue has an abridged or summary 
knowledge, the problem arises in not acknowledging that the cookbook and the ideology 
spring from traditions of behavior that efficiently determine and guide their respective 
ends. There needs to be constant reference to these traditions or we run the risk of 
demanding from the cookbook or ideology what it can not possibly give.  
 The alternative to the ideological style in politics is captured in Oakeshott’s 
concluding remarks regarding the cookbook. The content of the book, its recipes, 
operates according to several presuppositions: it can only speak to those who know what 
to expect from it and how to interpret it. Is it not the case that when the cook approaches 
a cookbook it is a rather traditional affair. The cookbook is filled with recipes which, 
more often than not, have been handed down generationally. The ceremonial occasions 
the cookbook commemorates may speak, for example, to the various seasons and what 
they bring. Those who consult the cookbook will have reasonable expectations of what 
the cookbook can do if it is followed appropriately. There will also be a familiarity with 
the appliances needed and what may be needed depending on the type of recipe it is. The 
cook tacitly understands that there will be an order to the ingredients that he must keep in 
tact if he wants the desired end. Most importantly, by following the recipe, the cook is 
replicating activity that has already been determined and so he is guided by the 
knowledge gained through a specific tradition of behavior. The fundamental difference 
between these two approaches, the ideologue’s disregard for the concrete origins of his 
ideology and the craftsman who replicates traditions of  behavior, is that the former treats 
knowledge as if it can be decontextualized, neatly packaged and applied to radically 
different contexts without suffering the slightest attenuation in its effectiveness to render 
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behavior efficient, whereas the latter operates like a fixed course within which traditions 
of behavior become highly efficient at achieving their proscribed end. 
 There is one more aspect of Oakeshott’s reflections on traditions of behavior that 
needs discussion before we look at its relevance to the type of knowledge Socrates 
endorses in Alcibiades Minor. Earlier when we spoke of the fixed course within which 
traditions of behavior operate, the image conjured up may have been one of behavior 
ceaselessly operating according to necessity. This image could not be further from how 
traditions of behavior operate, and Oakeshott explains as much by introducing the 
concept of intimations. Again, we must keep in mind that Oakeshott’s discussion of 
traditions of behavior takes place within the context of politics and so intimations are 
spoken of within that context. Nonetheless, we find his discussion of intimations to be  
applicable to traditions of behavior found in various crafts. The efficiency that results 
from a tradition of behavior is not due to the ‘grind’ of necessity that ever pushes on  (see 
178), but to its ability to use the resources found in its own traditions of behavior to 
modify and regulate itself. The ability to explore and purse these resources is to explore 
and pursue what Oakeshott refers to as intimations: 
This activity [traditions of behavior that make up a society’s political activity], 
then, springs … from the existing traditions of behavior themselves. And the  
form it takes, because it can take no other, is the amendment of existing arrange- 
ments by exploring and pursuing what is intimated in them. The arrangements 
which constitute a society capable of political activity whether they are customs 
or institutions or laws or diplomatic decisions, are at once coherent and 
incoherent; they compose a pattern and at the same time they intimate a sympathy 
for what does not fully appear. Political activity is the exploration of that 
sympathy; and consequently, relevant political reasoning will be the convincing 
exposure of a sympathy, present but not yet followed up, and the convincing 
demonstration that now is the appropriate moment for recognizing it. (174) 
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It is the intimations found in traditions of behavior that makes tradition useful. How we 
utilize the intimations will dictate to what degree tradition can be useful. This is why the 
idea of sympathy is important for Oakeshott, and goes some distance in accounting for 
the type of knowledge endorsed by Socrates: crafts, like politics, are recognizable 
precisely because they operate according to traditions of behavior. They are not seeking 
innovation at every turn, but the innovation that may be desired results in a piecemeal 
process in which intimations from within the craft is pursued to achieve a given end. 
Socrates has this sort of scenario in mind when, in the context of discussing the orator’s 
craft and what advice the orator should be capable of giving, he speaks of knowledge of 
the best as being the same as knowledge of utility. The orator must know both the 
traditions of behavior that have defined his craft, considering he is a part of the tradition; 
and when to tweak the tradition, as the occasion demands, in order to make his oratory 
most effective. 
 
III. Knowledge of Utility as Socratic Traditionalism 
 Following Socrates’ admission (145b2-c) that knowledge of the best is the same 
as knowledge of utility he queries Alcibiades about what more is needed to make one 
wise other than simply knowing about particular crafts. Here Socrates is rehearsing what 
he and Alcibiades have already established regarding the inadequacy of the possessor of 
skills (i.e., the orator) who lacks knowledge of the best. The rehearsal canvasses other 
possessors of skills that are operative in certain crafts but who have the same lack. About 
such crafts Socrates poses several questions: 
Now suppose we have a person who knows how to ride or shoot, or box 
(pycteuin), or wrestle (palaein), or compete in any other sport or exhibit any other 
skill (techne). What do you call the person who knows how best to exercise a 
particular skill? If it is the skill of riding, I expect you will call him a good 
rider.—I will.—And if it is boxing, you will call him a good boxer, and if it is 
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flute-playing (ayleticen) you will call him a good flute-player, and so in other 
cases. Or do you disagree?—No, not at all.—Now do you think that knowing 
about these things suffices to make a person wise, or is more needed?—Much 
more, upon my life. (145e) 
Knowing about these things does not make one wise because the possessor of the skills 
Socrates lists do not know when or on whom it is better for them to exercise their skills 
because they lack what is most important, the knowledge of utility (see page 71). Due to 
Socrates’ grounding of the type of knowledge the possessor of skills must have in a 
criterion of utility, not some mystical, ahistorical realm, he is endorsing tradition as the 
arbiter of what is best. We will argue for Socrates’ endorsement by using several 
illustrations from actual crafts highlighted in the aforementioned passage.   
As we have seen, what produces the best course of action for the craftsman is the 
few alternatives among the traditions of behavior that have been handed down to him. 
Additionally, the traditions of behavior the craftsman chooses to replicate are quite 
efficient at what they produce. In the passage under consideration Socrates’ list of skills 
are indicative of the traditionalism we are ascribing to him. Among the crafts listed, the 
most notable are boxing, wrestling and flute-playing. When we look at each of these 
crafts individually we see that to excel at them requires that the practitioner know the 
craft’s tradition sufficiently to be recognized as a practitioner of the craft, and to know 
when to tweak the tradition enough to accommodate various circumstances or opponents. 
However, before we look at each of the three crafts individually, a brief description of 
each craft, and its significance, is in order.   
Boxing, wrestling and flute-playing as traditional, physical education crafts date 
back to the eighth-century BCE. Homer speaks of boxing and wrestling in the Iliad (23. 
262-897) and the Odyssey (8. 120-130) in accounting for the funeral games for Patroclus. 
Flute-playing dates back to the sixth-century BCE, and was popularized mainly by the 
Pythian Games which featured musical contests. The importance of boxing, wrestling and 
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flute-playing, as well as other athletic competitions, was due to an aristocratic culture of 
sport which saw physical training occupying ‘the place of honour’ (Marrou 1956, 40). An 
important factor in gaining competence in these athletic events was to take lessons from a 
trainer (paedotribes) who coached the young on the sports grounds (palaestra) with the 
intention of fielding the best athletes during the pan-hellenic games. The coach was also 
responsible for having his athletes maintain a strict dietary regimen. From the middle of 
the fifth-century BCE  there were four major venues for athletic competitions, all of 
which featured boxing and wrestling: Olympian, Pythian, Nemean and the Isthmian 
Games (see OCD, 206). As we have mentioned, flute-playing was featured only in the 
Pythian Games. 
 The event of boxing entailed the boxer wearing gloves consisting of hard 
bandages (himantes oxis) with the fingers protruding against leather strips to keep them 
in place. Unlike modern day boxing, boxing in antiquity did not take place in a ring, there 
were no rounds, which enabled matches to last until an opponent gave up due to 
exhaustion,37 and kicking was allowed (Marrou, 122).  
Wrestling was the most popular event at all the Games. Its popularity signified by 
the use of the word palaestra for the gymnasium and for physical education (122). Each 
wrestler, after drawing lots, was paired off. The object of the wrestling match, of which 
there were three rounds, was to throw the opponent on to the ground without falling down 
with him. If both opponents fell, no points were won by the thrower. It did not matter 
how one’s opponent fell, although leg-holds were forbidden, but tripping was allowed. 
Flute (aylus38)-playing was featured in the Pythian Games along with other 
musical contests such as cithara-playing and singing to the cithara. Although not much is 
                                                        
37 Marrou tells the story of the Emperor Titus who tired his opponents out by keeping his guard up for two 
whole days without letting his opponent get a single blow in. Titus’ tactic sounds a lot like the ‘rope-a-
dope,’ the tactic the great American heavy weight champion Mohammed Ali employed to tire his 
opponents out. Ali simply danced around the ring while guarding himself, leaned against the ropes 
occasionally, until his opponent, intent on pursuing him, eventually exhausted himself.         
38 Actually the aylus was a reed instrument, most likely an oboe. 
70 
 
known about how musical contests were conducted and decided, the tradition of flute-
playing is captured in an Ode written by Pindar for a victor by the name of Midas of 
Akragas, about whom we will say more when discussing the praise offered to the victors 
of the Games.           
When we turn to actual practitioners of these traditional, physical education crafts 
those who are known to us because of their victories at the various Games, we see that it 
was not just the athleticism of the victors that is celebrated, it is the tradition of the 
individual craft, the significance of success and the glorification of natural talent 
complemented by laborious effort. Indeed, the victors are celebrated as consummately 
embodying traditions of behavior that call for strict discipline and informed spontaneity. 
Likewise, the athlete’s informed spontaneity is made possible by the resources or 
intimations of his craft’s traditions. The most significant chronicler of the games and its 
traditions that has come down to us is the sixth-century poet Pindar. Pindar was a 
conservative Boiotian aristocrat whose interest in the Games was primarily philosophical 
(see the excellent introductory essay on Pindar in Bowra 1969, ix-xviii). Each of Pindar’s 
odes were commissioned by patrons, often aristocratic families, who wanted to sing the 
praise of athletes originating from their respective Greek cities. We will look at relevant 
passages from three of Pindar’s odes, each ode commemorates a victor at one of the four 
Games in boxing, wrestling and flute-playing. The odes we will be looking at are 
typically divided into three sections. Each ode contains an opening and closing section 
devoted to the victor’s success, while the central section of the ode consist of a mythic 
narrative addressing the significance of tradition for the victor. The narrative may focus 
on the deeds of the heroes who are from the city the victor originates, which accounts for 
the tradition which produced the qualities displayed by the victor; it may serve as a 
negative contrast to the victor’s situation; and it may reflect a generalized aspect of the 
victor’s success. The central section of the odes will be our main focus because in it we 
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see homage being paid to the tradition of the craft and how well the victor has replicated 
and added to the craft through laborious effort.     
 
III. Boxing 
In the ode Olympian X (c. 474 BCE), which praises the victor Hagesidamos of 
Western Locroi, winner in the boys’ boxing, we will look at two passages. The first 
passage is from section two, it accounts for the mythical context in which Hagesidamos’ 
win will be placed. The second passage is from section four, it places Hagesidamos’ 
within the context of winners of various sporting events from the past.  Pindar begins his 
ode by asking the muses and truth, daughter of Zeus, to read him the name of the 
Olympian victor, Archestratos’ son Hagesidamos in preparation for the praise that was 
promised him in the past (see Olympian XI 4-5) and now must be paid (5-10). He then 
acknowledges the Lokrians of the West for their local tradition of poetry, mainly love 
songs, and upon Zeus’ request he proceeds to situate Hagesidamos’ victory within the 
grand tradition of the Games: 
Without labor few find joy, a light upon life that makes up for all efforts. 
The ordinances of Zeus have roused me to sing of the grandest Games, 
Which by the ancient tomb of Pelops, with contests six in number, Herakles 
Founded when he slew Poseidon’s son, fine Kteatos…, (25) 
By speaking of the origins of the Olympic Games, Pindar casts Hagesidamos as heir to a 
noble traditions of behavior that seek to reward the athlete-hero for surmounting the 
hardships and enduring the labor that inevitably arise from the pursuit and mastery of a 
craft. The noble tradition consists of Herakles surmounting the twelve labors to found the 
Olympic festival in honor of his father Zeus. Pindar connects Hagesidamos’ win with 
Herakles’ fifth labor in particular. The fifth labor requires Herakles to clean the stable of 
Augeas for a fee, but after Herakles’ task is complete Augeas refuses to pay the fee he 
promised. Herakles exacts revenge on Augeas by leading an army to sack Elis while 
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successfully repelling an attack by Eurytos and Poseidon’s son Kteatos, whom he kills. 
With the spoils from his conquest of Elis, Herakles establishes the four-yearly Olympic 
Games in Pisa (see Graves 1996, Vol. I. 490-491). Although Pindar recognizes that 
Hagesidamos’ win is due to the athletes’ disciplined labor, its not the only thing that 
accounts for his success. Pindar reminds us that the Gods have a say in all things and that 
Hagesidamos needs to acknowledge the divine in the spirit of Herakles who, after having 
fenced off the area in which athletic contests would be held—‘The hill of Cronus’, he 
erected six alters to the Olympian Gods, one for each pair, along side the sacrificial 
hearth he founded in honor of his great-grandfather Pelops (491). In speaking of the Gods 
this way, might Pindar be accounting for the unknown element in Hagesidamos’ victory? 
What we refer to as intimations, the various resources that are contained within traditions 
of behavior that render traditions useful, Pindar refers to as the divine. It is very difficult 
to account for the informed spontaneity, the split-second decisions, the good athlete 
excels at without appreciating the degree to which the good athlete knows the tradition of 
his craft and so is able to exploit its use well. Hagesidamos’ victory is due to his 
knowledge of utility. 
 Our second passage is from section IV of  Pindar’s ode to Hagesidamos. In this 
section Pindar places Hagesidamos’ win along side winners of the first Olympian Games 
and the festive events that greeted them: 
 All the holy place was loud with song in the glad feasting the music 
 banquets. We follow the first beginnings and in the namesake song of 
 glorious triumph we shall sing aloud of the thunderbolt and the fire-flung 
 shaft of Zeus, the noise-awakener, the flaming lightening, fitting in every 
 victory; the luxuriant music songs shall answer the pipe. (80) 
The athletes that performed in the first Olympic Games, all of whom are unknown, are: 
Oionos, winner in the foot-race; Echemos, winner in boys’ wrestling; Doryklos, winner 
in boys’ boxing; Phrastor, winner in the javelin throw; and Nikeus, winner in the stone-
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throw (70). Pindar’s acknowledgment of the first Olympic victors places Hagesidamos’ 
win within a long tradition of athletes excelling at their individual crafts, and 
Hagesidamos should be celebrated also. 
 
IV. Wrestling 
 In the ode Nemean VI (c.461 BCE), which praises the victor Alkimidas of Aigina, 
winner in the boys’ wrestling, the historical record is sparse in accounting for the details 
of praise bestowed upon Alkimidas’ victory. Nonetheless, the ode reflects our central 
concern with illustrating traditions of behavior as knowledge based in utility, the type of 
knowledge Socrates endorses in Alcibiades Minor. In Nemean VI section one will be our 
main focus because in it we see that Alkimidas descends from a family that includes 
many fine athletes. Wrestling is only one of the many sporting events that Alkimidas’ 
family has excelled at.  Pindar acknowledges Alkimidas’ familial descent a follows: 
 Even now Alkimidas gives visible witness that his race is like the fruitful 
 fields which change about and now give men abounding life from the soil, 
 now rest again and pick up strength. He has come from Nemea’s well-loved 
 Games, a boy in the struggle, who follows this calling from Zeus; he has been 
 revealed a hunter and had good sport in the wrestling. (10) 
The ‘visible witness’ Pindar speaks of may, in part, reflect an appreciation of the genetic 
endowment that laid the groundwork for Alkimidas’ victory, but when we consider that 
‘fruitful fields’ need cultivation, and the yield one gains due to cultivation reflects toil 
(‘now rest again and pick up strength’), it is more plausible to read Pindar as putting 
greater emphasizes on the discipline that is demanded from well performed crafts. 
Alkimidas’ athletic family is composed of craftsmen who hone their craft generationally, 
which goes some distance in explaining their continued success. Further passages we will 
consider suggest that traditions of behavior practiced by his family, complemented by 
toil, is what accounts for Alkimidas’ victory.  
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 The last stanza of section one and the beginning of section two is more direct 
about the connection between traditions of behavior learned in Alkimidas’ family and 
toil. Pindar comments on both: 
 He plants his feet in the kindred tracks of his father’s father, Praxidamas; 
 for he, an Olympic victor, first brought twigs from Alpheos to the Aiakidai; 
 He was crowned five times at the Isthmus, thrice at Nemea, and saved 
 Sokleidas from oblivion, who was first of Hagesidamos’ sons. To his delight 
 three prize-winners reached the peak of prowess by tasting toil.  
With good fortune from God. (15-25)  
The descent of the family is Hagesimachos, Sokleidas, Praxidamas, Theon, and 
Alkimidas (see Bowra, 209). In the passage under consideration it is quite clear that 
Alkimidas’ family embody traditions of behavior that have proven highly efficient at 
fielding successful athletes in the Games. The familial athletic tradition began with 
Hagesimachos, and we can only surmise that he, too, was a part of a local tradition that 
stressed athletic endeavors. The larger point that Pindar expresses is that from 
Hagesimachos to Alkimidas traditions of behavior were gained through concrete activity 
which become the basis on which each successive generation relied and replicated, but 
also a basis on which to learn from the tradition’s intimations: how best the tradition 
could be put to use. This is precisely Socrates’ point at 145e-146b in Alcibiades Minor 
when he criticizes craftsmen for having a skill but not knowing how best to use it, which 
is shown by their not knowing ‘when or on whom it was better for them to exercise their 
skills…’  
 
V. Flute-playing 
 The last ode we will consider from Pindar is Pythian XII (c.490 BCE) in praise of 
Midas of Akragas, winner in the flute-playing. The mythical backdrop of the ode is the 
occasion that inspired Athena to invent the flute and the tune ‘The Many-Headed’, which 
75 
 
mimicked the voice’s lament of the Gorgon Euryala for the killing of her sister Medusa 
by Perseus (see Graves, 223-230 and Bowra, 30). Pythian XII does not directly address 
mortal practitioners of the craft of flute-playing that may have influenced Midas. What it 
does treat is the relationship between the human voice and the mimetic quality of the 
flute. In keeping with its origins as a voice-like instrument, Pindar suggests that the craft 
of the good flute-player consists in replicating the expressiveness of the voice. Thus, a 
degree of informed spontaneity goes into the craft of flute-playing due to its ability to 
relieve and reflect the passions.39  
The passages we will reflect upon are from the end of section three and the 
beginning of section four. They read as follows: 
 And when she delivered from these labors the man she loved, the Maiden 
 created the flute’s wide-ranging music, to copy in it that strong and loud  
 lamentation which reached her from Euryala’s eager jaws … Blown 
 through thin bronze, and blown through the reeds which grow near the fair- 
 spaced city of the Graces in the garden of the Nymph of Kaphisos. Wherever 
 dancing is, they are sure to be. Any bliss that man may win (And without 
 labor, none!)… . (20-25) 
Although Athena invented the flute, she gave it to mortal man without traditions of 
behavior to follow in the strict sense that Oakeshott describes. If there are no traditions of 
behavior for Midas to have followed, and a degree of informed spontaneity is part and 
parcel of flute-playing, what accounts for his success and our reading of Pythian XII as an 
illustration of the type of knowledge of utility Socrates endorses in Alcibiades Minor? 
The role of the Graces in the craft of flute-playing goes some distance in justifying our  
reading. The Graces were Aglaia (Glory), Euphrosyna (Mirth) and Thalia (Health), and 
they had a prominent place in local cult at Orchomenos. The Graces make it possible for 
                                                        
39 This is one of the reasons why Aristotle says that citizens can listen to it but not learn to play it: ‘The 
proper time for using it is when the performance aims not at instruction, but at the relief of the passions’ 
(Pol.1341a20-25; cf. Republic 399d). 
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the flute-player to reproduce, as life-like as possible, the many sounds of the human 
voice. However, this does not mean that the good flute-player’s abilities are inexplicable 
because his playing is divinely inspired. We think the role of the Graces can be read in 
pedestrian way:  Midas’ success is due to his ability to be spontaneous by reproducing a 
range of emotions, originally conveyed by the human voice, in a very short period of 
time. Traditions of behavior and its use value (intimations) may be consulted in so far as 
the flute-player constantly tries to render life-like the sound his flute replicates, and he 
does so in a piecemeal fashion each time he tries.       
 
VI. Conclusion. 
In this chapter we discuss Socratic traditionalism, the type of knowledge Socrates 
refers to in Alcibiades Minor as knowledge of utility. What constitutes knowledge of 
utility in the dialogue is traditions of behavior that can be mastered and replicated, as well 
as serve as a basis of change for the craftsmen to adapt to new circumstances or 
competitors. For example, if a craftsmen is successful in using his tradition in such a way, 
not only is he in possession of the skill that defines his craft, he is able to put the skill to 
good use. Pindar’s odes illustrate and celebrate the traditions of behavior of the 
successful athlete. We can say of the boxer that he is part and parcel of a tradition that 
renders his behavior recognizable, regimented, and efficient. He is practiced in his craft. 
Much more than this is not needed to be a boxer. To speak of the successful boxer 
requires us to assume that a thorough mastery of the craft has taken place. However, in 
both scenarios we are still dealing with practice, not preconceived notions of the craft of 
boxing. It is this sort of practical knowledge that Socrates endorses in Alcibiades Minor.                
The significance of Socrates’ endorsing a view of knowledge that functions in this 
practical way is that it cautions us against the ideologue’s failure to see knowledge as the 
abridgement of concrete political traditions instead of the product of intellectual 
premeditation.    
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Chapter Five: Instances of Decision Theory in Plato’s Alcibiades Major and Minor, and 
Xenophon’s Memorabilia40      
 
In Alcibiades Major we are meant to see the way in which Socrates, after a 
prolonged period of observation, pursues an ambitious young man who has easily 
dismissed his other pursuers with disdain. Alcibiades has political ambitions, but lacks 
the proper philosophical perspective that only Socrates can provide. Socrates notes that 
the other pursuers thought well of themselves, but there was not one who was not 
outstripped by Alcibiades’ advantages and own estimation of himself. Socrates states, 
‘You say that you don’t need anybody for anything, since your own qualities are so great 
there’s nothing you lack; I’ll list them, starting with your body and ending with your 
soul’ (104a). The qualities that Socrates mentions are the young man’s great looks and 
size, his belonging to the leading family in the greatest Greek city, and his having 
relatives on his father’s and mother’s side who are among the best and all ready to assist 
him were he to need assistance. Beyond all these, Pericles whom his father left as 
guardian for Alcibiades and his brother, hold sway in Athens, in other Greek cities, and in 
many barbarian places. Given these advantageous, Alcibiades’ conceit is that he is 
completely self-sufficient and is in need of no one.  
Here we have Socrates verifying his prior assessment of Alcibiades as a young 
man motivated by enormous political ambitions. Socrates has been observing Alcibiades 
since he was a young boy. Why would Socrates be attracted to Alcibiades in the first 
place? This question is one of the more interesting questions about Alcibiades Major and 
other Socratic dialogues that feature various interlocutors. An interlocutor merits a 
conversation with Socrates because he is worthy. A passage from Xenophon’s 
Memorabilia, in which Socrates and Antiphon are discussing the proper way to bestow 
                                                        
40 Denyer 2001, 93 discusses imaginary choices offered by god as a prominent feature in the Alcibiades 
literature. This chapter explores the type of choices found in the Alcibiades literature.  
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beauty and wisdom on others, illustrates an attitude Socrates assumes when befriending 
others that is on display in his approach to the young Alcibiades: 
…but we think that he who makes a friend of one whom he knows to be gifted 
by nature (euphya), and teaches him all the good he can, fulfils the duty of a 
citizen and gentlemen. That is my own view, Antiphon. Others have a fancy 
for a good horse or dog or bird: my fancy, stronger even than theirs, is for good 
friends. And I teach them all the good I can, and recommend them to others  
from whom I think they will get some moral benefit. And the treasures of wise 
men of old have left us in their writings I open and explore with my friends… . 
(I. vi. 10-15.) 
This passage not only reveals Socrates’ approach to the cultivation of friendships once he 
enters in to them, but it also specifies a strict criterion for who becomes a candidate for 
friendship with Socrates (cf. Apology 23b-c and 33b-c on Socrates’ ironic eagerness to 
present himself to the jury as the friendly interrogator of all Athenians). But there seems 
to be a lacuna here. It is clear from Socrates’ opening remarks in Alcibiades Major that 
Alcibiades’ gift is his nascent philosophical nature that Socrates recognizes in his 
enormous ambition to be a great political ruler. It is also clear that Socrates, having 
become interested in Alcibiades, seeks to cultivate a friendship in the manner Xenophon 
describes. What is not so clear is how Socrates, after his initial judgment that Alcibiades 
is sufficiently gifted and ambitious to pursue, goes about corroborating his findings. 
Might there be a testing of the waters to assure himself that Alcibiades is not a dud before 
he attempts to bestow beauty and wisdom on his friend? Our assumption is that Socrates 
needs to, and does, confirm the potential of would-be friends because otherwise he would 
run the risk of judging an interlocutor worthy of friendship only to find he was mistaken. 
In fact, Xenophon tells us the critics of Socrates claimed he misjudged the natures of  
both Critias and Alcibiades by teaching them politics before prudence (see Memorabilia, 
I. II. 13-18). Whether Socrates, in fact, misjudges natures is a fit topic for discussion, but 
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out of the purview of this chapter. We propose the idea that Socrates, indeed, confirms 
his initial judgment regarding the giftedness (philosophical potential) of a given 
interlocutor by posing various thought experiments in the form of hypothetical, 
counterfactual and imaginary choices.41 How these choices function is to make an 
interlocutor’s desires transparent and to assess degrees of belief as bases for action. 
Socrates often makes use of these types of choices, which, interestingly enough, we have 
come to regard as the key feature of modern decision theory. We especially see the 
employment of decision theory choices and what it reveals about the nature of an 
interlocutor and his desires in the dialogue Alcibiades Major. But we will also discuss 
general aspects of its role in other Socratic writings such as Alcibiades Minor, and 
Xenophon’s Memorabilia.      
 
Decision Theory   
 Socrates’ use of thought experiments in the dialogues as a way of reassuring 
himself of an interlocutor’s philosophical potential aligns with the general thrust of 
decision theory as expressed by its founder F.P. Ramsey in his essay ‘Truth and 
Possibility’ (1978, 60-100). Although the essay’s subject matter, as a whole, goes beyond 
the scope of what we intend to discuss here, and should be read on its own as a lucid 
introduction to modern decision theory, Ramsey’s discussion of  hypothetical choices as 
a means of measuring degrees of belief will be our focus because it sheds light on the 
function and type of choices Socrates offers various interlocutors.  
The essay sets out a method to measure the degrees of beliefs and other 
psychological variables through their causal property, that is the extent to which 
individuals are willing to act on what they believe given hypothetical circumstances. 
                                                        
41 Thought experiments like counterfactuals have been discussed in relation to the variety of Socratic 
refutations (see, for example, Carpenter and Polansky ‘Variety of Socratic Elenchi’ in Scott 2002, 89-100) 
but not as a technique to measure the extent to which an interlocutor is philosophically gifted, the way 
Socrates initially supposes, to benefit from Socrates’ type of friendship. That is,  how does Socrates 
confirms if an interlocutor has the philosophical market value Socrates initially claims he does.      
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Hypothetical circumstances are not concerned with actualized beliefs—beliefs presently 
at work in our thinking of them, but with dispositional beliefs, beliefs that would dictate 
actions in the appropriate circumstances.42 According to Ramsey, beliefs can be assigned 
a magnitude or degree having a particular position in a sequence of magnitudes which 
determine the likelihood, given hypothetical choices, of our acting in one way as opposed 
to another.  For example, we can express full belief in a proposition by 1 (‘The earth is 
flat’), full belief in its contradictory by 0 (‘The earth is round’), and equal beliefs in the 
proposition and its contradictory by one-half (‘The earth may be flat or round’). 
Magnitudes are quite simple to assign when an individual has no doubts about anything.  
A more complex scenario may demand an individual to take account of various 
degrees of certainty in his beliefs (e.g., ‘I believe in Z two-thirds of certainty’). In order 
to account for the more complex scenario, Ramsey introduces what he calls Mathematical 
Expectation.43 Mathematical Expectation governs all our behavior in so far as we 
consistently seek to maximize our own or other people’s pleasure. How Mathematical 
Expectation expresses degrees of belief is illustrated by Ramsey in the following 
instance: 
I am at a cross-roads and do not know the way; but I rather think one 
of two ways is right. I propose therefore to go that way but to keep my  
eyes open for someone to ask; if now I see someone half a mile away over 
the fields, whether I turn aside to ask him will depend on the relative in- 
convenience of going out of my way to cross the fields or continuing on the  
wrong road if it is the wrong road. But it will also depend on how confident 
I am that I am right; and clearly the more confident I am of this the less 
distance I should be willing go from the road to check my opinion. (77) 
                                                        
42 Cf. Aristotle’s discussion of ‘first’ and ‘second’ activity in De An. 412a22-8 where he contrasts 
dispositional knowledge with actualized knowledge. 
43 For example, we can formalize mathematical expectation in the following way: Bob’s degree of belief in 
p is m/n; then Bob’s action is as he would choose it to be if he had to repeat it exactly n times, in m of 
which p was true, and the others false. In each of the n times Bob had no memory of the previous ones (76). 
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The distance Ramsey is prepared to go out of his way to ask becomes the measure of the 
confidence in his opinion, the Mathematical Expectation, because individuals conduct 
themselves in ways that consistently realize the objects of their desires.     
Ramsey’s supposition is that because the individual has certain beliefs about many things 
his actions will be determined according to the ranking of his beliefs.  A belief entails 
choices and to offer an individual many choices, according to Ramsey, is to reveal the 
individual’s preference for possible worlds ordered hierarchically according to their 
perceived value: 
If we had the power of the Almighty, and could persuade our subject of our 
power, we could, by offering him options, discover how he placed in order of 
merit all possible courses of the world. In this way all possible worlds would be 
put in order of value… . (78)  
Schematically the choices offered would look like the following:  
Would you rather have world a in any event; or world b if p is true, and world g if  
p is false? If, then, he were certain that p was true, he would simply compare a  
and b and choose between them as if no conditions were attached…. (79) 
Ramsey’s discussion of  thought experiments presented as hypothetical choices are the 
type of choices we see Socrates concerned with in Alcibiades Major and to a lesser extent 
in Alcibiades Minor and Xenophon’s Memorabilia. Socrates, too, is concerned with 
degrees of belief, but not their measurability in magnitudes. Socrates is concerned with 
degrees of belief in so far as the choices he offers Alcibiades confirm or falsify Socrates’ 
initial observation that Alcibiades has what it takes to benefit from Socratic friendship. 
Once Alcibiades begins to entertain the hypothetical choices offered him, his desires are 
rendered transparent. Socrates then judges Alcibiades’ desires as providing a basis for a 
virtuous life, and secondarily, great Athenian statesmanship.  
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Types of Hypothetical Choices  
In Plato’s dialogues the choices offered to interlocutors are outlandish and 
contrived, and assume the tone of a psychotherapist. There are three distinctive categories 
under which these choices are usually offered. The first category we can refer to as The  
Call of Ambition. Here the hypothetical choices offered by Socrates to the interlocutor 
are concerned with establishing as fact from prior observation that an interlocutor is 
worthy of being befriended by Socrates due the interlocutor’s ambition. When we speak 
of ambition we mean those overriding emotions or desires causing an individual to act in 
a particular way repeatedly to achieve a particular end. We are not speaking here of petty 
desires that are strongly felt and, as a result, cause an individual to act. Otherwise in 
characterizing ambition as we have, we could just as easily be referring to obsessive-
compulsive disorders. The ambition we are arguing Socrates has in mind in each of the 
three categories is grand ambition. The second category we can refer to as The Limits of 
Ambition. When we speak of limits we are referring to the length an interlocutor is 
willing to go in order to satisfy his desire(s). One way to assess the length an interlocutor 
is willing to go to fulfill a particular desire is to determine how strongly or to what degree 
he holds a particular belief. The significance of knowing how strongly an interlocutor 
holds a particular belief is that it allows Socrates, by offering hypothetical choices, to 
establish limits surrounding the subject-content of the conversation. In the Socratic 
conversation limits are established in order to prevent the interlocutor from assuming a 
sophistic stance (see Alcibiades Major 106b-c), and to facilitate the protreptic experience 
of the interlocutor by having virtue serve as the goal of the interlocutor’s ambition. The 
third category we can refer to as The Transparency of Ambition. When we speak of the 
Transparency of Ambition we are referring to the use of hypothetical choices to disclose 
the gulf between an interlocutor’s true beliefs that are instantiated in his deeds, as 
opposed to his stated beliefs. The interlocutor often agrees to abide by Socrates’ 
prescription to do what it takes to realize the goal of his ambition, arduous though it may 
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be, but we then find the interlocutor acting as if he were oblivious of his agreement. In 
the dialogues the comedic aspect is often brought about by the following trope: the 
interlocutor insists that we take his words, speeches and intentions seriously, but he 
makes himself look foolish because his actions are glaringly at odds with what he 
professes.  
 
Alcibiades Major 
 Of the many interlocutors we find in the Socratic discourses, Alcibiades’ 
relationship with Socrates gives us a good opportunity to assess these categories of 
choices. Three episodes in which we find Alcibiades considering hypothetical choices are 
in Plato’s dialogues Alcibiades Major and, to a lesser extent, in Alcibiades Minor and 
Xenophon’s Memorabilia. 
Socrates’ attraction to Alcibiades in the opening pages of Alcibiades Major is 
shown to be particularly strong. After a long period of observation, Socrates approaches 
Alcibiades with the intention of befriending him. Unlike the majority of the interlocutors 
featured in the Platonic dialogues who claim to have a strong, presumptive knowledge of  
X—(e.g. friendship (Lysis), piety (Euthyphro), bravery (Laches), etc.—Alcibiades makes 
no such strong claim. In Alcibiades Major Socrates’ conversation with Alcibiades is 
generated solely on ad hominem grounds. From the opening pages of the dialogue to its 
conclusion, Socrates appeals not so much to reason in trying to make virtue the goal of 
Alcibiades’ ambition, but to Alcibiades’ aristocratic prejudices and emotions.44 The 
uniqueness of Alcibiades lies in a type of arrogance (megalophronon), 103b2-104a) that 
is even more acute than the arrogance of his older pursuers. Alcibiades also has a 
                                                        
44 (Denyer, 2001, 121) convincingly shows that Alcibiades’ aristocratic statement at 111a1 (to ellenizin) ‘to 
speak Greek’ does not assume that a mere knowledge of one’s native language is superior to ‘something as 
rare as being good at playing draughts’. In fact, Alcibiades is relying on three commonly held Greek ideas: 
(1) One’s native language indicates sharing in particular customs, manners, values and political allegiances; 
(2) It is unfavorable (barbarus) if one’s native language is not Greek; (3) The moral superiority of the 
Greeks over the barbarians is due to their obedience to the law and sense of justice.   
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psychological advantage over his pursuers, which also makes him unique in the eyes of 
Socrates; he is beautiful physically, from a prominent Athenian family, and has 
influential friends (104b5). Although Socrates eventually convinces Alcibiades that he is 
self-sufficient for all the wrong reasons (see 127d-e), that had allowed him casually to 
brush aside his eager pursuers, Socrates engages Alcibiades in conversation to confirm 
whether he is sufficiently ambitious to pursue and thus worthy to receive Socrates’ 
friendship (104a-c). In addition to confirming his initial impression of Alcibiades through 
choices we refer to as The Call of Ambition, the following exchange between Alcibiades 
and Socrates brings into play the other two categories under which hypothetical choices 
are offered.             
After having gained Alcibiades’ confidence by appealing to his conceit and sense 
of wonder, Socrates offers the following hypothetical choices to Alcibiades: 
Suppose one of the gods asked you, “Alcibiades, would you rather live with what 
you now have, or would you rather die on the spot if you weren’t permitted to 
acquire anything greater?” I think you’d choose to die…. And if that same god 
were then to tell you that you should have absolute power in Europe, but that you 
weren’t permitted to cross over into Asia or get mixed up with affairs over there, I 
think you’d rather not live with only that to look forward to; you want your 
reputation and your influence to saturate all mankind, so to speak. (105a-c) 
 
The Call of Ambition 
Alcibiades coyly admits (106a8) that Socrates is right regarding the presence of 
his enormous ambition. This brief exchange confirms the initial impression Socrates 
gained from observing Alcibiades as a young boy. In Alcibiades Major Socrates does not 
recount many episodes that might have given him the impression that Alcibiades was a 
promising youth with ambition. At 110a-c Socrates recounts an episode in which a 
young, brash Alcibiades accuses a playmate of cheating in a game of knucklebones. 
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Socrates recounts the episode to illustrate the larger point that even at a young age 
Alcibiades was confident that he understood justice and injustice. Plutarch, however, 
recounts several episodes that illustrate Alcibiades’ budding ambition, which Socrates 
may have in mind. Plutarch prefaces his remarks about Alcibiades’ childhood by stating 
that the desire for superiority was the strong passion ‘of his real character’ (Clough 259). 
We are told of Alcibiades being placed in such a difficult position while wrestling he bit 
his opponents’ hand to gain the advantage. The opponent accused Alcibiades of biting 
like a woman; Alcibiades replied ‘No’… ‘like a lion’ (259). In another episode we are 
told that while playing a game of dice with friends a loaded cart was to pass before the 
part of the street Alcibiades intended to throw during his turn; he demanded the cart to 
stop but to no avail. Once the game was over Alcibiades having decided to teach the cart 
driver a lesson threw himself on the cart and dared the driver to drive on. The driver was 
so startled ‘…that he put back his horses, while all that saw it were terrified, and, crying 
out, ran to assist Alcibiades’ (259).  
Even if Socrates has these episodes in mind, how might this exchange between 
Alcibiades and Socrates employ elements of decision theory? First and foremost we see 
the use of thought experiments in the form of hypothetical choices. Socrates needs to 
establish as fact his prior observation that Alcibiades is sufficiently ambitious to pursue. 
Socrates can not establish this fact by focusing on Alcibiades’ actualized beliefs, he must 
focus on Alcibiades’ beliefs as a causal property in dictating what Alcibiades would do in 
the appropriate circumstances. In other words, Socrates must focus on Alcibiades’ 
dispositional beliefs. Under the category The Call of Ambition we believe Socrates is not 
concerned so much with the content of choices of what is being offered and the intensity 
or degree of what Alcibiades believes as he is with the mere aspect of employing 
hypothetical choices as a method to gauge Alcibiades’ probable behavior in various 
circumstances. The category The Limits of Ambition will address the content of choices 
and Alcibiades’ degree of belief in the choices offered to him.   
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The Limits of Ambition             
 The fact that Alcibiades would be willing to die if he could not achieve anything 
greater than he already has or is prevented from ruling over the continent of Europe and 
Asia, tells us that Alcibiades will order his actions in such a way he thinks most likely to 
realize his ambitions. Here we see Ramsey’s mathematical expectation. The distance 
Alcibiades is willing to go to acquire greater things is the measure of his ambition and the 
confidence he has in his abilities. Otherwise the lack of these greater things, which would 
call for the necessity to remain content with what he has acquired up to this moment, 
would be a peculiar kind of death by proxy. A belief entails choices, and the choices 
Socrates offers Alcibiades reveal his preference for hierarchically ordered worlds 
according to their perceived value in facilitating his ambition to attain greater things, as 
well as saturating all mankind with his influence and reputation. Schematically, the 
hypothetical choices offered to Alcibiades by Socrates might look like the following: 
Would you rather have world a (‘to live with what you now have’) in any 
 event; or world b (‘to die on the spot’) if r (‘if you weren’t 
permitted to acquire anything greater’) is true, and world g (implied:  
Alcibiades is allowed to acquire greater things) if r is false?  
If Alcibiades were certain that r was true, he would then choose, as if no conditions were 
attached, between a and b. Alcibiades seems to suggest that he would most likely choose 
b. (We say ‘most likely’ because Alcibiades will be shown to have inconsistent thoughts 
about death when we discuss The Transparency of Ambition.) The relevance of laying 
out the hypothetical choices as we have underscores Socrates’ push to get Alcibiades to 
show, for all to see, the value he places on possible courses of the world offered to him. 
We can infer from the value Alcibiades places on possible courses of the world that he 
may be willing to do whatever it takes to realize his ambition. Alcibiades’ ambition may 
be limitless, at least dispositionally. Socrates can now tailor his conversation to 
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Alcibiades’ enormous ambition by establishing parameters beyond which the 
conversation is prevented from going. In limiting the conversation, Socrates offers 
Alcibiades other possible courses of the world which entail different courses of action 
based on different rankings of beliefs.45 These other possible courses of the world can be 
thought of as Socratic counter-offers to Alcibiades’ possible world preferences. For 
example, when we look at Alcibiades Major we see the conversation revolving around 
three weak claims Alcibiades makes regarding knowledge, justice, and the soul. In 
response, we see Socrates limiting Alcibiades’ claims by making claims of his own 
regarding knowledge, justice, and the soul: 
 Knowledge (106b-113d): Alcibiades claims he has the general knowledge to go  
before the Athenians and instruct them in their ‘own business’ (107d). Socrates makes the 
counter-claim that there was never a time when Alcibiades learned about justice, what the 
better tend towards, or ‘in keeping the peace or in waging war with the right people’ 
(109a6). 
Justice (113d-118b): Alcibiades claims that when the Athenians are conducting 
their business they are not, in fact, concerned with what is just so as much as they are 
concerned with what is advantageous, and the just is not the same as what is 
advantageous (113d3). Socrates makes the counter-claim that the just is always 
advantageous. In making this claim Socrates argues indirectly that despite how the 
Athenians and other Greeks think of justice, Alcibiades must always see justice as 
advantageous and admirable (115a-116e).  
Soul (128-135e5): Alcibiades tacitly claims that the user of a thing is not different 
from all the things he uses. He is inclined to cultivate what he uses, not his true self. 
Socrates makes the counter-claim that the user of a thing is different from all things he 
uses because the soul is the true self. The body is an instrument of the soul. 
                                                        
45 E.g., Johnson 1999, 11-11 is basically discussing a possible world where Alcibiades’ priorities are both 
limited and transformed by the realization that God is the true self. Cf. Annas 1999, 52-71 on the Middle 
Platonists’ idea that we become god-like by engaging in depersonalized, abstract thinking.  
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 Socrates’ counter-claims, initiated by the type of hypothetical choices we find 
under the category The Limits of Ambition, are an essential feature of Socrates’ attempt 
to have virtue be the goal of Alcibiades’ ambition. Not only does it attempt to curtail the 
length Alcibiades is willing to go in order to satisfy his desires by offering possible 
worlds that may weaken his allegiance to particular possible worlds and their 
concomitant beliefs, it highlights how strongly or to what degree Alcibiades holds 
particular beliefs. 
 
The Transparency of Ambition 
 The aim of the last category under which hypothetical choices are offered, The 
Transparency of Ambition, is to disclose the gulf between an interlocutor’s stated beliefs 
and his true beliefs. If Socrates can discern an interlocutor’s true beliefs, he is in a better 
position to facilitate a protreptic experience: To turn the interlocutor towards virtue. The 
gulf between the two beliefs is either disclosed through the interlocutor’s deeds portrayed 
dramatically or through contradictory statements made by the interlocutor. In the case of 
Alcibiades we learn, through the use of hypothetical choices offered to him, that he 
would rather die if he could not rule all of Europe and Asia. So for Alcibiades death is 
bad. However, when we review relevant passages of the elenctic exchange between 
Alcibiades and Socrates on whether the just is advantageous (113d-118b), we see 
Alcibiades assent to the proposition that death is not just bad. The overall aim of the 
elenchos is to get Alcibiades to say that the just is always advantageous.  
 Alcibiades holds that some just things are advantageous and some just things are 
not advantageous (115a). But all just things are admirable (kala). Alcibiades supposes it 
is always admirable to do just things but one might come off much worse by doing them. 
The question becomes: are admirable things good, or are some bad? Alcibiades believes 
some admirable things are bad, and some contemptible things (aischra) are good. 
Alcibiades allows for doing admirable things from which one does not benefit. Socrates 
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suggests the following illustration, which Alcibiades accepts: someone might stay alive in 
war through not trying to rescue friends or relatives. Trying to help is brave and 
admirable, but could lead to wounds and death. Therefore: Trying to save friends is 
admirable inasmuch as it is brave, but bad inasmuch as it brings death.  
Alcibiades’ assent to the conclusion of the elenctic exchange indicates contradictory 
thoughts about death. This is significant because it suggests to Socrates that Alcibiades’ 
ambition is still quite conventional, although still quite enormous. Alcibiades is not so 
unusual that he disagrees with traditional moral notions, and how these notions apply to 
existential situations such as death. Socrates is in a better position now to facilitate 
Alcibiades’ turn towards virtue. 
 
Alcibiades Minor         
 In Alcibiades Minor we find the young, ambitious Alcibiades on his way to say 
prayers, encountering Socrates on the way, who, by the conclusion of the dialogue, 
convinces him that he is ignorant of what he needs to know regarding the nature of 
prayer. At issue is Socrates’ insistence that it would be better not to pray for anything 
specific, but, instead, like the Spartans, pray for what is good. Socrates’ thinking is that 
human knowledge is fallible, we do not know what is best for us or what happiness is, 
and so it would be best not to pray for anything specific. The use of the type of 
hypothetical choices we find under the category The Limits of Ambition is prominent in 
Alcibiades Minor. The employment of these choices is prefaced by a discussion of 
Oedipus. Socrates relates a cautionary tale to Alcibiades about being careful of  what he 
asks for in prayer because Alcibiades may ‘be praying for great evils when you think you 
are asking for great goods (138b6)’. The cautionary tale is the story of Oedipus who 
inadvertently blurted out the prayer that his sons use arms to settle their inheritance, that 
eventually came to pass. Socrates then introduces the following hypothetical choices 
through a personified god: 
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Suppose that the god to whom you are about to pray were to appear to you and 
ask you, before you began praying, whether you would be happy to be sole ruler 
of the city of Athens—or, if that seemed mean and tiny, were to offer you all the 
Greeks as well—or, if he saw that you regarded that too as insignificant unless the 
whole of Europe were included, were to promise you all of that plus simultaneous 
acknowledgement by the whole human race of the rule of Alcibiades son of 
Clinias. If that happened, I imagine, you will go home very happy and think you 
had come into possession of the greatest goods. (141a5-b1) 
Alcibiades agrees with what Socrates has just said, but Socrates queries Alcibiades 
whether or not he would be willing to give up his life in exchange for the territory and all 
of Greece; or if he were to receive these great goods, would he use them badly. 
Alcibiades quickly answers a definitive no (141c).  
Here we have hypothetical choices similar to the choices offered to Alcibiades in 
Alcibiades Major. In Alcibiades Major Socrates was interested in Alcibiades because his 
nascent philosophical nature needed cultivation, which Socrates recognized in his 
enormous ambition to be a great political ruler. The whole confrontation at the beginning 
of Alcibiades Major was geared towards confirming Socrates’ prior assessment of 
Alcibiades’ ambition, what we have termed The Call Of Ambition. In Alcibiades Minor 
the hypothetical choices offered by Socrates give us a better glimpse of the limits of 
Alcibiades’ Ambition, and, consequently, the limits around which the conversation will 
revolve. Alcibiades is still very ambitious as his responses to the hypothetical choices 
indicate, but it is not a reckless ambition. Alcibiades is willing to forgo the territory and 
rulership if it means giving up his life, or if it means gaining these gifts but using them 
badly. The caveat Alcibiades makes regarding the hypothetical choices offered to him 
reveal, at least dispositionally, that he recognizes the impossibility without knowledge of 
distinguishing between precious and pernicious things. Of course, Socrates will be of 
some help in getting Alcibiades to distinguish between the two.  
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As for the limits of the conversation around which the conversation revolves, 
Socrates is now in the position to hammer home the idea that ignorance of the best is 
what is bad in the use of possessions and actions. There are many examples that Socrates 
furnishes to reinforce this idea. For example, if we were in a state of good archers and 
flute-players, good athletes and craftsmen, each one in possession of a particular skill, but 
none of which had the knowledge of what is best, that state would be ‘a hotbed of 
dissention and lawlessness’ (146b2). The idea that Socrates is expressing is that skilled 
practitioners need knowledge of utility (ophelimos) in order to be a benefit to themselves 
and the community; the knowledge to apply their craft in the real world. What we have 
here is the thought that practical knowledge serves as the basis of virtue when it is 
acknowledged that the Spartans only pray that they receive what is good and noble 
instead of praying for anything more (148c-150b3).  
Might this idea of practical knowledge serving as the basis of virtue hit home with 
Alcibiades? After all, Alcibiades has ambitions to be a great ruler. If he were to go before 
the Athenian people claiming to give advice on making war, like the orators claim to give 
advice on various topics, but was ignorant of what advice is best regarding war, might he 
fail to understand when to go, or for how long, and with whom? Alcibiades must not be 
an irresponsible intellectual, and Socrates says as much to Alcibiades: 
For most people, then, it is an advantage neither to know nor to think they know 
anything, if they are going to do themselves more harm than good by rushing to 
do what they know or think they know.—Very true.—So you see it seems that I 
was quite right when I said that it looked as if other skills, if not combined with 
the knowledge of what is best, are more often than not harmful to their possessors. 
(146d1-e1)  
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Xenophon’s Memorabilia 
Xenophon’s Memorabilia: (1) Can be placed within the tradition of apologetic 
writings that seek to vindicate Socrates from the charges brought against him in the 
Apology, and (2) Is designed to recount the philosophical influence, anecdotally, Socrates 
had on various acquaintances and friends through conversation (Gray 1998, 26-40). In 
Xenophon’s discussion of Socrates’ relationship with Alcibiades, we find most 
prominently the type of  hypothetical choices offered under the category The 
Transparency of Ambition. Socrates is concerned with distinguishing between 
Alcibiades’ stated beliefs and his true beliefs. Why Alcibiades assumes such importance 
even for Xenophon  is because Alcibiades’ subsequent career plays into the hands of 
those who accused Socrates of corrupting the youth (see Plutarch’s ‘The Life of 
Alcibiades’), among other things. His accusers argued that Socrates taught his 
companions to scoff at established laws. Xenophon tells us that Socrates’ accusers 
focused on Socrates’ criticism of appointing public officials by lot. Xenophon comments, 
‘none would choose a pilot or builder or flautist by lot, nor any other craftsman for work 
in which mistakes are far less disastrous than mistakes in statecraft’ (I. II.9-13). In fact, it 
was Socrates that believed the practice of choosing statesman by lot corrupted the youth, 
according to Xenophon.  
Alcibiades’ insolence and licentious under the democracy is held up as being the 
result of the corrupting influence of Socrates. Although Alcibiades eventually brought 
great harm to Athens, Xenophon explains that it was through ambition that he came to 
associate with Socrates (I. II. 14-17). With the exception of Critias, Alcibiades was unlike  
any other Athenian in his desire to control everything  and outdo every rival in notoriety. 
What Alcibiades saw in Socrates was simplicity, independence, and moderation in all his 
pleasures. He observed that Socrates was able to do what he liked with any disputant. 
Xenophon concludes that the apparent reasons Alcibiades sought Socrates’ company is 
because he wanted to benefit from Socrates’ simplicity and knowledge. The real reason 
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Alcibiades sought Socrates’ company, Xenophon admits, is to gain proficiency in speech 
and action in order to realize his ambition. 
Xenophon’s talk of apparent and real reasons Alcibiades sought Socrates’ 
company is concluded by reflection on the thought that the hypothetical choices offered 
by god to Alcibiades would confirm Alcibiades’ real intentions (Xenophon mentions both 
Alcibiades and Critias, our focus remains Alcibiades): 
For my part I believe that, had heaven granted them the choice between the life 
they saw Socrates leading and death, they would have chosen rather to die. Their 
conduct betrayed their purpose; for as soon as they thought themselves superior to 
their fellow disciples they sprang away from Socrates and took to politics; it was 
for political ends that they had wanted Socrates. (I. II 13-18) 
Xenophon’s reflections on Alcibiades’ true reasons for associating with Socrates is 
somewhat unlike the other two examples taken from Alcibiades Major and Minor. In 
Xenophon it is not Alcibiades being dramatically offered hypothetical choices; it is rather 
Xenophon’s hypothetical reflection that envisions hypothetical choices being offered to 
Alcibiades by god. We might argue that the choices do not make transparent Alcibiades’ 
true desires, but they simply tell us the impression Alcibiades made on Xenophon. Yet 
we surely see the resemblance with Plato’s presentation. And, the hypothetical choices 
offered by the god between death for Alcibiades or adopting the simple life of Socrates, 
with Xenophon concluding that Alcibiades would choose the former, render Alcibiades’ 
true desires transparent in light of Alcibiades’ biography.  
Xenophon’s hypothetical reflection is not an idle one. It dramatizes the gulf 
between Alcibiades’ preferred reason for associating with Socrates, and the life he 
eventually led away from Socrates. For Alcibiades to prefer losing his life to imitating 
Socrates’ life suggests a particular order of value in which various beliefs are ranked. 
Since Socrates values virtue most highly, to be appalled at the prospect of living 
Socrates’ life seems to be a rejection of virtue. In the relevant circumstances, 
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circumstances away from Socrates’ influence, Alcibiades’ actions would be guided by 
licentiousness and insolence (I. II. 12-13). The tentativeness of Alcibiades’ actions 
occasioned by relevant circumstances speaks to the dispositional nature that hypothetical 
choices reveal. Perhaps Alcibiades would never act in such a manner, but given the 
choice accepted, there is a high degree of probability that Alcibiades will act in such a 
manner under the relevant circumstances. 
 
Conclusion 
An effective way of ascertaining an interlocutor’s degree of belief is through 
assessing its causal force by determining the extent to which he will act on what he 
believes given hypothetical choices. The use of hypothetical choices as a method of 
measuring degrees of belief was explored by the founder of modern decision theory F.P. 
Ramsey. Whereas Ramsey sets out a numerical formula to measure degrees of belief 
brought by hypothetical choices and circumstances, we have found hypothetical choices 
similarly employed by Socrates, though without quantitative measurement, to assess 
various psychological states of an interlocutor. We have discussed three distinctive 
categories under which these choices are offered in relation to the figure of Alcibiades in 
Alcibiades Major and Alcibiades Minor, and Xenophon’s Memorabilia. These categories 
are The Call of Ambition, The Limits of Ambition, and The Transparency of Ambition. 
The relevance of hypothetical choices can operate on many different levels, and in many 
different contexts.  
By offering hypothetical choices Socrates confirms his initial impression that 
Alcibiades, as a child, had a nascent philosophical potential that now needs cultivation. 
We see Socrates employing hypothetical choices to limit his discussion with Alcibiades 
to certain themes and concerns. Socrates also renders Alcibiades’ desires transparent by 
offering hypothetical choices, that are designed to reveal his true beliefs as opposed to his 
stated beliefs or deliberate actions. Often the glaring difference between what an 
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interlocutor professes in words and what he discloses in action, gives rise to bitter, 
comedic situations for the observer. 
We can point to several instances of the use of hypothetical choices in Socratic 
writings because it is an effective means of ascertaining the psychological momentum of 
the topics explored. Which reminds us that in Socratic writings, especially the Platonic 
dialogues, ideas and doctrines are not deracinated, they animate real lives for better or 
worse.               
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Chapter Six: Women, Moral Insight and Marriage 
 
Women play a prominent role in the Spartan and Persian speech in Plato’s 
dialogue Alcibiades Major. Assisting Socrates’ concern to help a reluctant Alcibiades see 
how he is at a disadvantage compared to his rivals, the kings of  Spartan and Persia, the 
women of the tale are forthright in their disdain towards Alcibiades. They find it 
laughable that Alcibiades fails to appreciate what it takes to be a great ruler. Questions 
that arise due to the prominence of women are: why would Plato cast the women in the 
Spartan and Persian speech to serve as moral templates? And what might this suggest 
about the role of women in regard to male achievement, generally? We conclude that 
Plato assumes women provide moral insight regarding male goals and achievement.  
The place to begin in support of our conclusion is within the context of familial, 
female relationships portrayed within the dialogue. After all, it is mainly mothers and 
wives who deem Alcibiades unfit to challenge their husbands and sons. We will argue 
that when it comes to Alcibiades’ desire to achieve greatness, Plato assumes in the 
Spartan and Persian speech that women have and continue to play the traditional role of 
providing a uniquely, feminine moral insight. In addition to the discussion of male 
achievement and women, we will also look at the social scientist George Gilder, who 
provides a contemporary perspective on feminine moral insight from the vantage point of 
men and marriage. As we will discuss, it is within the domain of marriage that we 
moderns come closest to understanding Plato’s assumption about the role women’s moral 
insight plays in male achievement.  
 The context in which the Spartan and Persian speech is introduced is Alcibiades’ 
repeated failure before Socrates’ questioning to give an account of what he knows, how 
he knows it, and from whom he learned it. Alcibiades’ ambition is to present himself to 
the Athenian people to show them that he deserves to be honored more than Pericles or 
any other politician that ever was. But we find that Alcibiades is in no position to know 
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better than the Athenians what they propose to discuss in the assembly. After repeated 
attempts at refutative and paradoxical arguments that fail to convince Alcibiades, 
Alcibiades is still unprepared to see the need for education and the lengthy and taxing 
project of caring for himself. Socrates and he have this exchange: 
Socrates: Very well. What do you propose for yourself? Do you intend to remain 
in your present condition or practice some self-cultivation (epimelian tina 
poeisthae)? 
Alcibiades: Let’s discuss it together (koene bule), Socrates. You know, I do see 
what you’re saying and actually I agree—it seems to me that none of our city’s 
politicians has been properly educated (apaedeutoe), except for a few.  
Socrates: And what does that mean? 
Alcibiades: Well, if they were educated, then anyone who wanted to compete with 
them would have to get some knowledge and go into training (askesanta), like an 
athlete. But as it is, since they entered politics as amateurs (idiotikos), there’s no 
need for me to train and go to the trouble of learning. I’m sure my natural abilities 
will be far superior to theirs. 
Socrates: Good god, my dear boy, what a thing to say—how unworthy of your 
good looks and your other advantages (anaxion tes ideas kae ton alla on ton soe 
hyparxonton,119a-c) 
It looks for a moment as if Alcibiades is willing to be directed by Socrates, but then he 
turns away. Rather than aspiring to be superior to other politicians by taking the effort to 
be educated and know what he is doing, Alcibiades seems content to wander in his 
thoughts and possibly make mistakes in action and merely surpass the other politicians by 
his native abilities. At this point, Alcibiades seems to have lost sight of his overall 
objective of having his name and power be known far and wide because he supposes that 
he simply needs to surpass the local, Athenian politicians. Socrates compares the case to 
skippering a naval ship against the enemy. The skipper should try to surpass those he is 
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warring against and not merely his fellow sailors. Alcibiades should be preparing himself 
to be better than his city’s real competitors rather than his fellows, the real competitors 
being the kings of Sparta and Persia. 
 The Spartan and Persian speech, proper, is framed by some judgment about men 
and what they aspire to achieve. There are three instances in the speech where the 
judgment takes place, one of which is directed at men in general who try to run the city’s 
affairs without proper preparation, the other two are directed at Alcibiades’ political 
aspirations. From each of these three judgments we will contextualize and discuss the 
most relevant passages, and then survey the literature to reflect on what others have said 
about the prominence of women in the Spartan and Persian speech. 
 
Midias 
Our first mention of women as judges is prompted by Socrates’ frustration with 
Alcibiades for taking the wrong competitors seriously. The conversation reaches the point 
where Socrates says:  
But no sir, you’ve got to keep an eye on Midias the cockfighter and such  
 people—people who try to run the city’s affairs with their ‘slave-boy hair styles’ 
 (as the women say) still showing on their boorish minds. They set out to flatter 
 (kolax) the city with their outlandish talk, not to rule it. These are the people, I’m 
 telling you, you’ve got to keep your eyes on. So relax, don’t bother to learn what  
 needs to be learned for the great struggle to come, don’t train yourself for what 
 needs training—go ahead and go into politics with your complete and thorough 
 preparation. (120a7-c) 
Little is known about Midias, other then he was an Athenian politician who was mocked 
in Aristophanes’ Birds (1297-8) for being lower-class, an embezzler, and interested in 
quail fighting. The women referring to politicians with ‘slave boy hairstyles’ calls to 
mind the Athenian custom of slaves having their hair cropped short in order to make it 
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easier to do menial work, but then trying to grow their hair long in order to conceal the 
tattoo often placed on the forehead to indicate those sold into slavery (Denyer 2001, 168). 
Considering Alcibiades’ low estimation of the Athenian politicians, the juxtaposing of 
Alcibiades’ laziness, in the form of Midias, and his aristocratic prejudices, is quite 
remarkable. It is as if the wives, with Socrates’ full agreement, are warning Alcibiades 
that no one is more likely to be arrogant than a lately freed slave. Alcibiades’ aristocratic 
prejudices are turned against him. 
 
The Persian King’s Mother 
The second mention of women as judges come towards the end of the Spartan and 
Persian speech. Socrates has gone to great lengths to show Alcibiades how negligible his 
wealth is compared to Spartan wealth. But Spartan wealth is nothing compared to that of 
the Persian King. To give an idea of the Persian wealth Socrates refers to a trustworthy 
traveler’s report that large tracts of land in Persia were named for parts of the Queen’s 
wardrobe, and devoted to supporting it (123b-c). This discussion of the Persian wealth 
leads into the following claim: 
  Now suppose someone were to say to Amestris, the king’s mother and the 
 widow of Xerxes, ‘the son of Deinomache intends to challenge your son; her 
 wardrobe is worth only fifty minas at best, and her son has less than three hundred 
 acres of land at Erchia.’ I think she’d be wondering what this Alcibiades had up 
 his sleeve to think of competing against Artaxerxes. I think she’d say, ‘I don’t see 
 what this fellow could be relying on, except diligence and wisdom—the Greeks 
 don’t have anything else worth mentioning.’  (123c-d)  
The point is that Alcibiades cannot be counting on his wealth in competing with 
Artaxerxes but can only be considering the care he must take of himself and his wisdom. 
Yet we have seen that Alcibiades does not suppose that he has to take much care of 
himself because his competitors, he thinks, differ hardly at all from other men. Though he 
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is but twenty years old and largely uneducated, he believes he can compete with the 
Persian King. But Socrates, referring to the Persian monarch’s mother’s judgment can 
hardly believe him: 
 What in the world could this youngster be relying on? Suppose we were to 
 reply, Good looks, height, birth, wealth, and native intelligence. Then, 
 Alcibiades, considering all that they have of these things as well, she’d conclude 
 that we were stark raving mad. (123e)  
The case has been made that Alcibiades can hardly count on surpassing the Persian or 
Spartan Kings by his personal advantages. Clearly he must take care of himself to seem 
to be competitive.  
 
Lampido, Daughter of Leotychides 
The third mention of women as judges is at the conclusion of the speech. Here Socrates 
speaks in his own voice as if generalizing the consensus on how the Spartan and Persian 
women feel about Alcibiades’ lack of preparedness in competing against their men: 
 Again, I think that Lampido, the daughter of Leotychides, wife of Archidamus 
 and mother of Agis, who were all Spartan kings, would be similarly amazed if 
 you, with your bad upbringing, proposed to compete with her son, considering all 
 his advantages. (123e-124a) 
Socrates recognizes that it should be shameful to Alcibiades that the women of his 
enemies should have a better appreciation than he does of what he needs to undertake to 
compete.  
 
What commentators have said about the prominent role of women in the Spartan 
and Persian Speech  
When we survey the literature on Alcibiades Major and the Spartan and Persian 
speech we find, as a rule, very little discussion, if any, of the role of women. Discussions 
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that have focused on the role of women in the speech tend to find it peculiar, but not 
significant; or if an account is offered it is exaggerated, and in the wrong direction. Of the 
two, the latter comes closest to seeing the role of women in the speech as we do, as 
judges. Typical of the discussions that find the role of women in the speech peculiar, but 
insignificant is Nicholas Denyer’s commentary on Alcibiades Major. Although Denyer, 
for example, takes note of what the women say about Midias the cockfighter and 
politicians who flatter the city, the most significant thing he says is that Socrates gives a 
feminine pronunciation to the word ‘slave-boy hair style’ (168). Denyer claims that 
women’s speech was more conservative than men’s, and had its characteristic 
pronunciations (169). We can plausibly infer from what Denyer has told us that because 
women’s speech was conservative, women’s judgments were conservative. Subsequently, 
they are attuned to the malaise of immoderation that demagogic politicians are prone to in 
trying to gratify the city. Denyer makes no such inference. As for the Persian king’s 
mother, Amestris, expression of disbelief about what Alcibiades could possibly be 
relying on to challenge her son, Denyer only says that “Amestris is represented as feeling 
disdain when she is represented as referring to Alcibiades, in his absence, by such a 
combination of the article with the demonstrative pronoun and his name (188). 
Lampido’s comment (see Alcibiades Major 124a) that she, too, would be amazed if 
Alcibiades tried to compete with her son considering Alcibiades’ bad upbringing is left 
without remark by Denyer. 
The discussions of the Spartan and Persian speech that take notice of the 
prominence of women exaggerate their significance, and often in the wrong way. Steven 
Forde’s short, but insightful commentary, on Alcibiades Major is typical of this. Forde 
rightly sees the women’s comment regarding Midias’ ‘slave-boy hair style’ as significant 
for Alcibiades’ political aspirations (229). The challenge of Midias for Alcibiades is that 
entering into a contest with him is tantamount to Alcibiades’ neglecting himself. For 
those politicians who are like Midias, Forde suggests, will prove successful most often 
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because they create the illusion that their competitors need not try very hard to defeat 
them. Hence, the competitors become self-defeating. How can the Midias types be 
stopped? Forde’s proposal is that by putting women in control of Athens they will know 
how properly to despise Midias (229). We are most sympathetic to Forde’s insight that 
women may know how to despise the Midias types because it is in line with what we 
think Plato presupposes about women: they provide moral insight regarding male 
achievement. We are most opposed to Forde’s proposal that only if women are in power 
can they properly disdain unworthy politicians. To the contrary, we will argue the more 
moderate position that women, regardless of  whether they are in power or not, are 
capable of knowing how to despise due to a uniquely, feminine moral sense. All of 
Forde’s subsequent remarks about the Spartan and Persian speech are premised on this 
over exaggeration of the prominence of women. For example, Forde’s reading of the 
trustworthy traveler telling Socrates about parts of the land in Persia being named for 
parts of the Queen’s wardrobe echoes his proposal about women having to be in a 
position of power to exercise moral insight. Forde claims: 
The word that Socrates uses to designate each of these [the queen’s wardrobe] is 
 kosmos, a term used often enough to designate at least ornamental or cosmetic 
 furnishings but one whose primary meaning is ‘order’ and one that in this 
 acceptation is of great philosophical significance. Indeed, what we learn from the 
 trustworthy traveler whom Socrates cites is precisely that the Persian domain is 
 cast onto a very well defined order; that order revolves somehow around the 
 person of the queen. (230) 
We do not think it is obvious that Socrates’ trustworthy traveler is saying what Forde is 
claiming he is saying: the queen is at the center of the Persian domain. As Amestris’ 
observation attests regarding the wide disparity in material wealth between Alcibiades 
and her son, it is the king’s mother’s summation of what she knows about Alcibiades and 
what she knows about her son that makes her judgment about Alcibiades likely failure so 
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powerful. An observant woman, though, on the fringes of the Persian domain, knowing 
what Amestris knew, would have made the same judgment. Forde concludes his 
comments on the Spartan and Persian speech with several points we are in agreement 
with. The queens of Sparta and Persia recognize true superiority. And because of this 
recognition, or what we call, moral insight, the wives and mothers of the Spartan and 
Persian kings will judge Alcibiades fit to achieve his goal of being a great ruler only 
when he makes himself superior to their kings and sons (231-232).  
 
Women and Moral Insight 
 The two questions with which we began this chapter, and the answer we 
proposed, steers clear of the two extremes that comprise the discussion of the role of 
women in the Spartan and Persian speech. We find the role of women significant and 
prominent, but not exaggerated. The assumption that women provide a degree of moral 
insight in regard to male achievement is taken for granted both by Socrates and 
Alcibiades in the speech. As we mentioned, women’s judgments about boorish politicians 
and Alcibiades’ potential frame the beginning of the speech and the ending, but 
Alcibiades does not seem to mind, and Socrates encourages it. What we mean by moral 
insight is the power or act of seeing into a situation with regard to standards of right 
behavior.46 Necessarily this definition would render women a conservative element 
within the social order given that standards of right behavior operate according to 
precedence. When we look at the three instances of women judging, we find that the 
political behavior of politicians are being judged in relation to a generic standard or 
pattern of non-slavish politicians and Alcibiades is being judged in relation to the 
                                                        
46 Cf. Aristotle’s comments on how tyrants favor putting women in positions of power because women tend 
to conserve the mores of regimes. In tyrannical regimes the hope is that women will inform against their 
husbands’ political opposition to the tyrant (Politics 1313b30-40). 
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standard or pattern represented by the kings of Sparta and Persia. Each of these 
judgments tends toward conserving right behavior.   
The judgment made about Midias, in particular, is used by Socrates against the 
prejudice that Alcibiades expressed earlier that politicians of dubious and slavish 
backgrounds are not real Greeks. Midias genuflects before and flatters the people, as the 
word kolax indicates. He desires to massage other people’s self-esteem with the hope of 
benefiting himself. Ordinarily, the word kolax is used in reference to a private life, but in 
the Spartan and Persian speech the term is extended to cover the demagogic activities of 
politicians. So Alcibiades is being forewarned by the women not to continue down the 
course he is presently on, but to follow the course of the genuine statesmen by pursuing a 
genuine education. The women are implicitly praising what Alcibiades can become and 
blaming what he is presently on the grounds that objective social standards are such that 
if he accepts what Socrates offers he, too, can be formidable. 
When we turn to the judgment of Amestris, the Persian king’s mother, we find her 
assessment of Alcibiades’ wealth to be in accord with what we have been arguing 
regarding moral insight. Alcibiades’ intention to rival her son Artaxerxes is seen by her 
the way the women see flattering politicians, as the petty strivings of people who have 
‘slave-boy hairstyles.’ Whereas before Socrates used what the women said about the 
slavish-minded Midias in relation to a generic standard or pattern of what it is to be a 
genuine statesmen, Amestris knows specifically what it will take for Alcibiades to be a 
formidable competitor in rivaling the Persian king. Here we may appeal to Aristotle’s 
characterization of the magnanimous man in order to appreciate what it is that informs 
Amestris’ bewilderment towards Alcibiades: 
The result of good fortune, however, seems to contribute to magnanimity. For   
 the well-born and the powerful or rich are thought worthy of honor, since they are 
 in a superior position, and everything superior in some good is more honored. 
 Hence these things also make people more magnanimous, since some people 
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 honor their possessors for these goods. In reality, however, it is only the good 
 person who is honorable. Still, anyone who has both virtue and these goods is 
 more readily thought worthy of honor. (EN 1124a20-25)   
Alcibiades has proven deficient in all the traditional assets of an up and coming king 
when compared to the assets possessed by the Spartan and Persian kings. He is superior 
in no goods Amestris recognizes as meriting honor (i.e., wealth, birth, power, 
intelligence). Thus, all the traditional avenues to greatness have seemingly been closed to 
Alcibiades, according to Amestris, and there is no room for finagling.  
 The judgment of Lampido concludes the speech, and supplements the reaction of 
Amestris with the weightiness of tradition. Lampido speaks as one whose grandfather 
was a Spartan king, Leotychides, husband was a Spartan king, Archidamus; and her son 
is a Spartan king, Agis. In Lampido we have moral insight distilled generationally. She, 
too, would be similarly amazed if Alcibiades were to compete with her son considering 
his bad upbringing. Might we conclude that, in fact, Lampido’s judgment is the 
summation of what Socrates has been trying to convince Alcibiades of all along: the ease 
with which he considers himself to be the equal of the kings of Sparta and Persia is in 
direct proportion to the knowledge gained by struggle and self-cultivation that keeps the 
kings in power.  
  
Conclusion: Men, Marriage and Moral Insight 
 We have argued that when it comes to Alcibiades’ desire to achieve greatness, 
Plato assumes in the Spartan and Persian speech that women provide moral insight, 
which is the power or act of seeing into a situation with regard to standards of right 
behavior.47 Perhaps a contemporary audience might approach a discussion about the role 
                                                        
47 The Milesian Aspasia is another example of this type of women we have in mind, and her much sought 
after moral advice echoes the advice offered to Alcibiades in the Spartan and Persian speech. Plutarch tells 
us that Aspasia was charming, and that she emulated, from old Ionian times, the courtesan Thargelia. The 
fact that Aspasia strove to emulate Thargelia underscores the point we have been making that when it 
comes to standards of right behavior women operate according to precedence. We also learn from Plutarch 
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of women in male achievement in terms of the popular cliché: behind every great man is 
a woman. Maybe so, but we feel the cliché confirms Plato’s assumption about the role 
women’s moral insight play in any endeavor involving male achievement. When we look 
at the modern institution of marriage, for example, we see little difference between the 
judgments of expectation made about Alcibiades’ desire to rival successfully the Spartan 
and Persian kings and the judgments of expectation a wife imposes on her husband. In 
both situations there is a standard of right conduct to be followed, for Alcibiades it is the 
genuine rulers and the Spartan and Persian kings, and for the husband it is the role of 
good provider.  
In describing marriage and the transformative power of women’s moral insight on 
husbands, George Gilder’s book Men and Marriage gives a contemporary description of 
what the enemies’ wives were telling Alcibiades. He must rid himself of ignorance and 
become civilized: 
 In creating civilization, women transform male lust into love; channel male 
 wanderlust into jobs, homes, and families; link men to specific children; rear 
 children into citizens…divert male will power into a drive to create. Women 
 conceive the future that men tend to flee…. (5) 
Gilder’s comments on women’s role in marriage and the civilizing affect it has on 
husbands foregrounds historical continuity that allows us to appreciate Plato’s 
assumption regarding the role of women in male achievement. Gilder’s argument is that 
in webs of relationships between males and females, most notably in marriage, wives act 
as moral judges of their husbands, “spurring attainment of the highest male purposes” 
(177). In Alcibiades Major Plato’s thinking parallels Gilder in that he suggests the idea 
that moral insight women disclose in judging male achievement is most effective in 
                                                                                                                                                                     
that Aspasia resided over a political salon that included Socrates and her renowned statesman-lover, 
Pericles. It was thought that by keeping Aspasia company and heeding her words any man could succeed at 
what he set out to accomplish. For example, we hear of Lysicles, a sheep-dealer, a man of low birth and 
character achieve great things in Athens after having kept Aspasia company (Plutarch’s Pericles Vol.1, 
221).          
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specific male/female relationships. With the exception of the general designation ‘the 
women’ (see 120b-c) who judge men slavish who undertake the city’s affairs without 
knowledge, the women judging Alcibiades in the dialogue are referred to as having 
familial, specific relationships (i.e., as mothers, sisters, or wives). We find Plato’s 
distinction important because it suggests two lines of thought Gilder pursues in arguing 
for the existence of moral insight women disclose in judging their husband’s goals and 
achievements: (1) The civilizing role women as wives play through their moral insight is 
inscribed in their bodies; and (2) Due to this inscription wives display a singular, 
feminine moral sense rooted in intimacy and caring.48 Marriage becomes the field in 
which the feminine moral sense vis-à-vis a husband’s goals and achievements is given 
the greatest scope for judging. 
The civilizing role women as wives play through their moral insight, according to 
Gilder, is accounted for by her breasts and womb which symbolize a female specific 
potentiality that extends through pregnancy, “childbirth, lactation, suckling, and long-
term nurture” (9). For the woman who has gone through such experiences they prove to 
be critical psychologically. They are times of great emotions signifying life altering 
                                                        
48 Recently we have seen the emergence of a distinctively feminine role in ethics expressed by feminists. 
The most prominent of these feminists is Carol Gilligan and her influential book In a Different Voice: 
Psychological Theory and Women’s Development. Gilligan sets out to counter developmental psychology’s 
privileging of masculine defense of justice and equality (i.e., rules and abstractions) as the highest level of 
moral development by privileging a feminine moral perception rooted in webs of relationships and 
responsibilities. We find Gilligan’s argument for the existence of a feminine moral sense persuasive, but it 
fails to account squarely for the origins of a feminine moral sense. For example, Gilligan’s introduction 
states the following about the intention of her book: 
The different voice I describe is characterized not by gender but theme. Its association with 
women is an empirical observation, and it is primarily through women’s voices that I trace its 
development…. No claims are made about the origins of the difference described or their 
distribution in a wider population, across cultures, or through time. Clearly, these differences arise 
in a social context where factors of social status and power combine with productive biology to 
shape the experience of males and females and the relations between the sexes. (2) 
Surely Gilligan equivocates in discussing the origin of the differences between the sexes because initially 
she says no claims will be made about the origins of the differences, but she goes on to tell us that these 
differences are due to social status, power and biology. In fact, Gilligan’s book accounts for the differences 
between the sexes by the interplay of social status and power only, not biology. Each page of her book 
strenuously argues that women’s moral sense is merely an equal counterpoint to masculine ideals and in no 
way connected to biology. There is a uniquely, feminine moral sense rooted in webs of relationships and 
responsibilities but we feel it originates in the womb and at the breast.           
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choices both on the personal level and societally. Even for the childless women what her 
body represents is a powerful symbol because it is a continuos reminder of her 
unquestionable importance to herself and the community.49 Although a woman may 
experience anxiety about her sexual role and how to perform it, she, nonetheless, takes 
her sexual identity for granted due to its importance and symbolism.50 Gilder’s argument 
is shown to be most insightful when we reflect upon the sexual identity of men in relation 
to their bodies. The male body has no civilizing role inscribed within it. “Masculinity,” 
Gilder exclaims, “is at bottom empty, a limp nullity” [emphasis added] (9). Unlike the 
female body, a man’s body is full of undefined energies in need of the guidance of 
culture. The masculine roles a male assumes are all cultural  inventions, with the roles 
husband and father being the most enduring and productive of inventions for civilized 
life. Even the civilizing role males assume as fathers and husbands emphasize the 
primacy of  women’s sexual identity because men can only define and defend the extant 
of their sexual identities through external activity (i.e., male achievement).     
Because men can only externalize their male identities through activity, women as 
wives are in the unique position of perpetually judging their husbands’ activities. What 
accounts for the wife’s ability to judge her husband’s activity, explains Gilder, is a 
singular, feminine moral sense rooted in caring and intimacy due to the biological basis 
of female sexuality. The feminine moral sense assumes a civilizing role in the guise of 
wife and mother when we turn to the two most enduring cultural constructs available in 
defining male identity, husbands and fathers. The biological bases of men’s sexual 
identity, as we have seen, depends on men proving themselves by doing. Outside of 
marriage the single male has no enduring cultural script to follow, so the constant doing 
                                                        
49 Cf. The discussion and its implications regarding the symbolic significance of femininity found at 
(Alcibiades Major,121b-c) on the length to which both the Spartan and Persian kings are willing to go in 
order to protect the chastity of their queens.  
50 (Hole and Levine, 306) highlight typical female confidence and complacency regarding women’s sexual 
identity.     
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eventually provokes a sense of male dispensability. Men begin to see themselves as 
sexually optional. This sense of dispensability is the impetus that makes young males 
good soldiers, martyrs and crusaders, but undesirables when it comes to marriageability.51 
Upon entering into marriage men must commit to a sense of futurity by adapting to a 
feminine requirement that demands long-term responsibility and discipline. Men must 
perform, and they perform best, and most confidently, when they are in a durable 
relationship with a women (14). Through marriage the limp nullity that characterizes 
masculine sexual identity is transformed; it is “conceived and experienced as having 
specific long-term importance like a woman’s” (14). It is the women’s judgment of a 
particular man, though, that enables the transformation to take place.    
In fatherhood we also see the civilizing role the wife’s moral sense of intimacy 
and caring plays in transforming male sexual identity. It must be emphasized that the role 
of father is the product of marriage and other cultural contrivances, not biology. The fact 
that there is no biological basis for the father to be around when the baby is born attests to 
this fact. Only the mother has an easy and dependable connection to the child (7). She is 
organically indispensable, both physically and emotionally. The father becomes an 
integral part of his child’s life only when the mother acknowledges his paternity, and “his 
position must be maintained by continuous performance, sexual and worldly, with the 
woman the judge” (13).         
Gilder’s discussion of marriage between a man and a women attributes immutable 
qualities to women that are grounded in their bodies. These qualities give rise to a 
uniquely feminine moral sense that is expressed quite vividly in the ability of women in 
marriage and mutatis mutandis the various women in the Spartan and Persian speech, to 
judge male performance. We maintain that the women in Alcibiades Major play the part 
of perpetuating traditional sexual roles (i.e., demanding that Alcibiades be a man of 
                                                        
51 Cf. The discussion of Alcibiades’ sexual exploits and his demise caused by a lady of a noble house 
(Plutarch’s Lives, Vol. 1).  
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excellence who leads the people instead of a politician who slavishly ‘flatters’ [kolax 
120b5] the people, and that Gilder’s contemporary perspective on male and female 
sexuality foregrounds Plato’s sincere, but benign, point that when it comes to male 
achievement, women provide moral insight into what is needed and how best to get there.   
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
 
In its choice of themes, the dissertation’s aim has been to scrutinize the ideas 
expressed in Alcibiades Major from a number of different perspectives. To that end, the 
overarching idea of the dissertation is captured in the dissertation’s title, Socratic 
Encounters: Plato’s Alcibiades. Alcibiades Major is so ripe with philosophical themes 
that, apart from how the themes animate the dialogue, they prove illuminating in other 
contexts, as we have shown. We conclude the dissertation by reflecting briefly on the 
implications of our approach to reading the dialogue this way. 
The main implication of our approach is the challenge it poses to the rumors that 
the ancients are not as relevant as they once were. Two chapters of the dissertation, in 
particular, show the continuing relevance of the dialogue and its timeless insights.    
Chapter Two’s title alone, ‘Listening in Plato’s Alcibiades Major and Plutarch,’ is 
instructive for modernity. What could be more rewarding than learning how to listen 
appropriately in an age that places a premium on quickness? It behooves us to look with 
admiration at the Graeco-roman tradition (first century B.C. through the second century 
A.D.) of reflecting upon listening, and how to benefit morally from what one listens to. 
As we pointed out, Plutarch is only one of many fine writers who composed short 
treatises on listening. Others include Pliny, Seneca, and Epictetus. In this chapter we 
showed the origins and likely consequences of listening inappropriately in Alcibiades 
Major. Its relevance for modernity lies in accounting for Alcibiades’ failure to benefit 
from the Socratic conversation. Although Alcibiades’ dispositions prevented him from 
benefiting from Socrates, the fact that one’s psychological states can affect what one 
hears invites us to consider their causal factors. The chapter offered an answer to such 
concerns. Socrates’ conversation was not simply an intellectual exercise (i.e., analyzing 
arguments) to convince Alcibiades he needed a genuine education. It was also an  attempt 
to moderate Alcibiades’s desires. Socrates’ approach to Alcibiades was, in part, 
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motivated by the assumption that  Alcibiades’ desires (or sentiments) were anterior to his 
reason. If he can alter Alcibiades’ feelings he can alter Alcibiades’ thinking. Socrates 
wagers that if he can get Alcibiades to recognize that his states of envy, excessive 
admiration, and inability to listen actively while engaged in conversation are 
impediments to realizing his ambition, he may be able to convince Alcibiades 
intellectually that his ambition is misdirected. 
Chapter six, ‘Women, Moral Insight and Marriage,’ goes some distance in 
revealing the timelessness of the ancient insight on the relationship between men and 
women illustrated in Alcibiades Major’s Spartan and Persian speech. On first reading the 
speech one is left with the impression that it is a nice, literary excursion in a dialogue 
chronicling the quest for a genuine education by the young Alcibiades, but without 
applicability to modern concerns. In fact, we showed how important and relevant the 
prominent role given to women in the speech by Plato is by comparing it to the role 
feminist thinkers, such as Carol Gilligan, envision women playing in contemporary 
society. For both Plato and Gilligan women  provide moral insight regarding male goals 
and achievement. The difference, of course, between the two is that feminist thinkers tend 
to account for the role women play in male achievement by saying, as Gilligan does, that 
the role is to be seen as a descriptive phenomenon only, which obviates any need to make 
claims about the origins of the role. Plato, on the other hand, locates the difference 
precisely where Gilder locates it in modern society: webs of relationships initiated 
through female specific potentiality that extends through pregnancy, childbirth, lactation, 
suckling, and long-term nurture. The role that women play in male achievement is 
biologically based.  
Despite the biological bases of the role of women in the Spartan and Persian 
Speech, the speech could be read as an introduction to Gilligan’s In a Different Voice. 
They each portray women in the same manner, but from different perspectives. By 
adjoining the Spartan and Persian Speech to In a Different Voice, the former would serve 
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as the mythos and the latter would serve as the logos. The pairing of these two thematic 
tropes would be in keeping with several of Plato’s other dialogues (e.g., Protagoras, 
Hipparchus, Phaedrus) that communicate to its audience on a number of different levels. 
These are just a few examples of how the ideas expressed in Alcibiades Major can 
resonate in the lives of modern readers when broadened to apply in a variety of different 
contexts. The dissertation has shown that the ancients can be a source of inspiration and 
guidance to those who seek it.  
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